Tag: FGS

About the paper

The report argues that 2026 will be shaped by a “rewired” world marked by geopolitical fragmentation, deep public pessimism, widening gaps between elites and citizens, accelerating AI adoption, and increasingly atomised influence systems.

It is a mixed-methods report based on 175 in-depth interviews with senior leaders and policy experts across business, politics, academia and media, combined with nationally representative polling of roughly 20,000 people across the US, Canada, the EU member states, the UK and Japan; public results are averaged across markets with equal weighting by country or bloc.

The report is explicit about scale and broad geography, but does not clearly specify fieldwork dates or detailed polling procedures beyond that summary.

Length: 56 pages

More information / download:
https://fgsglobal.com/radar

Core Insights

1. What is the report’s central argument about the state of the world in 2026?

The core argument is that the world is no longer merely volatile or uncertain; it has been fundamentally “rewired”. The report says the post-war rules-based order is fragmenting, international institutions are weakening, and politics is increasingly driven by strong leaders, national interest and spheres of influence rather than shared values or multilateral norms. It presents this as the defining context for 2026, with the US and China setting the pace and the rest of the world being forced to adapt.

The report also argues that this rewiring is not only geopolitical. It is economic, technological and communicative. Economically, it sees a K-shaped pattern in which gains accrue unevenly, especially to high-income groups and tech-related sectors. Technologically, AI is portrayed as a major driver of practical business change, labour-market disruption and geopolitical competition. Communicatively, influence is becoming atomised, with mainstream media and traditional institutions losing authority while fragmented digital networks and AI-mediated information systems gain power.

For leaders, the implication is that older assumptions about stability, consensus and institutional mediation are no longer dependable. The report’s message is that success in 2026 will depend on combining long-term strategic clarity with the agility to respond to constant disruption.

2. What evidence does the report provide that public pessimism and distrust have reached a critical level?

One of the report’s strongest findings is the depth and breadth of public pessimism across the 27 countries it polled. It says that in all 27 countries, substantial majorities believe the political system is failing ordinary people and needs fundamental reform, that public institutions are wasteful and badly run, that national identity is disappearing, that democracy is weakening, and that life will be harder for the next generation. It adds that 73% say their country feels divided. Denmark is singled out as the only country where one of these pessimistic propositions is not supported by a majority, which underscores how widespread the mood is elsewhere.

The report interprets this as more than routine dissatisfaction. It explicitly says this level of pessimism is not normal and may not be sustainable. It describes a widening gap between elites and the broader public, especially in Europe, Japan and Canada, where confidence in governments and institutions is said to be collapsing. It also notes that even people who dislike Donald Trump may still admire his disruptive capacity to act, because many citizens feel conventional institutions no longer deliver results.

Distrust also extends to information systems. In the stakeholder section, the report says only Denmark and Finland have more people trusting than mistrusting mainstream news media, while 61% overall believe mainstream media have their own agenda and cannot be trusted to report fairly. Politicians are described as the least trusted information source in every country surveyed. That finding strengthens the report’s wider claim that legitimacy is eroding across both politics and media.

3. Which major divides does the report identify, and why do they matter?

The report argues that 2026 will be defined by multiple reinforcing divides rather than one single cleavage. The first is the divide between elite and public opinion. Experts tend to see trade-offs as unavoidable on issues such as taxation, AI governance and business incentives, while the public often believes there are simple solutions if only better leaders were in charge. That gap matters because it creates fertile ground for populism and makes it harder for governments to build support for difficult but realistic policies.

A second divide is between old and young. The report says both generations feel resources are skewed unfairly towards the other, while many experts fear that wealth transfer through inheritance will make success depend more on family assets than enterprise. At the same time, polling suggests younger generations are somewhat more optimistic than older ones in the short term, even though the public overall thinks life will be harder for the next generation. This divide matters because it combines economic frustration with perceptions of intergenerational unfairness.

