Tag: management

  • IC Index 2026 by Institute of Internal Communication

    IC Index 2026 by Institute of Internal Communication

    About the paper

    The IC Index 2026 report examines the state of internal communication in UK large organisations, focusing on trust, change, leadership, AI, manager communication and employee attention.

    It is original survey research: Ipsos Karian and Box surveyed a representative quota sample of 5,000 UK workers aged 18–75, all working in organisations with 500+ employees, between 15 and 29 January 2026.

    The geographic scope is the UK; the report also includes practitioner reflections from internal communication experts.

    Length: 37 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.ioic.org.uk/insight-practice/ic-index.html

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the IC Index 2026 report?

    The report argues that internal communication has become more strategically important because employees are facing a tougher, more uncertain work environment, while trust, clarity and confidence are weakening. The subtitle — “The reality check” — is apt: the report presents declining communication ratings, falling trust in leaders, weak change communication, limited AI clarity and rising employee time pressure as warning signs for organisations.

    The authors frame internal communication not as a support function, but as a core mechanism for organisational resilience. They argue that internal communicators need to help leaders communicate with clarity, candour and compassion, build two-way communication systems, surface difficult conversations and connect organisational ambitions to employees’ lived reality.

    The report’s most important claim is that internal communication determines whether organisations can manage change, maintain trust and achieve their goals. The conclusion makes this explicit: organisations with dedicated IC teams have stronger strategic alignment, advocacy, information flow and representation, and the authors present this as evidence that internal communication is more critical when trust and change pressures intensify.

    2. What are the main problems the report identifies in the current employee experience?

    The report identifies six headline problems.

    First, employees are experiencing more organisational change but less clarity. More than half report restructuring in the past year, and over a third report redundancies; both are up 12 points compared with 2024. Yet only 49% agree that the reasons behind changes are clearly communicated, down seven points compared with 2023.

    Second, trust in leadership has fallen. The Trust Index is down seven points compared with 2025 and now sits at 58%. Trust in CEOs or most senior leaders and leadership teams has fallen by nine points each. Only half of employees say they trust their CEO or most senior leader, and only half trust the leadership team.

    Third, leaders appear to be overestimating how well they have communicated strategy and AI. Senior leaders are consistently much more positive than non-managers about strategy clarity, belief in strategy and AI communication. For example, 87% of senior leaders say the organisation has been clear on strategy and business priorities, compared with 57% of non-managers.

    Fourth, many employees feel poorly supported through change. Only 42% agree their organisation is good at helping employees adapt to change, while 31% actively disagree. The report links stronger change support to practical actions such as honesty about impacts, listening to employees, providing skills, and clarifying what people need to do differently.

    Fifth, frontline and digitally disconnected employees are less well served. Employees not frequently connected to a computer are more likely to hear about major changes through word of mouth and are less likely to trust leaders or feel psychologically safe.

    Sixth, employees have very little time for internal communication. Most employees spend ten minutes or less per day reading or viewing organisational news and updates, and just over one in five say they spend no or hardly any time at all.

    3. What does the report say drives employee confidence in the future?

    The report treats confidence as a multi-factor “equation”, not simply a product of optimistic messaging. Just under three in five employees — 57% — say they feel confident about the future of their organisation, while one in five actively disagree.

    The strongest driver of confidence is whether work processes allow employees to work efficiently. This is significant because it means confidence is grounded in employees’ day-to-day experience, not only in leadership narratives. Only half of employees agree that their organisation’s work processes allow them to work efficiently.

    The other major drivers are open and honest communication, clarity about strategy and business priorities, belief that AI is being used to solve the right problems, and feeling connected to people beyond one’s immediate team. The report’s implication is that internal communication can influence confidence, but cannot do so credibly if it ignores operational friction, weak processes or unclear AI adoption.

    This is one of the stronger analytical points in the report: employee confidence depends on whether the organisation feels coherent. Employees need to understand where the organisation is going, believe communication is honest, see that AI has a meaningful purpose, and experience work as efficient enough to make the future feel achievable.

    4. How does the report portray the role of leaders and managers?

    The report presents leaders and managers as central to whether communication lands — but also as part of the problem.

    Senior leaders are portrayed as increasingly disconnected from employee perceptions. They are much more likely than non-managers to believe that strategy and AI have been communicated clearly. On AI, for instance, 67% of senior leaders agree that leaders have explained clearly how AI will be used, compared with just 27% of non-managers.

    Managers are presented as the key sense-making layer. Most managers spend some time communicating with their teams each day, but more than half spend 30 minutes or less, and 14% spend less than 15 minutes. This matters because employees often depend on their direct managers to translate organisational messages into team-level meaning.

    The report also shows that manager support is uneven. More than three quarters of managers feel equipped to lead conversations about what is happening across the business, but this has declined compared with 2025 and 2024. Managers who receive training, preparation time or other structured support feel more equipped, while those receiving no support feel least equipped.

    The strongest practical insight is that managers adapting communication to their team context has a large impact. Employees whose managers do this well are far more likely to find communication relevant, rate communication as excellent and recommend their employer as a great place to work.

    5. What are the report’s most important implications for internal communication practice?

    The report’s main implication is that internal communication needs to move further upstream. It should not merely distribute decisions after they have been made; it should help leaders understand employee reality before, during and after change.

    For change communication, the report suggests that IC teams need to push for early, honest, jargon-free communication; clear rationale; regular updates; routes for questions; and visible listening. The evidence shows that employees are more positive when organisations explain the reasons for change, listen to views and clarify what people need to do differently.

    For leadership communication, the implication is that trust cannot be rebuilt through messaging alone. Leaders need visibility, openness, empathy and evidence that they understand employee challenges. The report connects falling trust especially to CEOs and senior leadership teams, making leadership communication a strategic risk area rather than a stylistic concern.

    For AI communication, the report implies that organisations are under-communicating the purpose and practical expectations of AI adoption. Only 35% believe their organisation is using AI to solve the right problems, and only 32% say their employer has clearly communicated how they are expected to use AI as part of their job.

    For channels and content, the report’s implication is that relevance is now existential. Employees have little time, and 56% say employer communications feel relevant. The report points towards personalisation, segmentation and opt-in/opt-out models, while also warning that these require good audience data and a serious channel strategy.

    Finally, the report argues that representation and good-news communication matter more than many organisations may assume. Only 42% see stories about people like them in internal communications, yet those who do are much more likely to be advocates and to trust the organisation. Similarly, good news is not merely “nice to know”: effective communication of good news has a stronger impact on advocacy and overall communication ratings than effective communication of bad news.

  • 2026 Work Trend Index by Microsoft

    2026 Work Trend Index by Microsoft

    About the paper

    Microsoft’s 2026 Work Trend Index Annual Report examines how A.I. agents are changing work, arguing that as agents take on more execution, human agency shifts towards intent-setting, judgement, orchestration and accountability.

    It is a mixed-methods report based on Microsoft 365 telemetry, a 20,000-person online survey of A.I.-using knowledge workers across 10 markets, a separate 1,800-person global survey on managers and agentic A.I., and expert perspectives; the main survey covers Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.

    Length: 29 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/worklab/work-trend-index/agents-human-agency-and-the-opportunity-for-every-organization

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report’s central argument is that AI and agents are not merely productivity tools; they are forcing a redesign of the operating model of work. Microsoft frames this as a shift in which agents take on more execution, while humans gain more “agency”: more capacity to define intent, direct work, exercise judgement and own outcomes.

    The report is explicit that the key question is no longer simply whether organisations are adopting AI. The larger question is whether they are structurally capable of capturing its value. Its thesis is that many workers are already using AI in advanced and resourceful ways, but their organisations have not yet redesigned the surrounding systems — leadership alignment, incentives, governance, performance evaluation, culture and management practices — to match what AI now makes possible.

    A useful way to express the report’s logic is this: AI raises individual capability, but organisational design determines whether that capability becomes institutional advantage. The report repeatedly contrasts “AI adoption” with “AI absorption”. Adoption means people or teams use tools. Absorption means the organisation changes how work is designed, evaluated, governed, learned from and scaled.

    This is why the report’s three-part structure matters. At the employee level, AI expands what individuals can do. At the leader level, the task becomes rearchitecting work rather than simply deploying tools. At the organisational level, the most advanced firms become “Learning Systems” that capture lessons from AI-enabled work and turn them into repeatable practices.

    2. How does AI change the role and value of individual employees?

    The report argues that AI lifts the ceiling on individual potential by helping people do more complex, higher-value work. In Microsoft’s privacy-preserving analysis of more than 100,000 Microsoft 365 Copilot chats, 49% of classified conversations supported cognitive work such as analysing information, solving problems, evaluating and thinking creatively. The rest were split between working with people, finding information and producing work.

    Survey findings reinforce this. According to the report, 66% of AI users say AI has allowed them to spend more time on high-value work, and 58% say they are producing work they could not have produced a year earlier. Among “Frontier Professionals” — the most advanced AI users in the research — that latter figure rises to 80%.

    However, the report does not present this as simple automation. Its stronger claim is that human value moves. As AI takes on more execution, the employee’s differentiating contribution becomes judgement, quality control, critical thinking, intent-setting and the design of the human-AI workflow. The report says AI users themselves recognise this: 50% name quality control of AI output as an increasingly important human skill, while 46% name critical thinking. A striking 86% say they treat AI output as a starting point, not a final answer, and that they remain responsible for the thinking.

    The report’s page 9 framework is particularly useful. It describes four modes of working with AI: asking, delegation, collaboration and exploration. The key point is not that one mode is superior. The most advanced users know which mode a task requires. Quick factual queries may be “asking”; recurring reports or structured summaries may be “delegation”; proposals and judgement-heavy communication may require “collaboration”; and unfamiliar workflows may call for “exploration”. This is an important conceptual distinction because it moves the discussion beyond “prompting” towards work design.

    3. What is the “Transformation Paradox” identified by the report?

    The “Transformation Paradox” is the report’s term for the gap between workers’ AI readiness and organisations’ ability to support it. Microsoft maps respondents across two dimensions: individual AI capability and organisational readiness. The result is a five-zone model.

    Only 19% of AI users fall into the “Frontier” zone, where both individual capability and organisational readiness are high. Another 10% are in “blocked agency”: they have strong individual AI capability, but their organisations are not ready to support or absorb it. A further 5% represent “unclaimed capacity”, where the organisation is more ready than the individual. Sixteen per cent are “stalled”, with both low individual capability and low organisational readiness. The largest group, 50%, sits in the “emergent” zone, where both individual practice and organisational conditions are still forming.

    The paradox is that the pressure to use AI is rising, but the organisational systems still reward old ways of working. The report says 65% of AI users fear falling behind if they do not adapt quickly with AI, yet 45% say it feels safer to focus on current goals than to redesign work with AI. Only 13% say they are rewarded for reinventing work with AI even when results are not immediately achieved.

    This is one of the report’s most important findings because it reframes AI transformation as a management and systems problem. The obstacle is not simply lack of tools or lack of individual skill. It is the mismatch between what employees are capable of doing and what their organisations measure, encourage, permit and reward.

    4. What role does leadership play in turning AI use into organisational value?

    The report places substantial responsibility on leaders and managers. It argues that the job of every leader is now to “rearchitect work” — not just introduce AI tools, but redesign workflows, roles, incentives, metrics, governance and expectations around what humans and agents should each do.

    Leadership alignment appears to be weak. Only 26% of AI users say their leadership is clearly and consistently aligned on AI. The report also finds a perception gap between leaders and employees: leaders are more likely than employees to say AI-driven reinvention feels safe and rewarded. That suggests that senior leaders may believe the organisation is more supportive of AI transformation than employees experience in practice.

    Managers are presented as especially important because they translate strategy into everyday behaviour. A separate Microsoft-led study of 1,800 employees globally found that when managers actively model AI use, employees report a 17-point lift in AI value, a 22-point lift in critical thinking about AI use and a 30-point lift in trust in agentic AI. When managers create psychological safety around experimentation, employees report higher AI readiness and value, and are more likely to be high-frequency users of agentic AI.

    The report also shows that Frontier Professionals tend to work in stronger managerial environments. Compared with non-Frontier Professionals, they are more likely to say their manager openly uses AI, sets quality standards for AI-assisted work, creates space for experimentation and encourages more ambitious work redesign. This supports the report’s broader argument: individual AI skill matters, but it compounds only when leaders create the right organisational conditions.

    5. What does the report mean by saying every firm must become a “Learning System”?

    The report uses “Learning System” to describe an organisation that captures what AI-enabled work is teaching it and turns those insights into shared, repeatable and improving practices. This is the report’s organisational endgame: the firms that win are not simply those with the most AI tools, but those that learn fastest from their own work.

