Tag: predictions

  • Crossing the Rubicon by the Scriptorium Initiative

    Crossing the Rubicon by the Scriptorium Initiative

    About the paper

    This is a conceptual whitepaper about how brand and communications functions should evolve into AI-native operating models, arguing that AI changes not just the tools of communication but the logic of the function itself.

    It reads as a practitioner whitepaper grounded in secondary analysis, cited literature, and practice-based reflection rather than original empirical research; no respondent base, interview sample, fieldwork period, or defined geographic dataset is clearly specified in the report.

    Length: 28 pages

    More information / download:
    https://scriptorium-initiative.ai/follow-us

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about AI and the future of the communications function?

    The report’s central argument is that AI represents a structural break for communications, not a simple productivity tool. It says previous technologies expanded reach and speed, but AI changes the function more fundamentally because it can read, write, interpret and increasingly act. In that sense, AI is described not just as another channel, but as “the medium, the message, and the messenger”.

    That leads to the paper’s key claim: communications leaders must decide whether to use AI merely to do old work faster, or to redesign the function around intelligence itself. The report repeatedly frames this as “crossing the Rubicon” — an irreversible leadership choice to rebuild workflows, governance, measurement and roles around human–machine collaboration.

    Importantly, the paper does not argue for replacing communicators. It argues that the purpose of communications remains the same — building trust and shaping behaviour — but that the operating model must change. In the author’s framing, the communicator moves from being chiefly a producer of messages to becoming a steward of intelligence, coherence and meaning.

    2. According to the report, what stays constant even as AI transforms communications?

    The report is very clear that the fundamentals do not change even when the tools do. Across different chapters, it returns to two enduring anchors: trust and behaviour. Communications, in the author’s view, has always been about credibility and action — earning belief and shaping what people do. In the AI era, these anchors become more rather than less important because synthetic content, deepfakes and machine-generated noise make trust scarcer and therefore more valuable.

    The paper also identifies five timeless principles that should still guide the profession: truth and transparency, audience understanding, narrative coherence, reciprocity and feedback, and governance and accountability. These are presented almost as first principles for navigating AI disruption. The implication is that while AI may transform production, distribution and optimisation, it does not remove the need for human honesty, empathy, judgment and responsibility.

    That continuity matters because it gives the report its normative centre. The author is not celebrating automation for its own sake. The paper argues that AI-native communications should be assessed by whether intelligence is aligned with integrity, whether meaning remains coherent, and whether human accountability is preserved.

    3. How does the report say the work of communicators will change in practice?

    The report says communicators will increasingly work inside hybrid systems made up of humans and intelligent agents. In these systems, AI will handle more of the executional load: drafting, monitoring, summarising, simulating reactions, spotting reputational risks and supporting decisions in real time. Humans, meanwhile, will focus more on interpretation, ethical judgment, tone, legitimacy and connection.

    One of the strongest ideas in the whitepaper is the shift from “messages” to “meaning systems”. In the old model, communications teams created messages and distributed them through chosen channels. In the new model, messages are filtered, rewritten, summarised and ranked by algorithms before they reach audiences. That means communicators can no longer assume control over the final expression of what they say. Their job becomes designing the system around intent, boundaries, tone and ethics so that AI-generated outputs still cohere over time.

    The paper also says roles will become less rigid. Traditional job boundaries such as press officer, content manager or speechwriter weaken as AI absorbs more production work. What becomes valuable are higher-order capabilities: sensemaking, narrative judgment, ethical discernment and orchestration. Measurement changes too: instead of counting outputs, speed or reach, the report says the function should focus on trust, credibility and behavioural effect.

    A further practical change concerns career development. The report worries that entry-level apprenticeship work may erode if AI takes over research, drafting and scheduling. That creates a paradox: short-term productivity may rise while long-term human capability weakens. So the future communicator is imagined not as someone learning by doing repetitive tasks, but as someone learning to supervise, question and guide intelligent systems.

    4. What leadership model does the report propose for communications chiefs and senior teams?

    The report argues that leadership must shift from control to coherence. Because AI systems are probabilistic rather than fully predictable, leaders cannot simply rely on traditional command-and-control models. Instead, they need to create clear intent, shared values, ethical boundaries and governance structures that keep human judgment at the centre.

    A core principle here is the “human communicator-in-the-loop”. The report insists that AI can assist, accelerate and act, but cannot be accountable. Responsibility for truth, tone and trust must remain human. This is not framed as a minor safeguard but as a foundational leadership doctrine for the AI-native communications function. Humans do not need to approve everything, but they must intervene wherever legitimacy, emotion, trust or significant consequences are involved.

    For chief communications officers in particular, the report outlines a changing role across three phases. In Phase I, the CCO is a learner who builds fluency, shared language and psychological safety around AI. In Phase II, the CCO becomes an architect who integrates AI into workflows, governance and cross-functional collaboration. In Phase III, the CCO becomes a steward of intelligence, acting as the moral and narrative compass for a function whose “Comms Cortex” sits at the centre of the operating model.