A third divide is between the engaged and the disengaged. Younger adults are less likely to follow politics and more likely to think voting makes no difference. The report says disengaged people are more likely to distrust others, believe globalisation has gone too far, downplay climate change and believe conspiracy theories. This matters because democratic systems depend on participation and basic confidence in shared reality.

A fourth divide is between the global north and south, especially on climate and development. Experts argue that climate impacts are increasingly tangible in the global south, while economic pressure and populism in the north are pushing climate lower down the agenda. Yet publics in the surveyed democracies broadly oppose sending money overseas for climate or development support. This matters because climate disruption and migration pressures are likely to intensify just as willingness for cross-border solidarity weakens.

4. How does the report portray the outlook for geopolitics, the economy, AI and climate in 2026?

On geopolitics, the report expects 2026 to be shaped by strong leaders and weaker institutions. It presents the US and China as the two dominant powers, with more grey-zone conflict, strategic rivalry in trade and technology, and the rest of the world struggling to align. It says public pessimism is high about both US-China relations and the chances of peace in the Middle East and Ukraine. Europe is portrayed as pivotal but vulnerable: admired for stability, yet anxious about its competitiveness, growth and geopolitical relevance.

On the economy, the report describes “a tale of two economies”. Experts are split between cautious optimists, who think the global economy will muddle through, and pessimists, who believe it is structurally fragile and overdue for correction. The report highlights over-leverage in the West, inflationary pressure, and heavy concentration of value in the “Magnificent 7” tech stocks. At the public level, affordability dominates: inflation and cost of living appear as the most important issue in several major markets, and many people believe growth mainly benefits those already well off.

On AI, the report says the debate has shifted from whether AI will matter to how it will be implemented and with what consequences. Experts expect significant business evolution rather than total revolution, including agentic AI, more conversational models, greater robotisation and practical implementation across functions such as customer service, HR, finance and software development. But both experts and publics are concerned about employment effects: 70% of the public believe AI will destroy more jobs than it creates, and large majorities support stronger regulation and higher taxation of AI companies.

On energy and sustainability, the report argues that current systems are not fit for purpose. Experts think infrastructure, regulation and planning are too slow to support either economic competitiveness or climate goals. Public concern about climate change remains high, but so do concerns about affordability. The report finds that most people support progress towards carbon neutrality at a slower pace to limit financial pain, rather than pushing ahead as fast as possible regardless of price increases.

5. What perspective does the report take on leadership, and what are its main practical implications?

The report clearly adopts a leadership-oriented perspective. It is written for decision-makers in business and politics, and its practical conclusion is that leadership in 2026 requires more than technical competence. Leaders need to understand fragmented realities, operate amid contested legitimacy, and make strategy resilient to volatility rather than built for stability. The report explicitly recommends building a “reality function” to interpret fractured environments, rebuilding strategy around volatility, treating affordability and fairness as non-negotiable constraints, and handling AI as both a capability issue and a social contract issue.

Its assumptions are also visible. The report assumes that institutional weakening, pessimism and fragmentation are durable enough to shape business strategy directly. It assumes that political backlash, distrust and perceived unfairness will increasingly constrain what organisations can do. It also assumes that influence is no longer governed by a stable hierarchy of media, parties and institutions, but by a messy system of competing networks, platforms and AI-shaped information flows.

The final practical message is that leaders must combine strategy, agility, authenticity and storytelling. Strategy matters because organisations need a stable destination. Agility matters because the route will keep changing. Authenticity matters because legitimacy is constantly contested. Storytelling matters because fragmented audiences do not absorb complexity easily, and leaders have to repeat and clarify their message in a crowded, distrustful environment. In that sense, the report is not just a diagnosis of 2026; it is also a guide to the leadership style it believes that environment now demands.

About the paper

The report is a mixed-methods outlook on the political, economic, technological, climate and workplace consequences likely to shape 2025, with a strong emphasis on what those shifts mean for business.