    The evidence behind this claim comes from Microsoft’s AI Impact Analysis. The report finds that organisational factors — culture, manager support and talent practices — account for more than twice the reported AI impact of individual mindset and behaviour: 67% versus 32%. The top single factor is organisational AI culture, followed by talent practices and manager support. The methodology is careful to state that these are statistical associations, not causal effects, because the variables are self-reported at the same moment.

    The report argues that as agents become more active, they generate valuable signals: what worked, what failed, where quality drifted, which hand-offs broke down and where workflows need redesign. In weaker organisations, these signals stay local. In stronger ones, they are captured, shared and encoded into routines. This is what Microsoft calls “Owned Intelligence”: institutional know-how that compounds over time, is specific to the firm and is difficult for competitors to copy.

    The report identifies three questions every advanced organisation must answer:

    1. who reviews agent performance
    2. who has authority to update agent workflows
    3. and how local wins are captured and scaled.

    It also argues that this requires coordination across four roles: employees who redesign their work around intent and review; leaders who redesign processes around outcomes and agent autonomy; IT teams that manage agents as entities with identities, permissions and lifecycle controls; and security teams that build monitoring, auditability and policy enforcement into the system.

    The implication is clear: AI transformation is not finished when employees start using AI. It becomes strategically meaningful only when the organisation builds the infrastructure to learn from AI-enabled work, codify that learning and continuously improve how humans and agents work together.

  • Want RoI from A.I.? Go for growth by PwC

    Want RoI from A.I.? Go for growth by PwC

    About the paper

    PwC’s AI performance study examines why some large companies generate measurable ROI from AI while others remain stuck in pilot activity.

    It is original proprietary survey research based on 1,217 senior executives, all director-level or above, across 25 sectors and across Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North America and South America; fieldwork took place in October and November 2025.

    The sample is heavily weighted towards large publicly listed companies: 91% were publicly listed and 76% had revenue of US$1 billion or more.

    Length: 30 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/technology/ai-performance/want-ai-roi-go-for-growth.html#the-takeaways

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that AI ROI is not mainly a function of how many AI pilots a company launches. It comes from what PwC calls “AI fitness”: the ability to aim AI at important business outcomes, build the foundations that make AI scalable and reliable, and embed AI deeply across the enterprise.

    PwC’s headline finding is that the most AI-fit companies achieve AI-driven financial performance that is 7.2 times higher than other companies. The study defines this performance as revenue and efficiency gains attributable to AI, adjusted against sector medians. According to the report, 20% of the surveyed companies capture 74% of AI-driven returns, showing that value is highly concentrated among a relatively small group of leaders.

    The core message is therefore: companies should stop counting pilots and start building the organisational machinery that turns AI activity into measurable business impact. The strongest performers treat AI not as a tool for scattered productivity gains, but as a reinvention engine that can reshape products, business models, operating models and competitive positioning.

    2. What does PwC mean by “AI fitness”?

    PwC defines AI fitness as a combination of six foundational capabilities and three measures of AI use.

    The six foundations are:

    1. Innovation — dedicated infrastructure, business-unit ownership and disciplined portfolio reviews.
    2. Governance and risk — Responsible AI frameworks, access controls, compliance processes and oversight bodies.
    3. Data and technology — modern platforms, trusted data, reusable components and redesigned workflows.
    4. Strategy — a clear connection between AI deployment and corporate strategy.
    5. Investment — sufficient funding and the ability to reallocate resources as priorities shift.
    6. Workforce — skills, incentives, collaboration models and trust in AI-generated insights.

    The three measures of AI use are:

    1. Breadth and depth — how widely AI is used across the value chain and how deeply it is embedded into workflows.
    2. Sophistication — whether AI is used merely to assist and summarise, or whether it executes tasks, operates within guard rails or becomes autonomous.
    3. Capturing value from industry convergence — whether AI helps the company identify and exploit new value pools across traditional sector boundaries.

    The important point is that PwC does not define AI leadership as “using more AI” in a generic sense. Leadership comes from combining AI use with the organisational conditions that make AI repeatable, trusted and commercially meaningful.

    3. Why does the report say companies should aim AI at growth and reinvention, not just efficiency?

    The report acknowledges that many companies use AI to improve efficiency: faster claims processing, code generation, customer support automation, productivity improvements and cost reduction. But PwC argues that the biggest returns come when AI changes what the company sells, how it creates value and where it competes.

    AI leaders are 2.6 times as likely as other companies to say AI has improved their ability to reinvent their business model. They are also more likely to use AI to identify emerging value pools, respond to changing customer needs, collaborate across sectors and compete outside their traditional industry boundaries.

    The strongest individual AI fitness factor in the study is the ability to capture growth from industry convergence. PwC’s logic is that AI allows companies to detect and act on new combinations of customer needs, data, services and partnerships that cut across old sector lines.

    The John Deere example illustrates this argument. The company used AI-powered precision spraying not simply to make an existing machine smarter, but to support a more service-like model linked to verified outcomes. According to the report, See & Spray was used on more than 1 million acres in the 2024 growing season and saved an estimated 8 million gallons of herbicide mix, while also positioning John Deere for recurring services revenue rather than one-off hardware differentiation.

    4. What foundations do AI leaders build differently from other companies?

    PwC’s argument is that foundations matter because they improve the “conversion rate” from AI use to measurable results. Companies with stronger foundations reportedly see nearly double the improvement in AI-driven performance when they increase AI use, compared with companies with weaker foundations.

    The report highlights five especially important foundation-building practices.

    First, AI leaders fund and flex the portfolio like investors. They invest materially more in AI — PwC says leaders invest 2.5 times as much of revenue as other companies — and they are better at reallocating financial and human resources towards higher-value AI opportunities.

    Second, they create infrastructure for innovation. They are more likely to provide sandbox environments and dedicated technical infrastructure for experimentation, and more likely to place accountable innovation owners inside business units.

    Third, they build workforce trust. Employees in AI-leading organisations are 2.1 times as likely to trust AI-generated insights and act on them in daily decisions. The report links this trust to cross-functional co-creation, role-based learning, incentives to experiment and clear guard rails.

    Fourth, they use governance to accelerate rather than obstruct. Leaders are more likely to have a documented Responsible AI framework and a cross-functional governance board, but the report frames governance as a way to move routine use cases faster while escalating only higher-risk cases.

    Fifth, they remove data and technology friction. AI leaders are much more likely to have reusable centrally catalogued AI components, high-quality accessible data, modern cloud-based platforms, and redesigned workflows that incorporate AI rather than merely adding AI tools on top of existing processes.

    The overall message is pragmatic: companies should not try to modernise everything at once. They should build only the foundations needed to scale the AI initiatives most closely tied to strategic outcomes.

    5. What are the report’s main implications for executives?

    The main implication is that executives need to move from an “AI activity” mindset to an “AI performance” mindset.

    PwC repeatedly warns against treating AI pilots as proof of progress. The report suggests that many companies have visible AI activity but little evidence of revenue growth, cost reduction, better decisions or improved customer outcomes. The practical challenge is therefore to connect AI to specific business objectives, measure impact, and stop or scale initiatives based on evidence.

    The report’s recommended executive agenda has four parts.

    First, aim AI at strategic value, especially growth, reinvention and industry convergence, rather than only internal productivity.

    Second, assign ownership and metrics. Every important AI initiative should have a business owner, success measures and accountability for outcomes.

    Third, industrialise what works. Companies should take proven use cases and replicate them across functions, regions, workflows and decision points, rather than leaving value trapped in isolated pockets.

    Fourth, move carefully towards greater autonomy. PwC argues that automation of routine, high-frequency decisions is strongly linked to AI-driven performance, but it should happen within explicit guard rails, with decision quality measured and trust thresholds met before expansion.

    The conclusion is that AI advantage may compound. The leading companies are learning faster, redeploying solutions faster and safely automating more decisions. For laggards, the risk is not just missing short-term efficiency gains, but falling behind as AI-fit competitors turn their foundations into a widening performance premium.

  • State of the Global Workplace 2026 by Gallup

    State of the Global Workplace 2026 by Gallup

    About the paper

    The paper examines employee engagement, wellbeing, daily emotions, job-market sentiment and the human side of AI adoption, arguing that management quality is a decisive factor in whether AI translates into organisational value.

    It is an original survey-based research report built primarily on Gallup World Poll data, supplemented by additional random U.S. workforce web samples; the report draws on 263,810 respondents in 2025, including 141,444 employed adults, and on a full 2009–2025 trend base of 5,754,327 respondents, covering more than 160 countries and areas worldwide.

    Length: 251 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.gallup.com/workplace/349484/state-of-the-global-workplace.aspx

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the global workplace in 2026?

    The report’s central argument is that the workplace challenge is not simply technological change, but whether organisations are managed well enough to convert change into performance. Gallup explicitly frames the report around “the human side of the AI revolution” and says the manager is the strongest predictor of employee AI adoption apart from technical integration. In other words, the report treats management effectiveness, employee engagement and organisational readiness as the real bottlenecks in turning AI into measurable gains.

    That argument rests on a broader point: workplaces are entering the AI era while employee engagement is weakening rather than strengthening. Global engagement fell again in 2025, to 20%, its lowest level since 2020, and Gallup argues this matters because engagement is a practical indicator of readiness for disruption and change. Low engagement, in this framing, is not just a morale issue but an economic and strategic one.

    2. What are the report’s most important global findings on engagement, wellbeing, emotions and the job market?

    The most striking headline is that global employee engagement declined for a second consecutive year, falling to 20% in 2025 from a 2022 peak of 23%. At the same time, 64% of employees are classified as not engaged and 16% as actively disengaged. Gallup estimates that low engagement cost the global economy about $10 trillion in lost productivity, or 9% of global GDP.

    By contrast, wellbeing improved slightly. Global thriving rose from 33% to 34% in 2025, the first improvement in three years. But that modest recovery sits alongside persistently high negative emotions: 40% reported stress, 22% anger, 23% sadness and 22% loneliness. The report makes clear that these emotional burdens remain above pre-pandemic levels, suggesting that the workplace has not returned to its earlier psychological baseline.

    Job-market sentiment also improved, but only slightly. Globally, 52% of employees said it was a good time to find a job, up one point from the previous year, though still below the 2019 peak. So the overall picture is mixed: modest improvement in wellbeing and job confidence, but continued weakness in engagement and continued elevation in emotional strain.

    3. Why does Gallup place so much emphasis on managers?

    Gallup’s answer is that the recent global deterioration in engagement is largely a management story. The report says lower engagement among managers accounts for most of the recent downturn, and manager engagement has dropped by nine points since 2022. On the chart on page 7, managers fall from 31% engaged in 2022 to 22% in 2025, while non-managers move only marginally, from 20% to 19%. That is a significant loss of what Gallup calls the former “engagement premium” of being a manager.

    The report also argues that managers are pivotal to meaningful AI adoption. In Gallup’s Q1 2026 U.S. workforce survey, the top two drivers of frequent AI use are integration with existing systems and manager-led adoption. Employees in AI-investing organisations who strongly agree that their manager actively supports AI are 98.7 times as likely to strongly agree that AI has transformed how work gets done, and 97.4 times as likely to strongly agree that AI gives them more opportunities to do what they do best every day.

    Gallup’s perspective is therefore not that AI will bypass human leadership, but almost the reverse: the better the management layer, the more likely AI is to become valuable. The report even suggests AI could improve global engagement if it helps managers apply stronger people-management practices more consistently.

    4. What patterns does the report reveal across regions, and what do they imply?

    The regional data show a world that is far from uniform. On engagement, the United States and Canada rank first at 31%, followed closely by Latin America and the Caribbean at 30%, while Europe ranks last at just 12%. That makes Europe the lowest-engagement region globally despite relatively strong life evaluation and job-climate scores. This suggests that a region can look comparatively strong on broader life outlook without generating much attachment to work itself.

    On wellbeing, Latin America and the Caribbean lead at 56% thriving, closely followed by Australia and New Zealand at 55%, whereas South Asia is lowest at 16%. On job climate, Southeast Asia leads at 64%, while the Middle East and North Africa is lowest at 36%. The United States and Canada stand out for a sharp deterioration in job confidence, dropping 10 points year on year to 47%, making the region second-to-last on that measure.

    Emotionally, the picture is equally uneven. South Asia has the highest anger and sadness, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia the highest loneliness, while Post-Soviet Eurasia records the lowest stress. The report’s implication is that there is no single global workplace condition. Instead, different regions combine engagement, wellbeing, stress and job optimism in distinct ways, which matters for both management practice and interpretation.

    5. What does the report suggest about AI, jobs and the future of work?

    Gallup presents AI as a force that is already boosting individual productivity for many workers but has not yet reliably produced organisation-level gains. The report notes that in U.S. organisations that have implemented AI, 65% of workers say AI has had a somewhat or extremely positive effect on their productivity, yet only 12% strongly agree that AI has transformed how work gets done in their organisation. This gap between personal efficiency and institutional transformation is one of the report’s core tensions.