It combines 70 individual depth interviews with senior stakeholders across business, politics, media, finance and academia, conducted in October and November 2024, with a nationally representative UK poll of 2,084 adults fielded from 15–17 November 2024; the primary geographic scope is the UK, although the analysis addresses global developments, especially the US and Europe.

Length: 25 pages

More information / download:
https://a.storyblok.com/f/137553/x/493262557e/fgs-global-radar-2025_the-year-of-consequences.pdf

Core Insights

1. What is the report’s central argument about 2025, and why does it call it “the year of consequences”?

The core claim is that 2025 is not presented as a year of entirely new issues, but as the year in which the consequences of recent political shocks, especially the 2024 election cycle and above all Donald Trump’s return, begin to bite. The report argues that many of the underlying challenges remain the same, but the language, political framing and practical terms of engagement around them are changing. In that sense, 2025 is portrayed as a year of disruption, reframing and forced clarity rather than simple continuity.

The report roots this in a broader anti-incumbent mood across developed Western economies. It argues that falling living standards, inflation and concern over immigration helped drive voters away from established governments. Trump is treated as the most consequential manifestation of that trend, with likely spillover effects across geopolitics, sustainability, AI, business and culture.

At the same time, the report is not wholly apocalyptic. It repeatedly stages a tension between pessimists and pragmatists, or between gloom and opportunity. Its final position is that 2025 will be dangerous and unstable, but that it may also create openings for decision-making, innovation and strategic repositioning. That balanced but business-oriented framing is central to the report’s purpose.

2. How does the report think Trump’s return will reshape the global environment for politics and business?

Trump is the organising force of the report. The authors state bluntly that “2025 will be the year of Trump”, and the expert consensus presented is that he should be taken more seriously this time because he now has more experience, stronger intent and a limited window in which to act. The report expects an early phase of “shock and awe”, including executive action on tariffs, deregulation, immigration and geopolitical positioning.

Economically, the report expects Trump to push tax cuts and deregulation, with many experts anticipating a short-term US boom that could also buoy global dealmaking and M&A. But it also records a counter-view: that tariffs, labour restrictions and fiscal loosening may later fuel inflation and possibly trigger conflict with the Federal Reserve. So the outlook is not one of settled optimism, but of a potentially powerful near-term stimulus coupled with medium-term instability.

Geopolitically, the report suggests Trump’s foreign policy is harder to predict because international order is not seen as his main priority. It outlines fears that support for NATO, Ukraine and multilateral institutions could weaken, while authoritarian states may feel emboldened. It also expects pressure on Ukraine to accept a deal, sympathy towards Netanyahu, and renewed tension around Taiwan. At the same time, some interviewees think Trump’s disruptive style might break deadlock in stalled conflicts. That split between alarm and reluctant pragmatism is one of the report’s recurring patterns.

3. What does the report say about the state of democracy, public trust and mainstream politics, especially in the UK and Europe?

A major theme is that democratic systems are under strain because governments are struggling to bridge the gap between what they promise and what they can actually deliver. The report links this to structural pressures such as debt, ageing populations, infrastructure needs, weak growth and immigration tensions, especially in Europe. It argues that this mismatch is eroding faith in liberal democracy and creating fertile ground for populism.

The UK polling evidence is used to illustrate this erosion. The report says 24% of the UK electorate now believes that voting does not make a difference, while nearly eight in ten voters think they are entitled to expect more from government. Particularly striking is the finding that more than one in five people under 45 agree that the best system for running a country effectively is a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections. The report reads this as a serious warning sign about younger adults’ confidence in democratic delivery.

On the UK specifically, Labour is portrayed as politically dominant but strategically unclear. The report says business and even Labour supporters see a lack of compelling growth narrative, while public confidence is weak: only 13% think the government has a clear and convincing plan for stronger growth, only 11% think it is doing what they hoped, 64% think the UK is in steep decline, and 68% believe Labour will increase their taxes. So the report’s view is that stability of parliamentary control does not equal public confidence or strategic clarity.