    The report also shows rising concern about AI-related job loss. In Q1 2026, 18% of U.S. employees said it was somewhat or very likely their job would be eliminated within five years because of technological innovation, rising to 23% in organisations where AI had been implemented. In finance, insurance and technology, the figures are higher still. At the same time, Gallup says the employment effects are not uniformly negative: larger AI-implementing employers are more likely to be reducing headcount, while smaller ones are more likely to be expanding.

    The broader conclusion is that AI is reconfiguring work, but outcomes depend heavily on context, especially leadership, workforce choice and upskilling. Gallup repeatedly links optimism and wellbeing to employees feeling they have choices in the work they do. So the report’s future-of-work message is not deterministic. AI may intensify pressure, flatten structures and increase job anxiety, but it may also improve management and expand capability, depending on how organisations lead the transition.

  • Global Connectedness Report 2026 by DHL and NYU Stern

    Global Connectedness Report 2026 by DHL and NYU Stern

    About the paper

    The paper is a data-driven globalization report by Steven A. Altman and Caroline R. Bastian of NYU Stern, produced in partnership with DHL.

    It is not survey-based; it is a secondary-analysis and index report using more than 9 million country-to-country data points on trade, capital, information and people flows, ranking 180 countries globally.

    Its geographic scope is worldwide, with country profiles and regional analysis across major world regions.

    Length: 320 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.dhl.com/global-en/microsites/core/global-connectedness/report.html

    Core Insights

    1. Is globalization actually reversing, or is the report arguing that deglobalization is overstated?

    The report’s central argument is that deglobalization is overstated. It does not deny that geopolitical risk, tariffs, war, policy volatility and public scepticism have increased. But it argues that the actual data on cross-border flows do not show a broad retreat from international to domestic activity.

    The DHL Global Connectedness Index reached a record high in 2022 and has remained broadly stable through 2025. The report’s key measure of “depth” — international activity relative to domestic activity — sits at around 25%. That means globalization is historically high, but still limited: the world is far from “hyperglobalized”. Most economic and human activity still happens within countries rather than across borders.

    This distinction is central to the report’s logic. The authors are not saying that globalization is smooth, frictionless or politically uncontested. They are saying that globalization is being reshaped rather than reversed. The world is more volatile, but not meaningfully less connected.

    2. What evidence does the report give that global flows remain resilient?

    The report examines four broad types of flows: trade, capital, information and people.

    On trade, the report finds that goods trade grew faster in 2025 than in any year since 2017, excluding the post-Covid rebound. Part of this was driven by U.S. importers front-loading goods before tariff increases, but China’s exports to non-U.S. markets and AI infrastructure investment also supported growth. AI-related goods reportedly accounted for a large share of goods trade growth in the first three quarters of 2025.

    On capital, the picture is more mixed, but not one of retreat. Foreign direct investment and M&A activity remain broadly in line with historical patterns, even though greenfield FDI announcements weakened in some areas. The report emphasises that companies continue to invest abroad and that multinational firms still conduct close to record shares of activity outside their home markets.

    On information, the report is more cautious. Information flows have been the fastest-growing part of globalization over the past two decades, but some indicators have plateaued or weakened since 2021. International patenting has slowed, scientific collaboration has declined slightly, and cross-border intellectual property flows have eased. The report suggests that geopolitical tensions and data restrictions may now be constraining this part of globalization.

    On people, the report finds that international travel has recovered from the Covid-19 collapse, while international student mobility and migration remain on longer-term rising trends. However, people flows remain the least globalized category: only a small share of the world’s population lives outside its country of birth.

    3. How serious is geopolitical fragmentation, especially between the U.S., China and Russia?

    The report treats geopolitical fragmentation as a real risk, but argues that its global effects remain limited so far.

    The clearest evidence of fragmentation is in U.S.–China ties. Since 2016, the share of U.S. trade, capital, information and people flows involving China has fallen substantially, while China’s share involving the U.S. has also declined. Direct U.S. imports from China fell from a peak of 22% in 2017 to 13% in 2024, and then to 9% during the first three quarters of 2025.

    However, the report adds an important complication: the U.S. has not necessarily reduced its underlying reliance on Chinese content. Goods imported from third countries may still contain Chinese inputs. When looking at direct and indirect China-origin content, the report says there is no clear evidence of a major decline in U.S. reliance on goods from China through 2024.

    Russia is the more dramatic case. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s flows with the EU have collapsed across trade, investment, information and people flows. Russia’s exports have become less diversified and more dependent on a few destinations such as China, India and Türkiye.

    But the report’s broader conclusion is that these cases do not amount to a global split into rival blocs. Only a small share of global trade and investment has shifted away from geopolitical rivals. Most international business already takes place among friendly or neutral countries, which limits the likely impact of “de-risking” on globalization as a whole.

    4. Is globalization being replaced by regionalization or nearshoring?

    The report’s answer is: not yet, at least not in the data.

    Despite widespread discussion of nearshoring, friendshoring and regional supply chains, the report finds that many international flows are crossing longer, not shorter, distances. The average distance traversed by flows in the DHL Global Connectedness Index reached a record high in 2024. Goods trade and greenfield FDI crossed record average distances in 2025.

    This directly challenges the idea that globalization is giving way to regionalization. If international activity were becoming more regional, the average distance covered by flows should be falling. Instead, the report finds the opposite for several major flow types.

    That said, the report does not dismiss regionalization entirely. It notes that many governments and companies are interested in nearshoring and supply-chain resilience, and that such changes can take years to implement. It also acknowledges that international flows are already highly regionalized: roughly half of global trade, capital, information and people flows occur within major world regions. The report’s point is not that regionalization is irrelevant, but that there is not yet robust evidence of a major new shift from global to regional patterns.

    5. Which countries are most globally connected, and what does that reveal about globalization?

    Singapore ranks as the world’s most globally connected country, followed by Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Hong Kong SAR, the United Arab Emirates, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Denmark.

    The report distinguishes between two dimensions of connectedness: depth and breadth. Depth measures the size of international flows relative to domestic activity. Breadth measures how widely a country’s flows are distributed across the world.

    Small, wealthy economies tend to score highly on depth because their domestic markets are limited and they rely heavily on cross-border trade, capital, people and information flows. That explains the strong performance of places such as Singapore, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Ireland and the UAE.

    Larger economies often score higher on breadth than depth. The United Kingdom ranks first on breadth, followed by the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Israel, France, Italy, Germany, Japan and Australia. These countries have flows that reach widely across the world, but their large domestic economies mean that international activity can still represent a smaller share of total activity.

    This country-level analysis reinforces one of the report’s core themes: globalization is uneven. Some countries are deeply and broadly connected, while others remain peripheral. Wealth, peace and security, openness, regional integration, infrastructure and domestic business conditions all shape how connected a country becomes.

  • Leading at the Intersections 2026 by Weber Shandwick

    Leading at the Intersections 2026 by Weber Shandwick

    About the paper

    Weber Shandwick’s Leading at the Intersections 2026 is a short corporate affairs trends report about the strategic shifts reshaping modern corporate affairs, especially in the U.S. and for U.S. multinationals.

    It is primarily an expert commentary / advisory perspective, with one referenced survey of Fortune 1000 communications and corporate affairs executives conducted by Weber Advisory and Gravity Research; the sample size, fieldwork method and timeframe are not clearly specified in the report.

    The geographic focus is mainly the United States, with some attention to global stakeholder expectations around U.S. companies abroad.

    Length: 13 pages

    More information / download:
    https://webershandwick.com/news/the-five-shifts-redefining-the-c-suite-agenda-in-2026

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that corporate affairs leaders are now operating “at the intersections” of several forms of disruption:

    • geoeconomic instability
    • polarised U.S. politics
    • reputational volatility
    • AI-driven transformation
    • workforce anxiety
    • cultural fragmentation
    • and changing expectations around responsible business.

    Its core message is that corporate affairs can no longer be treated as a reactive communications function. The authors frame it as a strategic leadership capability that must help organisations make sense of complexity, protect licence to operate, create stakeholder value and support business resilience.

    The report’s strongest underlying assumption is that the operating environment has become too volatile for narrow, bottom-line-only communication. Companies need to understand how business value, stakeholder expectations, culture, politics, technology and social impact now interact. In that sense, the report positions modern corporate affairs as a form of integrated strategic intelligence.

    2. How does the report suggest companies should think about value in a time of disruption?

    The report warns that in uncertain times, leaders may be tempted to focus narrowly on economic value and the bottom line. Weber Shandwick argues the opposite: disruption is precisely when companies need to broaden their understanding of value.

    It identifies several value dimensions beyond financial performance:

    • functional value
    • emotional value
    • and societal value.

    The point is not that profit becomes irrelevant, but that companies’ licence to operate depends on more than profit. Trust, relevance, purpose, stakeholder relationships and perceived contribution to society all become part of the value equation.

    The report links this especially to the 2026 U.S. midterm environment. Affordability, cost of living, inequality, trade, healthcare, housing, immigration and AI regulation are all described as issues shaping public expectations. In this environment, companies face reputational risk if they are seen as detached from ordinary stakeholder concerns.

    One particularly useful insight is that “corporate speak” is no longer neutral. The report frames over-polished, generic language as a credibility risk. Companies are advised to communicate with more emotion, empathy and candour — not as a stylistic preference, but as a trust-building necessity.

    3. What new expectations does the report identify for corporate diplomacy?

    The report argues that U.S. multinationals will be pushed into more explicit forms of corporate diplomacy in 2026. The key issue is that foreign stakeholders may increasingly expect U.S. companies to show that they are not simply proxies for U.S. foreign policy.

    This is an important distinction. The report suggests that U.S. brands have, so far, retained some independence from declining perceptions of U.S. political leadership. But that separation may become harder to maintain if U.S. government actions become more confrontational or less aligned with international norms.

    Three expectations stand out. First, companies must demonstrate local accountability: where decisions are made, how local interests are protected and which commitments endure despite political shifts in Washington. Second, they need deeper local relationships across government, business and civil society, because these relationships become a form of reputational defence. Third, executives may need to speak more visibly and carefully abroad, because silence can increasingly be interpreted as alignment.

    The report also connects this to B2G strategy in an “America First” context. For tech companies in particular, it recommends local storytelling around outcomes governments already care about: workforce upskilling, manufacturing, energy resilience, defence readiness and public-sector efficiency.

    4. Why does the report treat cultural intelligence as a leadership capability?

    The report presents cultural intelligence as a core leadership currency because companies are increasingly pressured to respond to cultural flashpoints in real time. Digital discourse, ideological polarisation, influencer dynamics, bots and platform algorithms all make it harder for organisations to remain silent or generic without others filling in the blanks.

    The report’s argument is not that companies should comment on everything. Rather, leaders need to know their organisation’s “true north” and make sharper decisions about when to engage, how to engage and when not to engage. Cultural intelligence is therefore both an external sensing capability and an internal decision-making discipline.

    The report highlights three ways to build cultural adaptation fluency. Companies should internalise organisational values so they function as an operating system rather than decorative statements. They should dig deeper into the “why” behind cultural signals, not just track what is trending. And they should make scenario planning a routine practice, using AI and other tools to anticipate how cultural communities and influencers may react.

    A useful nuance here is the distinction between audiences and algorithms. The report notes that meaning still comes from human belief, but reach is shaped by platforms. Leaders therefore need to design communication for both human interpretation and algorithmic circulation.

    5. What implications does the report draw for responsible business and AI transformation?

    The report argues that responsible business is not disappearing, even if the language around ESG, sustainability or social impact changes for political and practical reasons. The fundamentals remain important because companies still need to balance material business pressures, stakeholder tensions and reputational risk.

    Three responsible business challenges are highlighted.

    1. First, companies must define the future of human work as AI integration accelerates. Stakeholders will expect human-first integration plans, workforce readiness and credible opportunities for future talent.
    2. Second, the report argues that climate action is becoming more fragmented because coordinated multilateral action is weakening, while “China First” green tech and “America First” energy politics reshape the context.
    3. Third, companies must separate values from “vibes”: in a fragmented information environment, responsibility strategies must be anchored in the business model rather than broad, consensus-seeking purpose claims.

    On AI, the report’s position is pragmatic rather than utopian. AI transformation is treated as unavoidable, but the authors warn against simplistic winner/loser narratives. Companies need a transformation narrative that proves the business case while addressing the human side of change.

    The report identifies three AI-related communication challenges:

    • real-time stakeholder insight
    • machine readability intelligence
    • and human-centred generative creativity.

    The most distinctive point is “machine readability”: companies now need to understand how they appear in AI search and AI-generated summaries, which sources shape those outputs, and how to correct misinformation or poor representations.

    The final message is: be AI-enabled, not AI-enthralled. For B2B marketing in particular, AI should not replace the entire martech stack or become a reason to defund other vital technologies. The stronger argument is for deliberate integration: clear use cases, regulatory awareness, privacy safeguards and attention to workforce impact.

  • Global Foresight 2036 by the Atlantic Council

    Global Foresight 2036 by the Atlantic Council

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods strategic foresight publication from the Atlantic Council that combines original survey research, expert commentary, six “snow leopard” horizon-scanning essays, and a shorter AI discussion section.

    Its core empirical base is the organisation’s fourth annual survey of 447 geostrategists and foresight practitioners from 72 countries, fielded in November and December 2025; the respondent pool is global, though roughly half are US citizens and the sample is drawn from the Atlantic Council’s network rather than a general population sample.

    Length: 76 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/global-foresight-2036/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the world of 2036?

    The report’s central argument is that the decade ahead is likely to be more unstable, more fragmented, and more dangerous than the present, even though the exact future cannot be predicted with certainty. Rather than offering a single forecast, the report uses foresight to map the pressures, risks, and directional shifts that experts think are most likely to shape 2036.

    Its overall tone is notably pessimistic. The opening findings state that 63 percent of respondents expect the world in 2036 to be worse off than it is now, while only 37 percent think it will be better. The report frames this darker mood through a cluster of reinforcing trends:

    • intensifying US-China rivalry
    • a possible hot conflict over Taiwan
    • weakening multilateral institutions
    • democratic decline
    • nuclear proliferation
    • climate stress
    • and rapid AI advances whose benefits are matched by growing concern.

    At the same time, the report is not purely apocalyptic. It argues that foresight is valuable precisely because it helps policymakers and readers prepare for multiple possible futures, including surprising ones. That is why the publication pairs survey findings with under-the-radar “snow leopards” and a separate AI section: the aim is not just to describe probable big trends, but to widen the reader’s field of vision.

    2. What are the report’s main findings from the expert survey?

    The report organises its main survey results into ten headline findings. The most prominent is that respondents broadly expect China to surpass the United States economically by 2036, even if they do not think China will simply replace the US as an uncontested global hegemon. Instead, most foresee either bipolar competition or a more diffuse multipolar system. They also increasingly expect China to attempt to take Taiwan by force, and more than 40 percent foresee another world war, most likely sparked in Taiwan or surrounding waters.

    A second major finding is that NATO is expected to survive, but not unchanged. Respondents are divided on whether it will become more or less influential, yet 44 percent think it will no longer exist in its current form by 2036. The survey also suggests growing doubts about whether the United States will still play the same commanding role within the alliance.

    On Russia and Ukraine, the survey points away from a decisive Russian victory and toward a frozen conflict. Respondents also see Russia as a diminished power by 2036, though still potentially dangerous, especially in nuclear terms. On AI, a majority believe artificial general intelligence could emerge within the decade, and more respondents still see AI as a net positive than a net negative, though the gap has narrowed as concern rises.

    Other major findings include:

    • expectations of wider nuclear proliferation, especially involving Iran and possibly Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan, and some NATO countries
    • a more autonomous but still strategically limited Europe
    • declining climate cooperation even as warming worsens
    • weakening global institutions alongside democratic erosion
    • and continued dollar dominance, though with crypto seen as the biggest challenger rather than another national currency.

    3. What evidence and patterns in the report best reveal how experts think power is shifting?

    One of the clearest patterns is that respondents do not think the future belongs to a single dominant actor in the way the post-Cold War era was often understood. The report repeatedly points to diffusion, contestation, and erosion of established forms of leadership. China is seen as rising strongly in economic power, nearly matching the US in technology and diplomacy, while the United States is still expected to remain militarily pre-eminent. That split itself is telling: respondents appear to be imagining a world where different forms of power are no longer concentrated in one state.

    Another pattern is institutional weakening.

    Respondents expect the United Nations, UN Security Council, WTO, World Bank, and IMF all to lose influence over the next decade.

    That suggests not merely dissatisfaction with current institutions, but a broader expectation that the post-1945 order is fraying. The report explicitly connects this decay with democratic recession, arguing that respondents who foresee deeper democratic decline are especially likely to expect institutional weakening and a worse overall world.

    A third pattern concerns regional and bloc-level reconfiguration. Europe is not expected to become the world’s leading military, economic, or tech power, yet respondents increasingly think it will achieve greater strategic autonomy. NATO may endure, but in altered form. The Global South section then adds another layer by showing that respondents from those countries often expect even sharper shifts away from US primacy and are more inclined to see China rising, Russia doing better in Ukraine, and even internal US breakdown.

    Together, these patterns show that the report is less about simple replacement of one superpower by another and more about a messy redistribution of influence across states, blocs, technologies, markets, and non-state actors.

    4. What does the report suggest about the role of technology and underappreciated trends in shaping the future?

    The report treats technology as both a direct force of change and a lens that reshapes how other global risks unfold. AI is the most obvious example. Respondents expect major advances, including the possible arrival of AGI within a decade, and the report presents AI as a technology with systemic implications for economics, geopolitics, knowledge production, and everyday life. But the accompanying expert discussion is more cautious than the survey toplines: Atlantic Council specialists stress that today’s AI is not good at truly forecasting the future, that AGI is far from certain, and that trust, energy demands, and market instability could constrain progress.

    The six “snow leopards” deepen this technological and horizon-scanning emphasis. These essays focus on phenomena that may be easy to overlook now but could become highly consequential. They include:

    1. Private tech firms shaping conflict outcomes
    2. Circular rather than one-way migration
    3. Kelp forests as climate and economic assets
    4. The erosion of the human rights order
    5. AI-driven cultural erasure
    6. Neurotechnology capable of decoding thought.

    What unites these cases is the report’s belief that future disruption will not come only from the usual headline issues. Some of the biggest shifts may emerge from domains that sit between established categories: companies behaving like geopolitical actors, migration functioning as an innovation loop, environmental restoration becoming industrial strategy, or data bias turning into cultural loss. This part of the report broadens the frame beyond interstate competition and argues for paying attention to early signals and second-order effects.

    5. What are the report’s biggest implications for policymakers, strategists, and communicators?

    The report’s main implication is that leaders should prepare for a world defined less by stability and rule-bound cooperation than by rivalry, fragmentation, and institutional stress. For policymakers, this means planning for deterrence, alliance adaptation, nuclear risk, democratic erosion, and climate-related conflict at the same time rather than treating them as separate silos. The report’s structure itself makes that point: geopolitics, democracy, climate, finance, and technology are deeply entangled.

    A second implication is that strategic assumptions inherited from the post-Cold War period look increasingly fragile. The report suggests that US leadership can no longer be taken for granted, NATO may need redesign rather than maintenance alone, and multilateral bodies may not be capable of managing future crises in the way they were once expected to. That pushes strategists toward resilience, contingency planning, and coalition-building under less favourable conditions.

    For communicators, the report is especially useful as a map of narratives that may dominate the coming decade:

    • democratic decline
    • technological disruption
    • geopolitical fragmentation
    • and competing visions of order.

    It also shows that audiences are unlikely to share a single worldview.

    The section on Global South respondents is particularly important here, because it demonstrates that expectations about the future vary significantly by geography and political vantage point. In practical terms, this means communication about global risk, strategy, or public policy will increasingly need to account for fragmented perceptions rather than assuming one shared interpretive frame.

    The final implication is methodological: the report argues implicitly for foresight as a discipline of disciplined imagination rather than prediction. Its value lies not in claiming certainty, but in helping readers test assumptions, notice emerging signals, and think more seriously about consequences before they fully arrive.

  • A.I. Radar 2026 by BCG

    A.I. Radar 2026 by BCG

    About the paper

    BCG AI Radar 2026 is a survey-based report on corporate AI investment, CEO ownership of AI transformation, and the rise of agentic AI.

    It is based primarily on BCG’s 2026 AI Radar Survey of 2,360 executives, including 640 CEOs, across multiple industries and markets including the US, Europe, India, Japan, Greater China, the Middle East and Africa.

    The methodology is original survey research, supplemented in places by BCG analysis, BCG client experience, and a separate BCG–MIT Sloan Management Review dataset.

    Length: 29 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.bcg.com/publications/2026/as-ai-investments-surge-ceos-take-the-lead

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that AI has moved from experimental technology investment to a strategic, CEO-level transformation agenda. BCG’s core claim is that corporate AI investment is not only increasing sharply, but is also becoming more durable: organisations are planning to keep investing even if near-term financial returns disappoint.

    The clearest evidence is that projected AI investment has roughly doubled from 2025 to 2026, rising from around 0.8% to 1.7% of organisational revenue. At the same time, 94% of organisations say they will continue investing even if their AI initiatives do not pay off in 2026. Only 6% say they would pull back.

    The deeper message is that BCG sees AI no longer as a CIO-led technology programme, but as a broad business transformation. This is why the report places so much emphasis on CEOs: 72% of CEOs surveyed say they are now the main decision maker on AI, twice the share reported the previous year.

    2. What evidence does BCG provide that AI investment is becoming more serious and sustained?

    BCG provides three main pieces of evidence.

    First, AI investment as a share of revenue is projected to double in 2026. The report shows AI investment rising from about 0.6% of revenue in 2024, to 0.8% in 2025, and then to 1.7% in 2026. That is a significant escalation, especially because BCG notes that the average base revenue of the underlying companies has remained almost the same.

    Second, the increase is broad-based across industries. The chart on page 7 shows all industries planning higher AI investment in 2026. Technology leads at 2.1% of annual revenue, followed by financial institutions at 2.0%, insurance and energy/utilities at 1.9%, consumer at 1.7%, and healthcare at 1.6%. Industrials and real estate are lower at 0.8%, but still show an increase.

    Third, the commitment appears resilient. On page 5, BCG reports that 70% of respondents would “stay the course” or make strategic changes if AI does not deliver the desired financial impact in the next 12 months, while 24% would ramp up resourcing or invest in outside experts. That means disappointment would not necessarily reduce investment; for many organisations, it could trigger more disciplined or more aggressive implementation.

    3. How is leadership of AI changing inside organisations?

    The report’s second major argument is that AI transformation is becoming CEO-led rather than CIO-led. This is one of the most important shifts in the deck.

    BCG reports that 72% of CEOs say they are the main decision maker on AI in their organisation, twice the level from the previous year. It also reports that 82% of CEOs are more optimistic about AI’s ability to deliver ROI than they were 12 months earlier.

    The report goes further by linking AI success to CEO job security. Half of surveyed CEOs believe their job stability depends on getting AI investments and strategy right by 2026. That is a striking framing: AI is not presented merely as a productivity tool, but as a defining test of executive leadership.

    BCG also shows that CEOs express stronger conviction than other executive groups. On page 13, CEOs are slightly ahead of CIOs/CTOs in saying they are ready to lead an AI transformation, confident AI will pay off, and expecting major role disruption by 2030. The implication is that AI is becoming a top-management issue because it affects operating models, workforce design, competitive advantage, and future business models.

    4. What role does agentic AI play in the report’s argument?

    Agentic AI is presented as the next major mechanism through which organisations expect to see measurable value from AI. BCG reports that around 90% of CEOs believe AI agents will enable their organisations to report measurable ROI in 2026, and that CEOs have committed more than 30% of their organisation’s 2026 AI investment to agentic AI.

    The report describes agentic AI as both an opportunity and a risk. On cybersecurity, for example, 59% of leaders see AI agents as both a threat and an opportunity. The same capabilities that make agents useful — automation, scale, system access, continuous learning — can also make them dangerous if misused, hacked, or poorly governed.

    The report also uses BCG–MIT Sloan Management Review data to show that AI applications are expected to take on broader roles in organisations. Currently, 26% of organisations say AI acts as an assistant; in three years, that rises to 61%. The expected role of AI as colleague, coach, mentor, rival, and even boss also increases substantially. This supports BCG’s point that agentic AI is not just a software upgrade; it changes how companies organise work, decision-making, and governance.

    5. What does BCG believe separates leading CEOs from the rest?

    BCG identifies three CEO archetypes: Followers, Pragmatists, and Trailblazers.

    Followers, around 15% of CEOs, recognise AI’s potential but lack full conviction and make cautious early investments. Pragmatists, around 70%, are excited and confident but invest when they see clear value and lower risk. Trailblazers, around 15%, are the most committed group: they invest more heavily, upskill more of their workforce, spend more time deepening their own AI expertise, and are more confident that AI will deliver ROI.