4. What picture does the report paint of AI, climate and business opportunity in 2025?

The report treats AI as both transformative and unsettled. It emphasises the extraordinary scale of investment, including a cited $1 trillion being spent on AI data centres, and argues that while many firms are still struggling to turn proof-of-concept work into real competitive advantage, most experts believe the technology will prove genuinely transformative over time. It suggests that the biggest near-term gains may come not from science-fiction breakthroughs, but from practical uses that improve productivity, speed up processes and reduce backlogs in functions such as marketing, communications and public services.

But the public mood is far more divided. The report says opinion splits almost exactly into thirds: those who fear AI could control humans, those who think it will positively transform lives, and those who think it is overhyped. It also notes public scepticism about concrete benefits: only 39% expect positive effects on healthcare and life expectancy, 38% on productivity, and just 17% on their own standard of living, while 50% fear negative effects on job opportunities. The report therefore positions AI as a field where elite and public sentiment have not yet converged.

On climate, the report argues that international diplomacy has weakened, especially because of Trump and the disappointing COP29 outcome, yet it also sees real momentum in the economics of transition. Its key argument is that sustainability will progress less through idealistic global cooperation and more through energy security, cost competitiveness and industrial advantage. In other words, the report believes the climate narrative is shifting from moral exhortation to transactional self-interest.

That argument is reinforced by polling. Majorities believe climate science and think action is necessary, but many also want a slower pace to reduce cost burdens, and 45% say there is little point in costly UK action unless larger countries do more. So the report’s broader conclusion is that both AI and climate will move forward in 2025, but under more pragmatic, contested and economically framed conditions than before.

5. What does the report conclude about workplace culture, generational divides and the implications for business leaders?

The workplace section suggests that culture debates will remain intense, but the report’s own evidence points to a fairly practical hierarchy of employee priorities. In its UK poll, the top three features of an ideal workplace culture are flexible working hours, trust in leadership, and support for employee wellbeing and mental health. That is notable because it places everyday working conditions and leadership credibility above more symbolic or ideological culture-war themes.

The report argues that hybrid work is still durable, but that employers will become more assertive about office attendance, with three-day minimum expectations likely to spread. It also says mental health will become even more strategically important because of its effect on absenteeism, wellbeing and retention. By contrast, DEI remains in place but is expected to be discussed less publicly and in less politicised language, especially in the wake of Trump’s return. The report also finds that DEI-related factors rank relatively low in the public’s list of workplace culture priorities.

Generational differences are another major finding. The report shows sharp age-based divides on asylum, free speech, gender identity, China, EU relations and views of intergenerational fairness. But it also complicates the cliché of a simple youth-versus-age split by showing that preferences are more situational: for example, flexible working matters most to those in mid-career and to women, while views on resilience, authority and fairness vary in more layered ways.

For business leaders, the implication is clear: broad-brush assumptions about “what younger people want” are not enough. The report points instead towards a need for clearer leadership, more explicit explanations of workplace expectations, greater care around employee wellbeing, and more disciplined choices about when companies comment publicly on social or geopolitical issues. Overall, it recommends a more grounded, less performative model of corporate culture.

Overall, the report is best read as a business-facing synthesis of elite interviews and UK public opinion that argues 2025 will be shaped by disruption, reduced ideological certainty and more transactional politics. Its message is that leaders should prepare for volatility, but also for openings created by clearer power structures, technological progress and a more hard-headed operating environment.

About the paper

The report is a mixed-methods outlook study on the political, economic, technological and social forces expected to shape 2024, with a particular focus on implications for business.

It combines 60 stakeholder depth interviews conducted in October and November 2023 with public polling of 2,024 UK adults, weighted to be nationally representative; the geographic scope of the primary data is clearly the UK, even though many of the issues discussed are global.