    The report’s most important distinction is that Trailblazers create a “positive flywheel”. They make AI and agentic AI a top priority, deepen their own AI literacy, commit capital at scale, upskill the organisation, and track measurable ROI. For example, Trailblazers spend around 60% of their AI budget on agentic AI, compared with 25% for Pragmatists and Followers. They also allocate around 60% of their AI budget to upskilling and retraining the current workforce, and report that around 70% of their workforce has been upskilled or reskilled on AI.

    BCG’s practical conclusion is therefore quite direct: CEOs must act decisively. The final recommendation is a five-part agenda:

    1. Make AI a key priority
    2. Deepen AI literacy
    3. Commit investments at scale
    4. Upskill the organisation
    5. Track measurable ROI.

    The report’s underlying assumption is that AI advantage will not come mainly from adopting tools, but from executive commitment, organisational redesign, workforce capability, and disciplined measurement.

  • FGS Global Radar 2026 – A Rewired World by FGS

    FGS Global Radar 2026 – A Rewired World by FGS

    About the paper

    The report argues that 2026 will be shaped by a “rewired” world marked by geopolitical fragmentation, deep public pessimism, widening gaps between elites and citizens, accelerating AI adoption, and increasingly atomised influence systems.

    It is a mixed-methods report based on 175 in-depth interviews with senior leaders and policy experts across business, politics, academia and media, combined with nationally representative polling of roughly 20,000 people across the US, Canada, the EU member states, the UK and Japan; public results are averaged across markets with equal weighting by country or bloc.

    The report is explicit about scale and broad geography, but does not clearly specify fieldwork dates or detailed polling procedures beyond that summary.

    Length: 56 pages

    More information / download:
    https://fgsglobal.com/radar

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the state of the world in 2026?

    The core argument is that the world is no longer merely volatile or uncertain; it has been fundamentally “rewired”. The report says the post-war rules-based order is fragmenting, international institutions are weakening, and politics is increasingly driven by strong leaders, national interest and spheres of influence rather than shared values or multilateral norms. It presents this as the defining context for 2026, with the US and China setting the pace and the rest of the world being forced to adapt.

    The report also argues that this rewiring is not only geopolitical. It is economic, technological and communicative. Economically, it sees a K-shaped pattern in which gains accrue unevenly, especially to high-income groups and tech-related sectors. Technologically, AI is portrayed as a major driver of practical business change, labour-market disruption and geopolitical competition. Communicatively, influence is becoming atomised, with mainstream media and traditional institutions losing authority while fragmented digital networks and AI-mediated information systems gain power.

    For leaders, the implication is that older assumptions about stability, consensus and institutional mediation are no longer dependable. The report’s message is that success in 2026 will depend on combining long-term strategic clarity with the agility to respond to constant disruption.

    2. What evidence does the report provide that public pessimism and distrust have reached a critical level?

    One of the report’s strongest findings is the depth and breadth of public pessimism across the 27 countries it polled. It says that in all 27 countries, substantial majorities believe the political system is failing ordinary people and needs fundamental reform, that public institutions are wasteful and badly run, that national identity is disappearing, that democracy is weakening, and that life will be harder for the next generation. It adds that 73% say their country feels divided. Denmark is singled out as the only country where one of these pessimistic propositions is not supported by a majority, which underscores how widespread the mood is elsewhere.

    The report interprets this as more than routine dissatisfaction. It explicitly says this level of pessimism is not normal and may not be sustainable. It describes a widening gap between elites and the broader public, especially in Europe, Japan and Canada, where confidence in governments and institutions is said to be collapsing. It also notes that even people who dislike Donald Trump may still admire his disruptive capacity to act, because many citizens feel conventional institutions no longer deliver results.

    Distrust also extends to information systems. In the stakeholder section, the report says only Denmark and Finland have more people trusting than mistrusting mainstream news media, while 61% overall believe mainstream media have their own agenda and cannot be trusted to report fairly. Politicians are described as the least trusted information source in every country surveyed. That finding strengthens the report’s wider claim that legitimacy is eroding across both politics and media.

    3. Which major divides does the report identify, and why do they matter?

    The report argues that 2026 will be defined by multiple reinforcing divides rather than one single cleavage. The first is the divide between elite and public opinion. Experts tend to see trade-offs as unavoidable on issues such as taxation, AI governance and business incentives, while the public often believes there are simple solutions if only better leaders were in charge. That gap matters because it creates fertile ground for populism and makes it harder for governments to build support for difficult but realistic policies.

    A second divide is between old and young. The report says both generations feel resources are skewed unfairly towards the other, while many experts fear that wealth transfer through inheritance will make success depend more on family assets than enterprise. At the same time, polling suggests younger generations are somewhat more optimistic than older ones in the short term, even though the public overall thinks life will be harder for the next generation. This divide matters because it combines economic frustration with perceptions of intergenerational unfairness.

    A third divide is between the engaged and the disengaged. Younger adults are less likely to follow politics and more likely to think voting makes no difference. The report says disengaged people are more likely to distrust others, believe globalisation has gone too far, downplay climate change and believe conspiracy theories. This matters because democratic systems depend on participation and basic confidence in shared reality.

    A fourth divide is between the global north and south, especially on climate and development. Experts argue that climate impacts are increasingly tangible in the global south, while economic pressure and populism in the north are pushing climate lower down the agenda. Yet publics in the surveyed democracies broadly oppose sending money overseas for climate or development support. This matters because climate disruption and migration pressures are likely to intensify just as willingness for cross-border solidarity weakens.

    4. How does the report portray the outlook for geopolitics, the economy, AI and climate in 2026?

    On geopolitics, the report expects 2026 to be shaped by strong leaders and weaker institutions. It presents the US and China as the two dominant powers, with more grey-zone conflict, strategic rivalry in trade and technology, and the rest of the world struggling to align. It says public pessimism is high about both US-China relations and the chances of peace in the Middle East and Ukraine. Europe is portrayed as pivotal but vulnerable: admired for stability, yet anxious about its competitiveness, growth and geopolitical relevance.

    On the economy, the report describes “a tale of two economies”. Experts are split between cautious optimists, who think the global economy will muddle through, and pessimists, who believe it is structurally fragile and overdue for correction. The report highlights over-leverage in the West, inflationary pressure, and heavy concentration of value in the “Magnificent 7” tech stocks. At the public level, affordability dominates: inflation and cost of living appear as the most important issue in several major markets, and many people believe growth mainly benefits those already well off.

    On AI, the report says the debate has shifted from whether AI will matter to how it will be implemented and with what consequences. Experts expect significant business evolution rather than total revolution, including agentic AI, more conversational models, greater robotisation and practical implementation across functions such as customer service, HR, finance and software development. But both experts and publics are concerned about employment effects: 70% of the public believe AI will destroy more jobs than it creates, and large majorities support stronger regulation and higher taxation of AI companies.

    On energy and sustainability, the report argues that current systems are not fit for purpose. Experts think infrastructure, regulation and planning are too slow to support either economic competitiveness or climate goals. Public concern about climate change remains high, but so do concerns about affordability. The report finds that most people support progress towards carbon neutrality at a slower pace to limit financial pain, rather than pushing ahead as fast as possible regardless of price increases.

    5. What perspective does the report take on leadership, and what are its main practical implications?

    The report clearly adopts a leadership-oriented perspective. It is written for decision-makers in business and politics, and its practical conclusion is that leadership in 2026 requires more than technical competence. Leaders need to understand fragmented realities, operate amid contested legitimacy, and make strategy resilient to volatility rather than built for stability. The report explicitly recommends building a “reality function” to interpret fractured environments, rebuilding strategy around volatility, treating affordability and fairness as non-negotiable constraints, and handling AI as both a capability issue and a social contract issue.

    Its assumptions are also visible. The report assumes that institutional weakening, pessimism and fragmentation are durable enough to shape business strategy directly. It assumes that political backlash, distrust and perceived unfairness will increasingly constrain what organisations can do. It also assumes that influence is no longer governed by a stable hierarchy of media, parties and institutions, but by a messy system of competing networks, platforms and AI-shaped information flows.

    The final practical message is that leaders must combine strategy, agility, authenticity and storytelling. Strategy matters because organisations need a stable destination. Agility matters because the route will keep changing. Authenticity matters because legitimacy is constantly contested. Storytelling matters because fragmented audiences do not absorb complexity easily, and leaders have to repeat and clarify their message in a crowded, distrustful environment. In that sense, the report is not just a diagnosis of 2026; it is also a guide to the leadership style it believes that environment now demands.

  • Future of Professionals Report 2025 by Thomson Reuters

    Future of Professionals Report 2025 by Thomson Reuters

    About the paper

    Thomson Reuters’ Future of Professionals Report 2025 examines how AI and GenAI are affecting legal, risk, compliance, tax, accounting, audit and trade professionals, with a particular focus on strategic AI adoption and ROI.

    It is an original survey-based report, drawing on 2,275 responses gathered in February and March 2025 from professionals across firms, corporations, government and in-house functions.

    The geographic scope is international, with responses from the US, Canada, UK, Mainland Europe, Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Australia/New Zealand.

    Length: 31 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/future-of-professionals

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that AI adoption has moved from experimentation to strategic differentiation. Thomson Reuters’ core claim is that the decisive question is no longer whether professional organisations should adopt AI, but whether they do so deliberately, visibly and in alignment with broader business goals.

    The report frames a widening divide between organisations with a clear AI strategy and those relying on informal or ad hoc adoption. Organisations with visible AI strategies are presented as significantly more likely to experience AI-related benefits, including revenue growth, productivity gains and stronger operational performance. By contrast, organisations without a strategy are portrayed as at risk of falling behind within a few years.

    This is not just a technology argument. The report repeatedly emphasises that AI must be connected to organisational purpose, workflow redesign, leadership behaviour, talent strategy and individual professional development. AI is described as an enabler of broader transformation rather than a standalone tool.

    2. What evidence does the report provide that AI is already affecting professional work?

    The report provides several data points showing that AI has already become a major force in professional services and related corporate functions.

    Most prominently, 80% of respondents believe AI will have a high or transformational impact on their profession within five years. At the same time, 53% say their organisation is already experiencing at least one type of benefit from AI adoption. The most common benefits are efficiency, productivity, faster response times, reduced errors, cost reduction and freed-up time.

    The report estimates that AI could save professionals around five hours per week, or 240 hours per year. In the foreword, Thomson Reuters states that for legal professionals this represents an average annual value of around $19,000 per professional, contributing to a combined annual impact of $32 billion in the US legal and tax/accounting sectors.

    However, the report also identifies a gap between expected long-term impact and current organisational change. While 80% expect AI to have a major impact within five years, only 38% expect high or transformational change in their own organisation this year, and 30% believe their organisation is moving too slowly.

    3. What distinguishes organisations that achieve stronger ROI from AI?

    The report’s main explanatory model is the “AI Success Pyramid”, which identifies four layers required for stronger AI returns: strategy, leadership, operations and individual users.

    The strongest lever is strategy. Organisations with a visible AI strategy are described as 3.5 times as likely to experience at least one form of ROI compared with organisations that have no significant AI adoption plans. They are also almost twice as likely to report revenue growth from AI compared with organisations adopting AI informally.

    Leadership is the second layer. Respondents whose leaders lead by example are 1.7 times as likely to see AI benefits. Organisations investing in AI-powered technology are twice as likely to report benefits, while those adding new governance roles are also more likely to experience positive outcomes.

    Operational change is the third layer. The report argues that organisations need to redesign workflows, roles, delivery models, services and pricing structures. This is where AI moves beyond personal productivity and begins to change how professional work is produced and delivered.

    The fourth layer is individual adoption. Professionals with good or expert AI knowledge are 2.8 times as likely to see organisational benefits as those with basic or no knowledge. Regular users of AI tools are 2.4 times as likely to report benefits compared with non-regular users. This makes individual AI literacy a strategic issue, not merely a personal skill upgrade.

    4. What risks, barriers and tensions does the report identify?

    The report identifies several barriers to more robust AI adoption. The largest barrier to investment is demonstrable accuracy, cited by 50% of respondents. This is followed by available budget, data security, ethical concerns and implementation resources.

    Accuracy is especially important because professional work often carries high stakes. The report notes that 91% of professionals believe computers should be held to higher standards of accuracy than humans, including 41% who say AI outputs would need to be 100% accurate before being used without human review. This reinforces the report’s view that human oversight remains essential.

    The report also highlights a new concern: overreliance on AI at the expense of professional skill development. Almost a quarter of respondents identify this as a negative consequence of concern. This is a subtle but important shift from earlier fears of job loss towards worries about deskilling, judgement and long-term professional capability.

    Another major tension is misalignment between organisational and individual adoption. Some professionals have personal AI goals but are unaware of any organisational strategy, meaning they are being encouraged to adopt AI without clear guidance. Conversely, some organisations have AI strategies but professionals lack personal AI goals, creating an implementation gap.

    The report also describes the “jagged edge” of AI adoption: uneven adoption across regions, functions, organisations and demographics. For example, some organisations invest heavily but see low individual usage, suggesting wasted investment and weak change management. Others see high individual usage but low organisational investment, which may create risks if employees rely on public tools without proper safeguards.

    5. What does the report imply for the future of professional work?

    The report implies that professional value will increasingly depend on the ability to combine domain expertise with AI fluency. It does not argue that AI replaces professional judgement. Instead, it argues that modern professionals will use AI to augment core abilities such as research, writing, analysis, communication, project management, technical expertise and higher-order thinking.

    The “modern professional” in the report is someone who can use AI as a working partner: to analyse patterns, compare regulations, draft documents, summarise complex material, explain specialist issues in accessible ways, manage deadlines and explore scenarios. The traditional professional skillset remains important, but the report suggests that it will increasingly be mediated and amplified by technology.

    The report also points to a significant skills gap. Forty-six percent of respondents report skills gaps within their teams, with the largest gap in technology and data skills. Technical domain expertise is also a concern. This means the future challenge is not only AI adoption but reskilling across multiple levels of the organisation.

    The report’s final implication is competitive: organisations and professionals that act deliberately are likely to gain advantage, while those that wait may lose relevance. For organisations, this means connecting AI to strategy, governance, workflow and value creation. For individuals, it means developing AI proficiency through formal training, experimentation, peer learning and active involvement in how AI is developed and used.

  • The New CCAO and CCO Mandate by United Minds

    The New CCAO and CCO Mandate by United Minds

    About the paper

    The paper examines how Chief Corporate Affairs Officers and Chief Communications Officers are adapting to political volatility, cultural complexity, economic uncertainty, and AI-enabled communications work.

    It is an original qualitative research report based on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with CCOs and CCAOs from Fortune 1000 companies, conducted over two months in early 2025; the exact number of participants is not clearly specified in the report.

    The geographic scope includes both U.S.-based and European corporate affairs leaders.

    Length: 8 pages

    More information / download:
    https://webershandwick.com/news/new-ccao-and-cco-mandate-navigating-a-new-era-of-corporate-leadership

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that the corporate affairs and communications function has not retreated in importance as companies have pulled back from the more visible social-issue positioning of the early 2020s. Instead, CCAOs and CCOs have become less publicly visible but more strategically central inside the enterprise.

    The core claim is that corporate affairs leaders are now expected to help companies navigate a volatile intersection of business, politics, culture, stakeholder expectations, employee sentiment, and reputation risk. Their mandate is no longer simply to explain corporate decisions after the fact. They are increasingly expected to help shape those decisions before they are made.

    The report frames this as a shift from communications as a reactive function to corporate affairs as a source of enterprise foresight. The ideal corporate affairs function, according to the report, helps leaders anticipate risk, understand stakeholder dynamics, interpret political and cultural signals, and protect the company’s licence to operate.

    2. How is the CCAO/CCO role changing in relation to business strategy?

    The report’s first major theme is that corporate affairs leaders are becoming proactive business partners. Their value increasingly lies in their ability to translate political, regulatory, cultural, and stakeholder signals into business implications.

    This means they are not only advising on messages, positioning, or crisis response. They are helping business leaders understand where external pressures may require changes to products, operations, stakeholder engagement, or risk management. One example in the report describes a policy-related issue around a consumer product where corporate affairs brought data to the business, prompting an eight-week sprint that helped resolve product issues and changed the relationship between corporate affairs and the product leader.

    The report presents corporate affairs leaders as “orchestrators” across functions. Because they sit close to the CEO agenda and have an enterprise-wide view, they can connect information from legal, policy, HR, product, finance, operations, communications, and external stakeholders. Their strategic value comes from synthesising those signals into business intelligence.

    The practical recommendation is to build formal cross-functional intelligence networks and develop ways to quantify external risk in financial terms. In other words, corporate affairs must be able to speak the language of business impact, not only the language of reputation.

    3. Why does political complexity matter so much in the report?

    Political volatility is one of the report’s defining conditions. The authors locate the research in the early 2025 U.S. context, following Donald Trump’s second inauguration and first 100 days in office. The report says companies are operating in a climate shaped by executive orders, economic volatility, hyper-partisanship, and sudden political attention.

    The report argues that this has forced corporate affairs leaders to rethink public engagement. Companies are moving away from broad social activism and towards brand protection, business-aligned issue engagement, and risk management. The task is no longer simply “Should we speak out?” but “Where does engagement serve the business, where does silence reduce risk, and where is private dialogue more effective than public positioning?”

    One especially important idea is the “audience of one” problem: the risk that a single powerful political figure can draw attention to a company and create operational, reputational, or regulatory consequences. Corporate affairs leaders are therefore developing scenario plans, rapid-response frameworks, and more cautious approaches to political communication.

    This also changes the advisory role of corporate affairs. The report suggests that CCAOs and CCOs are becoming voices of restraint and judgement within executive teams, helping leaders distinguish between noise, bargaining tactics, genuine risk, and issues that require action.

    4. How does the report redefine crisis and reputation management?

    The report argues that crisis management is no longer an exceptional capability. It has become a baseline expectation. In a “permacrisis” environment, corporate affairs teams must apply crisis tools continuously, not only when a discrete crisis breaks out.

    This changes the role in two ways. First, crisis work now extends beyond media response. Corporate affairs teams are expected to help solve the underlying problem, coordinate across business functions, and prevent issues from escalating. Secondly, the report says corporate affairs leaders must make the financial case for proactive reputation management.

    One quoted example describes a corporate affairs leader asking for $2.5 million for a campaign during a contentious situation and using analysis to show that the potential return was 12 times the investment. The point is that reputation work becomes more credible in the C-suite when it is connected to profit protection, revenue risk, regulatory exposure, or operational continuity.

    The implication is that corporate affairs must move from “the team that handles crises” to “the function that helps prevent avoidable business risk”. The report recommends crisis prevention scoring, financial modelling of reputational risk, and closer collaboration with finance and analytics partners.

    5. What does the report say about employees and AI as part of the new mandate?

    The report treats employee communication as a continuing priority, but one that has become more delicate. Employees are described as one of the most important stakeholder groups, especially during uncertainty. At the same time, internal communication now has to navigate political polarisation, regulatory sensitivity, DEI-related scrutiny, and the risk that different employee groups may interpret corporate messages very differently.

    The report therefore points to a more cautious, “sanitised” form of transparency. Companies may still communicate openly, but in ways designed to avoid partisan signalling or unnecessary exposure. The authors recommend mapping internal stakeholder intersections and using tools such as message testing to understand differences within the employee base.

    AI is presented as a practical accelerator for the corporate affairs function. The report says AI is being used for tasks such as preparing Q&As, analysing large volumes of stakeholder content, vetting influencers, monitoring media and misinformation, supporting strategic planning, and improving data analysis. Rather than presenting AI mainly as a replacement threat, the report frames it as a way to free communications professionals from routine work and move them towards more strategic advisory roles.

    However, the report also makes clear that AI adoption is a change-management issue. Teams need clarity on what should remain human-led, what can be AI-assisted, and what ethical guardrails are needed around bias, accuracy, and appropriate use.

    Overall conclusion

    The report’s main message is that the CCAO/CCO mandate is expanding from communications execution to enterprise-level judgement. Corporate affairs leaders are being asked to help companies interpret volatility, anticipate risk, advise CEOs, manage political exposure, support employees, use AI responsibly, and convert stakeholder intelligence into business decisions.

    Its most important contribution is the framing of corporate affairs as a foresight function. Its main limitation is methodological: while the qualitative design is described in some detail, the report does not clearly specify the number of interviewees, which makes it harder to judge the breadth of the evidence base.

  • Reimagining Tomorrow by Global Alliance for PR and Communication Management

    Reimagining Tomorrow by Global Alliance for PR and Communication Management

    About the paper

    The report is an original global survey of how PR and communication professionals are adopting, governing, and thinking about AI in their work.

    It is based on 473 responses collected between 18 February and 17 April 2025, using a mix of multiple-choice and open-ended survey questions; the geographic scope is global, with respondents from Africa, EMENA, North America, Australia/New Zealand, Asia-Pacific, and South and Central America, although the report notes self-selection bias, regional variation, and an overrepresentation of smaller organisations.

    Length: 21 pages

    More information / download:
    https://globalalliancepr.org/reimagining-tomorrow-ai-in-pr-and-communication-management/

    Core Insights

    1) What is the central argument of the report about AI in PR and communication management?

    The core argument is that AI adoption is already widespread in the profession, but governance, ethics, training, and strategic leadership have not kept pace. The report presents PR and communication as a profession at an inflection point: practitioners are using AI enthusiastically, yet the structures needed to guide that use responsibly are still underdeveloped. On page 3, the report’s summary makes this tension very clear: 91% are allowed to use AI, but only 39.4% of organisations have responsible AI frameworks, and 38.3% have no constraints at all. It also argues that the profession’s most valuable future contribution is not merely technical implementation, but shaping ethical frameworks, governance structures, and stakeholder communication about AI.

    The interpretive section on page 4 pushes that point further. It says the real opportunity for PR and communication teams is to elevate their strategic role by helping organisations develop and implement responsible AI, rather than remaining focused on tactical use. In other words, the report is not anti-AI; it is pro-adoption but strongly argues that adoption without guardrails is risky and professionally shortsighted.

    2) What does the survey reveal about how widely AI is being used, and how organisations are managing that use?

    The survey shows that AI use is already mainstream in the field. According to the report, 91% of respondents say AI is allowed in their organisations, and among the 9% who say it is not allowed, 52.8% admit they use it anyway as “shadow AI.” That alone suggests that AI adoption is not waiting for formal permission structures. Access is also relatively broad: 65.2% say all team members in PR and communication have access, while 24.3% say access is restricted to select individuals and 10.5% say it is limited to leaders only.

    At the same time, management of AI is patchy. The report says 38.3% of organisations have no constraints or restrictions in place, 37.5% rely on approved company-wide tools, 35.8% allow staff to explore freely, and only 18.3% have formal processes for AI tool recommendation and approval. Organisational support is also middling: the average support rating for implementation is just 2.78 out of 5, which the report explicitly describes as moderate but insufficient. That is an important finding because it shows that permission to use AI is much more common than meaningful support for using it well.

    So the picture is not one of controlled institutional rollout. It is closer to democratised but uneven adoption: people have access, many are experimenting, but the quality of support, governance, and process is inconsistent.

    3) Where is the biggest gap between current AI practice and what PR professionals believe their role should be?

    The biggest gap lies between tactical activity and strategic responsibility. The report says PR and communication professionals see governance and ethics as their top priorities: 33.3% rank formal AI governance structures as the number one priority, and 27.3% rank training for ethical, safe, and transparent AI use as the top priority. Yet their actual involvement patterns do not fully reflect those priorities. The report’s alignment analysis shows that teams are often more involved in technical implementation than in the activities they themselves consider most strategically important.

    This mismatch is described in detail on page 9. The report highlights the largest misalignments in lower-value technical areas such as AI certification programmes, where the gap is 80.6%, and advising on complex prompts and use cases, where the gap is 60.4%. By contrast, the smaller gaps are in ethical AI use and formal AI governance, which suggests these are the areas closest to the profession’s intended role. The report interprets this as a resource allocation problem: teams are spending time where they are currently needed, but not necessarily where they believe they create the most value.

    This matters because it reframes the profession’s future. The report is effectively saying that PR should not define its AI contribution by being good at prompts or faster outputs. It should define it by governance, ethics, risk, literacy, stakeholder engagement, and strategic counsel.

    4) What specific weaknesses does the report identify in governance, confidence, and stakeholder communication?

    The report identifies three especially important weaknesses.

    First, governance remains thin.

    Only 39.4% of organisations have a responsible AI guideline, policy, or framework. Even where such frameworks exist, they are far from universal, and coverage is uneven. Among organisations that do have guidelines, the most common elements are ethics/law, governance/standards, security/privacy, and risk/reputation. The report also notes that because of skip logic, those framework-content percentages apply only to the subset of respondents whose organisations already have guidelines, not to the entire sample.

    Second, ethical confidence is limited.

    Only 26.2% say they feel very confident evaluating the ethical implications of AI in their roles; 60.5% are only somewhat confident, and 13.3% are not confident. The report treats this as a major training opportunity, not a marginal issue. That reading is reinforced by respondents’ own definitions of responsible AI, which emphasise ethics, beneficial use, human oversight, verification, and transparency.

    Third, stakeholder communication is surprisingly weak.