Length: 23 pages

More information / download:
https://a.storyblok.com/f/137553/x/db3cf37498/fgs-global-radar-report-2024.pdf

Core Insights

1. What is the report’s central argument about 2024, and why does it frame the year as unusually consequential?

The report’s central argument is that 2024 will be defined by volatility, uncertainty, disruption and change, but not in a purely apocalyptic sense: it also presents openings for adaptation, resilience and selective optimism. The authors frame the year as unusually consequential because it combines an exceptional concentration of elections, continuing geopolitical conflicts, economic fragility, climate pressure, AI disruption and changing expectations of business leadership.

The report begins by describing 2024 as a year of “known-unknowns”, with particular emphasis on the fact that more people would be involved in elections than at any other point in human history, and with the US election treated as the most consequential uncertainty. Rather than trying to predict exact outcomes, the study aims to identify the trends and debates that will affect business during the year. That is an important framing choice: this is not a forecasting model, but a strategic interpretation exercise grounded in elite interviews and public opinion data.

Its key findings reinforce that framing. Opinion formers expect uncertainty and turbulence across geopolitics, the economy, culture and the workplace. They see volatility as more likely to intensify than fade. At the same time, they hold a mildly more positive view of the UK’s prospects than the public does, largely because they expect some political stabilisation after the UK general election and some easing in inflation and interest rates. So the report’s core argument is not simply that 2024 will be chaotic, but that business leaders will have to navigate overlapping shocks while distinguishing between background noise and genuinely strategic shifts.

2. Which major risks and uncertainties does the report identify as most important for business leaders?

The report identifies political instability and geopolitics as the most important risk cluster for business leaders. Stakeholders describe political instability as the biggest risk facing business in 2024, driven by major elections, continuing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the growing influence of non-democratic states. The phrase “uncertainty is the new certainty” captures the report’s broader diagnosis: unpredictable external shocks are no longer exceptional but normalised.

Within that broader risk picture, the potential return of Donald Trump is treated as the single most significant political threat. Stakeholders widely believe a Trump victory is a real possibility and fear that a second term would be more unconstrained than the first, with consequences for NATO, Ukraine, global trade and geopolitical stability. Importantly, the report notes that this concern is less about the resilience of the US domestic economy and more about the international effects of American foreign policy and political posture. The public polling echoes this anxiety, with large shares of UK respondents expecting another Trump presidency to destabilise the world and negatively affect their own lives.

The report also highlights immigration as a major source of political polarisation, especially in the UK, Europe and the US. Stakeholders expect it to become an even more contentious election issue, sharpened by climate-related migration pressures and labour-market tensions. This matters for business because immigration is not presented merely as a social issue; it is bound up with economic policy, labour supply, social cohesion and electoral strategy.

Beyond politics, the report emphasises supply-chain vulnerability, energy-price shocks and the strategic consequences of long-running conflict. Several interviewees argue that resilience now matters as much as profit, and that businesses will have to think more seriously about de-risking supply chains. The report stops short of advocating a single economic doctrine, but it clearly suggests that geopolitical risk is now a boardroom issue rather than a distant policy concern.

3. How does the report portray the economic outlook, and where do stakeholder and public perspectives diverge most sharply?

The report portrays the economic outlook as cautiously stable rather than buoyant. Stakeholders broadly expect a middling global year and a mildly positive UK year, shaped by falling inflation, eventual interest-rate cuts and the likelihood of a more stable UK political environment. They do not foresee dramatic economic improvement, but neither do they expect collapse. In that sense, the report’s economic lens is one of guarded pragmatism.

For the UK specifically, stakeholders are relatively bullish. They associate an expected Labour victory with greater predictability, continuity in fiscal policy and a calmer investment environment after years of political turmoil. They also expect inflation and interest rates to decline over the course of 2024, though some note that the timing of monetary easing may be late and its effects delayed. This is not presented as a growth boom, but as a return to something closer to normality.