    Given that communication is the profession’s core function, the report finds it striking that fewer than half communicate about responsible AI approaches to stakeholders, 46.9% communicate about AI ethics, and only 35.6% communicate about AI governance structures. The most common topic communicated is simply how to use AI tools, at 53.6%, which the report interprets as evidence of a tactical rather than strategic focus. This is one of the report’s sharpest critiques: PR professionals are not yet communicating about AI in the way their own strategic position would suggest they should.

    5) What broader implications does the report draw for the future of the profession?

    The report suggests that AI will reshape the profession significantly over the next five years, pushing it away from routine production work and towards more strategic, advisory, and governance-oriented roles. Respondents predict shifts “from content creator to content facilitator,” more focus on strategy, more automation of routine tasks, possible workforce reduction, increasing regulatory complexity, and a risk of depersonalisation or diminished creativity.

    The concern side is equally strong. On page 13, respondents describe the main threats as job displacement, reduced creativity, authenticity problems, misinformation, and loss of human interaction. That combination shows the profession is not simply optimistic about efficiency gains; it is also worried about relevance, trust, and the erosion of distinctly human value.

    The report’s conclusion is that the profession can either be diminished by AI or elevated by it. Elevation depends on moving beyond content creation, building stronger governance and ethical frameworks, investing in training, communicating more actively with stakeholders, and positioning PR as a strategic advisor on responsible AI implementation across the organisation. Its recommendations to professionals and organisations alike all point in that direction. So the deeper implication is not just that AI will change communications work, but that it may redefine what counts as valuable communications leadership in the first place.

  • State of Global Workforce 2025 by Gallup

    State of Global Workforce 2025 by Gallup

    About the paper

    The report synthesises Gallup’s annual global employee-experience research, combining Gallup World Poll data with additional random samples of working populations in the United States and an opt-in web component for China.

    It is an original quantitative research report based on surveys of employed adults aged 15+; the 2024 findings draw on 227,347 employed respondents collected from April to December 2024, within a wider 2009–2024 trend dataset of 5,490,517 respondents across more than 160 countries and areas.

    Methodological details are clearly stated, though some country results are suppressed where sample sizes are too small.

    Length: 141 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.gallup.com/file/workplace/659528/state-of-the-global-workplace-2025-download.pdf

    Core Insights

    1) What is the central argument of the report about the state of the global workplace in 2025?

    Gallup’s central argument is that the global workplace is at a critical moment: employee engagement and wellbeing have deteriorated just as organisations are entering a period of major transformation driven by AI and broader workplace disruption. The report frames this as a leadership challenge rather than a purely economic or technological one. Leaders must decide whether to use this moment to strengthen management, reconnect teams and improve performance, or risk further decline.

    The report’s headline evidence is stark. Global employee engagement fell from 23% to 21% in 2024, only the second decline in the past 12 years and equal in size to the fall recorded during the year of COVID-19 lockdowns. Gallup estimates that this drop cost the global economy US$438 billion in lost productivity. At the same time, global life evaluation among employees fell to 33%, suggesting that workers’ overall sense of wellbeing has weakened as well.

    So the report is not merely saying that people feel a bit less positive about work. It is arguing that the workplace is becoming more fragile at exactly the point when organisations need resilience, adaptability and trust.

    2) What does the report identify as the main driver of declining engagement and wellbeing?

    Gallup is unusually direct: the main driver is managers. The report says manager engagement fell from 30% to 27%, while individual contributor engagement stayed flat at 18%. No other major worker category saw as large a decline. Young managers under 35 saw a five-point drop in engagement, and female managers saw a seven-point drop.

    The same pattern appears in wellbeing. Older managers saw a five-point decline in wellbeing, while female managers again recorded a seven-point drop. Individual contributors, by contrast, improved slightly on life evaluation. Gallup therefore presents managers as the pressure point where workplace strain is showing up first and most intensely.

    The report links this to the accumulation of post-pandemic disruption: retirements and turnover, the hiring boom and bust, rapidly restructured teams, tighter budgets, supply chain issues, changing customer expectations, digital transformation, AI tools, and new employee expectations around flexibility and remote work. Managers sit in the middle of all of that. In Gallup’s telling, they have become the human shock absorbers of organisational change.

    3) Why does manager engagement matter so much for organisational and economic performance?

    Gallup’s answer is that managers are the single biggest determinant of team engagement. The report states that 70% of team engagement is attributable to the manager. That means problems at management level do not stay there. They cascade downward into team morale, effort, productivity and retention.

    The report stresses that engaged employees are more productive, less absent, better at building customer relationships and more effective at generating results. It also notes that countries with less engaged managers tend to have less engaged individual contributors. So this is not just an internal HR issue. Gallup connects manager disengagement to broader business performance and even GDP growth.

    That is why the report repeatedly warns that if manager engagement keeps falling, the damage will not stop with managers and will not stop with engagement. Gallup presents manager burnout as a leading indicator of wider organisational decline: poorer performance, more absenteeism, more turnover, weaker team cultures and reduced economic output.

    4) What do the global and regional data reveal about the current pattern of employee experience?

    At global level, the picture is mixed but troubling. In 2024, 21% of employees were engaged, 62% not engaged and 17% actively disengaged. Only 33% were classified as thriving in life overall, while 40% reported daily stress, 23% daily sadness and 22% daily loneliness. Half of workers were watching for or actively seeking a new job.

    The regional pattern is highly uneven. On engagement, the highest regional levels were in the United States/Canada and Latin America/Caribbean, both at 31%, while Europe ranked last at 13%. On thriving, Australia/New Zealand led at 56%, followed by Latin America/Caribbean at 54% and the United States/Canada at 52%, while South Asia ranked lowest at 15%. Europe is notable for combining relatively high life evaluation with the lowest engagement, suggesting that people may feel comparatively well in life while still feeling detached from work.

    The emotional pattern is also revealing. Stress is especially high in the United States/Canada, Australia/New Zealand, East Asia and the Middle East/North Africa. Loneliness is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, while anger and sadness are most elevated in South Asia and parts of the Middle East/North Africa. Meanwhile, Europe has the lowest regional engagement but also among the lowest levels of anger and loneliness. This suggests that disengagement is not always accompanied by emotional volatility; in some regions it may look more like resignation or detachment.

    Another notable point is the work-location breakdown. Globally, exclusively remote employees show the highest engagement at 31%, compared with 23% for hybrid workers and 19% for on-site non-remote-capable workers. Hybrid and on-site remote-capable workers have the highest thriving scores at 42%, while fully remote workers report the highest loneliness, sadness and stress. So the report hints that flexibility may boost engagement and wellbeing in some respects, but also carries emotional trade-offs.

    5) What actions does Gallup recommend leaders take in response?

    Gallup’s prescription is focused almost entirely on rebuilding management capability. The report lays out three actions.

    First, ensure all managers receive training. Fewer than half of the world’s managers, 44%, say they have received management training. Gallup argues this is the most achievable intervention and says managers who receive training are half as likely to be actively disengaged as those who do not.

    Second, teach managers effective coaching techniques. Gallup cites evidence that participants in manager training focused on best practices saw up to 22% higher engagement than non-participants, their teams saw engagement rise by up to 18%, and manager performance metrics improved by 20% to 28%, with effects lasting nine to 18 months after training.

    Third, invest in ongoing manager development to improve wellbeing. The report says manager training can raise manager thriving from 28% to 34%, and when that training is paired with active encouragement for development, thriving rises to 50%. Gallup therefore treats manager development not just as a performance tool but as one of the most effective wellbeing investments leaders can make.

    This leads to the report’s broader conclusion: the role of the manager needs to be rethought. Gallup argues that improving manager engagement is the key lever for reversing declining productivity, improving employee wellbeing and unlocking a much larger economic upside. It estimates that if the world’s workplace were fully engaged, US$9.6 trillion could be added to the global economy, equivalent to 9% of global GDP.

    Overall, the report’s message is clear: the workplace problem is not simply that employees are tired or dissatisfied. It is that the management layer is under strain, and unless leaders strengthen it deliberately, the costs will spread through teams, organisations and economies.

  • Global Foresight 2025 by the Atlantic Council

    Global Foresight 2025 by the Atlantic Council

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods foresight study on what the world may look like in 2035, combining an expert survey, short horizon-scanning essays on six under-the-radar “snow leopards,” and three written future scenarios.

    The original research element is a survey of 357 geostrategists and foresight practitioners drawn from the Atlantic Council’s networks, fielded in late November and early December 2024, with respondents spread across sixty countries plus the United States and representing every continent except Antarctica; the survey sample, however, skewed US-based, male, and older.

    Length: 84 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/global-foresight-2025/

    Core Insights

    1. What overall picture of the world in 2035 does the report present?

    The report presents a distinctly darker-than-light global outlook. Its central message is that many leading strategists expect the next decade to be shaped less by steady progress than by heightened instability, strategic rivalry, institutional weakness, and accumulating systemic risks. The report explicitly says that 62 percent of respondents think the world in ten years will be worse off than today, while only 38 percent think it will be better off.

    That pessimism is not absolute. The report notes some areas of guarded optimism, especially around artificial intelligence and climate cooperation. A majority of respondents think AI will have a net positive impact on global affairs over the next decade, and about half foresee expanded cooperation on climate change. But those brighter notes are outweighed by broader anxiety about war, nuclear risk, democratic decline, and geopolitical fragmentation.

    Structurally, the report is trying to do more than predict single outcomes. It says foresight cannot provide certainty, but it can help readers understand the forces already driving change and the possible consequences of those forces over the coming decade and beyond. That framing matters: this is not a forecast claiming “this will happen,” but an effort to map where expert opinion sees the heaviest risks and most consequential uncertainties.

    So the overall picture is of a world entering 2035 under pressure from several overlapping dynamics at once:

    • hard-power rivalry
    • erosion of the postwar order
    • weak prospects for conflict resolution
    • technological disruption
    • and climate-linked stress.

    The report’s worldview is therefore not just pessimistic but systemic: it suggests that multiple domains of instability are reinforcing each other.

    2. Which geopolitical and security risks do surveyed experts see as most likely to shape the next decade?

    The headline risk is major war. The report’s most striking finding is that 40 percent of respondents expect another world war by 2035, defined as a multifront conflict among great powers. It adds that this war could go nuclear and could extend into space, with 48 percent expecting nuclear weapons to be used by at least one actor in the coming decade and 45 percent expecting direct military conflict in space.

    The report identifies China and Russia as the main vectors through which a broader conflict could emerge. On China, 65 percent of respondents think Beijing will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, a sharp rise from the previous year’s survey. On Russia, 45 percent think Russia and NATO will engage in direct military conflict, also a significant increase year-on-year. In other words, the report suggests that expert concern is moving away from abstract rivalry and toward concrete expectations of military confrontation.

    Another major concern is bloc formation. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to become formal allies by 2035, and many foresee a world divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs. The report treats this as a potentially war-amplifying trend rather than merely a diplomatic realignment. Respondents who foresaw both bloc division and formal alliance-building were much more likely also to expect world war.

    Nuclear proliferation is another core risk. The report says 88 percent of respondents expect at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the next decade. Iran is by far the most cited likely new nuclear power, but expectations also rose for South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. On use, Russia and North Korea are seen as the most likely current nuclear powers to launch a nuclear strike.

    The report also shows pessimism about existing conflicts. On Ukraine, only 4 percent think the war will end on terms largely favourable to Ukraine; most expect either terms favourable to Russia or a frozen conflict. On the Middle East, respondents are much more optimistic about Israeli-Saudi normalisation than about Israeli-Palestinian peace. More than 60 percent expect the current status quo of occupied Palestinian territories to persist by 2035.

    Taken together, these findings suggest the report sees the coming decade as one in which escalation risks are rising across several theatres at once, while the mechanisms for resolving those conflicts appear weak.

    3. How does the report assess the future of US power, alliances, multilateral institutions, and democracy?

    The report’s view of the United States is nuanced: it still sees the US as the likeliest dominant military power in 2035, but a weaker and more uncertain leader in other domains. Seventy-one percent of respondents expect the US to remain militarily dominant, and 58 percent still see it as the leading technological innovator. But fewer expect it to dominate economically, diplomatically, or in soft power, and confidence has dropped across several of these measures compared with the previous year.

    That matters because the report implies that US power is increasingly relative rather than comprehensive. It is not presenting a picture of outright American collapse, but of a more limited United States operating in a multipolar world. Three-quarters of respondents expect the world in 2035 to be multipolar, with multiple centres of power.

    Alliances remain part of that picture, but with more uncertainty than before. A majority still expect the US to maintain its alliance network in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, yet this figure fell sharply from the previous survey. At the same time, almost half expect Europe to achieve greater “strategic autonomy” by taking more responsibility for its own security. So the report suggests a future in which alliances may persist, but under new terms and with more burden-sharing or hedging.

    On multilateral institutions, the mood is much grimmer. Large majorities expect the United Nations, the UN Security Council, and the World Trade Organization to be less capable of solving problems by 2035 than they are today. The World Bank and IMF fare somewhat better, while respondents are relatively more hopeful about regional groupings such as ASEAN, the EU, and even BRICS. That pattern reveals an important assumption in the report: global governance is likely to weaken, while regional or alternative formations may gain relative importance.

    The report is similarly downbeat on democracy. Nearly half of respondents think today’s democratic recession will worsen into a democratic depression by 2035, while only 17 percent foresee a democratic renaissance. It also says 65 percent expect global press freedom to decrease. So the report does not treat democratic backsliding as a side issue; it sees it as one of the defining trends of the next decade.

    There is also a gender dimension to that pessimism. Women in the survey were more negative than men across several questions, especially about nuclear use, democratic decline, rights curtailment, and future US dominance. The report interprets this as reflecting persistent inequalities and the unequal burden crises place on women.

    4. What overlooked “snow leopards” does the report argue could have outsized future impact?

    One of the report’s most distinctive features is its “snow leopards” section: six under-the-radar developments that may not dominate headlines now but could become highly consequential. This is the horizon-scanning part of the report, and it broadens the analysis beyond headline geopolitics.

    1.The first is the threat that non-state actors could attack undersea cables.

    The report argues that the global digital and financial system depends heavily on these cables and that they are vulnerable not only to states but also to militant groups or terrorists. Its core point is that a relatively low-cost attack on critical subsea infrastructure could produce outsized disruption across communications, finance, and military operations.

    2. The second is enhanced geothermal systems.

    The report presents this as a low-carbon energy source with major underexploited potential, noting that if technological and cost barriers fall, it could become a significant contributor to electricity generation in the United States. This is framed not merely as a climate story but as a strategic energy-development story.

    3. The third is a new carbon-capture material, COF-999, described as a yellow powder that could dramatically reduce the cost and resource intensity of pulling carbon dioxide from the air.

    The report does not claim this solves climate change, but it treats the discovery as an example of the sort of scientific breakthrough that could shift the economics of mitigation.

    4. The fourth is rewilding.

    Here the report argues that land abandonment, urbanisation, changing food systems, and ecological restoration could together make much more land available for rewilding, with implications for biodiversity, carbon capture, tourism, and land use. It also notes trade-offs and possible backlash, so this is presented as a consequential but contested trend.

    5. The fifth is quantum batteries.

    The report uses this as an example of a frontier technology that may transform energy storage, with particular attention to medical devices, emergency systems, and electric mobility. The point is not that the technology is ready now, but that its eventual impact could be large if the science translates into scalable applications.

    6. The sixth is Gen Z’s vulnerability to misinformation.

    This may be the most sociologically revealing of the snow leopards. The report challenges the assumption that digital natives are naturally better at navigating false information, arguing instead that heavy social media exposure, algorithmic feeds, parasocial influence, and weak verification habits may leave this generation especially susceptible. The long-term implication is that future elites may enter positions of power with distorted information habits and weaker trust.

    Across all six, the deeper message is that the future will not be shaped only by visible great-power rivalry. It may also be shaped by overlooked vulnerabilities, scientific breakthroughs, and social shifts that sit below the surface until they suddenly matter.

    5. What do the report’s three scenarios suggest about the range of possible global futures—and what is the report ultimately trying to make readers understand?

    The report ends with three scenarios for 2035:

    1. “The reluctant international order”
    2. “China ascendant”
    3. and “Climate of fear.”

    These are explicitly presented not as predictions but as plausible futures designed to stimulate thinking. That distinction is crucial. The scenarios are a tool for exploring interaction effects between present-day trends, not for declaring which future is most likely.

    “The reluctant international order” imagines a world in which the rules-based international order has neither collapsed nor been revitalised. Cooperation persists because major powers and non-state actors still need it, even if they engage reluctantly and pragmatically. This scenario suggests that messy, improvised, partial cooperation may be more realistic than either liberal renewal or total breakdown.

    “China ascendant” imagines a world in which Beijing becomes the dominant global power, not through one dramatic rupture but through a slow shift enabled by US inwardness, economic influence, institutional repositioning, and strategic patience. The point here is that geopolitical transformation need not come through open war; it can happen gradually through hedging, institutional drift, and changing perceptions of who is reliable and effective.

    “Climate of fear” imagines a world where worsening climate instability drives migration, political conflict, democratic stress, and escalating interest in radical responses such as geoengineering. This scenario shows the report’s assumption that climate change is not just an environmental issue but a force multiplier affecting politics, conflict, mobility, governance, and public fear.

    Taken together, the three scenarios reveal the report’s deeper purpose. It is not merely asking, “What will happen?” It is asking readers to think about how today’s choices, vulnerabilities, and neglected signals can combine into very different but still plausible futures. That is why the report mixes survey data, horizon scanning, and narrative scenarios. It wants to move the reader from passive consumption of trends to active strategic imagination.

    The underlying perspective is clear: the future is not predetermined, but it is being shaped now by decisions on deterrence, alliance maintenance, institutional reform, climate action, technology governance, and democratic resilience. The report’s central implication is therefore strategic rather than descriptive: if leaders fail to act early on compounding risks, the darker futures it sketches become more plausible.

  • FGS Global Radar 2025: The Year of Consequences by FGS

    FGS Global Radar 2025: The Year of Consequences by FGS

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods outlook on the political, economic, technological, climate and workplace consequences likely to shape 2025, with a strong emphasis on what those shifts mean for business.

    It combines 70 individual depth interviews with senior stakeholders across business, politics, media, finance and academia, conducted in October and November 2024, with a nationally representative UK poll of 2,084 adults fielded from 15–17 November 2024; the primary geographic scope is the UK, although the analysis addresses global developments, especially the US and Europe.

    Length: 25 pages

    More information / download:
    https://a.storyblok.com/f/137553/x/493262557e/fgs-global-radar-2025_the-year-of-consequences.pdf

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about 2025, and why does it call it “the year of consequences”?

    The core claim is that 2025 is not presented as a year of entirely new issues, but as the year in which the consequences of recent political shocks, especially the 2024 election cycle and above all Donald Trump’s return, begin to bite. The report argues that many of the underlying challenges remain the same, but the language, political framing and practical terms of engagement around them are changing. In that sense, 2025 is portrayed as a year of disruption, reframing and forced clarity rather than simple continuity.

    The report roots this in a broader anti-incumbent mood across developed Western economies. It argues that falling living standards, inflation and concern over immigration helped drive voters away from established governments. Trump is treated as the most consequential manifestation of that trend, with likely spillover effects across geopolitics, sustainability, AI, business and culture.

    At the same time, the report is not wholly apocalyptic. It repeatedly stages a tension between pessimists and pragmatists, or between gloom and opportunity. Its final position is that 2025 will be dangerous and unstable, but that it may also create openings for decision-making, innovation and strategic repositioning. That balanced but business-oriented framing is central to the report’s purpose.

    2. How does the report think Trump’s return will reshape the global environment for politics and business?

    Trump is the organising force of the report. The authors state bluntly that “2025 will be the year of Trump”, and the expert consensus presented is that he should be taken more seriously this time because he now has more experience, stronger intent and a limited window in which to act. The report expects an early phase of “shock and awe”, including executive action on tariffs, deregulation, immigration and geopolitical positioning.

    Economically, the report expects Trump to push tax cuts and deregulation, with many experts anticipating a short-term US boom that could also buoy global dealmaking and M&A. But it also records a counter-view: that tariffs, labour restrictions and fiscal loosening may later fuel inflation and possibly trigger conflict with the Federal Reserve. So the outlook is not one of settled optimism, but of a potentially powerful near-term stimulus coupled with medium-term instability.

    Geopolitically, the report suggests Trump’s foreign policy is harder to predict because international order is not seen as his main priority. It outlines fears that support for NATO, Ukraine and multilateral institutions could weaken, while authoritarian states may feel emboldened. It also expects pressure on Ukraine to accept a deal, sympathy towards Netanyahu, and renewed tension around Taiwan. At the same time, some interviewees think Trump’s disruptive style might break deadlock in stalled conflicts. That split between alarm and reluctant pragmatism is one of the report’s recurring patterns.

    3. What does the report say about the state of democracy, public trust and mainstream politics, especially in the UK and Europe?

    A major theme is that democratic systems are under strain because governments are struggling to bridge the gap between what they promise and what they can actually deliver. The report links this to structural pressures such as debt, ageing populations, infrastructure needs, weak growth and immigration tensions, especially in Europe. It argues that this mismatch is eroding faith in liberal democracy and creating fertile ground for populism.

    The UK polling evidence is used to illustrate this erosion. The report says 24% of the UK electorate now believes that voting does not make a difference, while nearly eight in ten voters think they are entitled to expect more from government. Particularly striking is the finding that more than one in five people under 45 agree that the best system for running a country effectively is a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections. The report reads this as a serious warning sign about younger adults’ confidence in democratic delivery.

    On the UK specifically, Labour is portrayed as politically dominant but strategically unclear. The report says business and even Labour supporters see a lack of compelling growth narrative, while public confidence is weak: only 13% think the government has a clear and convincing plan for stronger growth, only 11% think it is doing what they hoped, 64% think the UK is in steep decline, and 68% believe Labour will increase their taxes. So the report’s view is that stability of parliamentary control does not equal public confidence or strategic clarity.

    4. What picture does the report paint of AI, climate and business opportunity in 2025?

    The report treats AI as both transformative and unsettled. It emphasises the extraordinary scale of investment, including a cited $1 trillion being spent on AI data centres, and argues that while many firms are still struggling to turn proof-of-concept work into real competitive advantage, most experts believe the technology will prove genuinely transformative over time. It suggests that the biggest near-term gains may come not from science-fiction breakthroughs, but from practical uses that improve productivity, speed up processes and reduce backlogs in functions such as marketing, communications and public services.

    But the public mood is far more divided. The report says opinion splits almost exactly into thirds: those who fear AI could control humans, those who think it will positively transform lives, and those who think it is overhyped. It also notes public scepticism about concrete benefits: only 39% expect positive effects on healthcare and life expectancy, 38% on productivity, and just 17% on their own standard of living, while 50% fear negative effects on job opportunities. The report therefore positions AI as a field where elite and public sentiment have not yet converged.

    On climate, the report argues that international diplomacy has weakened, especially because of Trump and the disappointing COP29 outcome, yet it also sees real momentum in the economics of transition. Its key argument is that sustainability will progress less through idealistic global cooperation and more through energy security, cost competitiveness and industrial advantage. In other words, the report believes the climate narrative is shifting from moral exhortation to transactional self-interest.

    That argument is reinforced by polling. Majorities believe climate science and think action is necessary, but many also want a slower pace to reduce cost burdens, and 45% say there is little point in costly UK action unless larger countries do more. So the report’s broader conclusion is that both AI and climate will move forward in 2025, but under more pragmatic, contested and economically framed conditions than before.

    5. What does the report conclude about workplace culture, generational divides and the implications for business leaders?

    The workplace section suggests that culture debates will remain intense, but the report’s own evidence points to a fairly practical hierarchy of employee priorities. In its UK poll, the top three features of an ideal workplace culture are flexible working hours, trust in leadership, and support for employee wellbeing and mental health. That is notable because it places everyday working conditions and leadership credibility above more symbolic or ideological culture-war themes.

    The report argues that hybrid work is still durable, but that employers will become more assertive about office attendance, with three-day minimum expectations likely to spread. It also says mental health will become even more strategically important because of its effect on absenteeism, wellbeing and retention. By contrast, DEI remains in place but is expected to be discussed less publicly and in less politicised language, especially in the wake of Trump’s return. The report also finds that DEI-related factors rank relatively low in the public’s list of workplace culture priorities.

    Generational differences are another major finding. The report shows sharp age-based divides on asylum, free speech, gender identity, China, EU relations and views of intergenerational fairness. But it also complicates the cliché of a simple youth-versus-age split by showing that preferences are more situational: for example, flexible working matters most to those in mid-career and to women, while views on resilience, authority and fairness vary in more layered ways.

    For business leaders, the implication is clear: broad-brush assumptions about “what younger people want” are not enough. The report points instead towards a need for clearer leadership, more explicit explanations of workplace expectations, greater care around employee wellbeing, and more disciplined choices about when companies comment publicly on social or geopolitical issues. Overall, it recommends a more grounded, less performative model of corporate culture.

    Overall, the report is best read as a business-facing synthesis of elite interviews and UK public opinion that argues 2025 will be shaped by disruption, reduced ideological certainty and more transactional politics. Its message is that leaders should prepare for volatility, but also for openings created by clearer power structures, technological progress and a more hard-headed operating environment.