The sharpest divergence appears between elite and public sentiment. The UK public is markedly more pessimistic than stakeholders, especially on the cost of living, living standards and the broader strength of the economy. The report shows net negative expectations on the cost of living, personal standard of living and the UK economy, even if job security is slightly more resilient. Public pessimism is also intensified by concern that prolonged wars will push up energy prices again. So while stakeholders see scope for stabilisation, the public sees little immediate relief.

That divergence matters because it reveals one of the report’s underlying themes: macro-level improvement does not automatically translate into felt improvement. A steadier political environment and lower inflation may look positive from a policy or business perspective, but ordinary people may still experience stagnation, pressure and distrust. The report therefore suggests that leaders will need to communicate with much greater sensitivity to this gap between institutional optimism and lived economic insecurity.

4. What does the report say about AI, and why does it treat it as both an opportunity and a source of backlash?

The report treats AI as one of the defining contradictions of 2024: it is seen as a potentially transformative engine of productivity and growth, but also as a source of labour disruption, democratic risk and public unease. Stakeholders are generally more optimistic than the public. They expect AI to boost economic growth, unlock gains in medicine and science, and accelerate efficiency. At the same time, they anticipate redundancies in white-collar fields such as customer service, software development and communications, with some even arguing that entry-level roles across many industries are vulnerable.

This combination of optimism and anxiety explains why the report expects backlash. Interviewees warn that AI could be used to distort elections through deepfakes and misinformation, undermining democratic legitimacy during an election-heavy year. They also foresee organised labour resistance, treating the 2023 actors’ strike as an early sign of broader anti-AI mobilisation. The public data supports this: a majority expects increased backlash, including further strikes, and many support faster government regulation to protect against security breaches and misinformation.

Another important point is that the public is less confident and less informed about AI than elite stakeholders. Only a small minority say they are very confident they could explain what AI is, and attitudes differ sharply by age, gender and self-reported tech literacy. Younger people and those more confident in explaining AI are more positive; older respondents and less confident groups are notably more negative. This suggests that public opinion on AI is shaped not just by material risk, but by familiarity and perceived agency.

The report therefore presents AI as a major battleground for 2024, not because it doubts the technology’s momentum, but because it expects a struggle over who benefits, who bears the costs and how regulation should work. That is why it frames the coming debate as not merely technological, but economic, political and social.

5. What broader conclusions does the report draw about climate, corporate purpose and the role of business in society?

The report suggests that businesses are entering 2024 under pressure to become more disciplined, more internally focused and more credible in how they talk about their role in society. On climate, stakeholders agree that the issue is strategically central and that no serious business leader or politician can now deny its importance. Yet they are pessimistic about actual progress towards net zero in 2024, citing weak political will, high investment requirements, election-year caution and unresolved disputes over who pays. The result is a gap between rhetorical commitment and practical momentum.

The public broadly shares the sense that climate change matters, but the report shows limits to public willingness to absorb the cost. That creates a politically difficult environment: there is acknowledgement of urgency, but less agreement on sacrifice. The report’s interpretation is that democratic politics, especially short electoral cycles, favours short-term decisions, whereas climate action demands long-term commitment. This is one of its clearest structural arguments.

On corporate purpose, the report argues that purpose remains important but that its public expression is changing. Many stakeholders believe external purpose messaging has become entangled with accusations of virtue signalling and greenwashing. As a result, they expect companies and CEOs to retreat from broad social commentary and focus more on purpose that is directly relevant to the business and more meaningfully communicated to employees and communities. This is not a rejection of purpose, but a repositioning of it.

The same logic appears in workplace culture. Hybrid working is described as here to stay, though not as a case for full-time remote work becoming universal. Stakeholders and the public both expect flexibility to remain important, and the public wants even more of it. Taken together, the report’s broader conclusion is that businesses in 2024 will need to act with restraint, relevance and credibility: less grandstanding, more internal alignment; less abstract signalling, more evidence and substance.

Overall, the report’s perspective is that business leadership in 2024 will be judged not by confidence alone, but by the ability to operate in a world of overlapping instability while making selective, defensible choices about what to engage in, what to say and how to build trust.