    This leadership model is as cultural as it is technical. The paper stresses that people do not simply need tools; they need readiness, trust and inclusion. Leaders must explain why AI is being adopted, what will change, and what must not change. In that sense, the paper presents AI transformation not as a software implementation exercise, but as an exercise in organisational meaning-making and ethical design.

    5. What roadmap does the report offer, and what are its main implications for organisations?

    Rather than promising a fixed end state, the report offers what it calls the “Scriptorium Journey”, a three-phase path towards an AI-native communications function. Phase I, “Wake Up and Skill Up”, is about literacy, orientation and ethical grounding. Phase II, the “Agentic Foundry”, is where experimentation becomes structured integration and hybrid workflows begin to take shape. Phase III, “AI Native and Hybrid Teams”, is the point at which intelligence becomes the organising logic of the function and the Comms Cortex becomes its central cognitive infrastructure.

    One of the report’s most interesting assumptions is that organisations should stop thinking in terms of static target operating models. Because AI is evolving too quickly, the author argues that success should not be defined as reaching a final destination. Instead, organisations need a quarterly rhythm of foresight, experimentation, leadership alignment, team immersion and ongoing evolution. Readiness and relevance over time matter more than finishing a transformation programme.

    The wider implication is that hesitation also carries risk. The report warns that organisations that delay may find their voice increasingly shaped by systems they do not govern. By contrast, those that redesign communications deliberately around intelligence, while retaining human accountability, can preserve trust, relevance and strategic influence. In the paper’s closing logic, the future function may be smaller in structure but deeper in purpose: less focused on output volume, more focused on aligning purpose, perception and behaviour at scale.

    Overall, the report is less a research study than a strategic manifesto for senior communications leaders. Its value lies in the conceptual framework it offers: AI as a structural shift, trust and behaviour as constants, human accountability as non-negotiable, and transformation as a continuing leadership rhythm rather than a one-off change project.

  • Global Foresight 2036 by the Atlantic Council

    Global Foresight 2036 by the Atlantic Council

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods strategic foresight publication from the Atlantic Council that combines original survey research, expert commentary, six “snow leopard” horizon-scanning essays, and a shorter AI discussion section.

    Its core empirical base is the organisation’s fourth annual survey of 447 geostrategists and foresight practitioners from 72 countries, fielded in November and December 2025; the respondent pool is global, though roughly half are US citizens and the sample is drawn from the Atlantic Council’s network rather than a general population sample.

    Length: 76 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/global-foresight-2036/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the world of 2036?

    The report’s central argument is that the decade ahead is likely to be more unstable, more fragmented, and more dangerous than the present, even though the exact future cannot be predicted with certainty. Rather than offering a single forecast, the report uses foresight to map the pressures, risks, and directional shifts that experts think are most likely to shape 2036.

    Its overall tone is notably pessimistic. The opening findings state that 63 percent of respondents expect the world in 2036 to be worse off than it is now, while only 37 percent think it will be better. The report frames this darker mood through a cluster of reinforcing trends:

    • intensifying US-China rivalry
    • a possible hot conflict over Taiwan
    • weakening multilateral institutions
    • democratic decline
    • nuclear proliferation
    • climate stress
    • and rapid AI advances whose benefits are matched by growing concern.

    At the same time, the report is not purely apocalyptic. It argues that foresight is valuable precisely because it helps policymakers and readers prepare for multiple possible futures, including surprising ones. That is why the publication pairs survey findings with under-the-radar “snow leopards” and a separate AI section: the aim is not just to describe probable big trends, but to widen the reader’s field of vision.

    2. What are the report’s main findings from the expert survey?

    The report organises its main survey results into ten headline findings. The most prominent is that respondents broadly expect China to surpass the United States economically by 2036, even if they do not think China will simply replace the US as an uncontested global hegemon. Instead, most foresee either bipolar competition or a more diffuse multipolar system. They also increasingly expect China to attempt to take Taiwan by force, and more than 40 percent foresee another world war, most likely sparked in Taiwan or surrounding waters.

    A second major finding is that NATO is expected to survive, but not unchanged. Respondents are divided on whether it will become more or less influential, yet 44 percent think it will no longer exist in its current form by 2036. The survey also suggests growing doubts about whether the United States will still play the same commanding role within the alliance.

    On Russia and Ukraine, the survey points away from a decisive Russian victory and toward a frozen conflict. Respondents also see Russia as a diminished power by 2036, though still potentially dangerous, especially in nuclear terms. On AI, a majority believe artificial general intelligence could emerge within the decade, and more respondents still see AI as a net positive than a net negative, though the gap has narrowed as concern rises.

    Other major findings include:

    • expectations of wider nuclear proliferation, especially involving Iran and possibly Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan, and some NATO countries
    • a more autonomous but still strategically limited Europe
    • declining climate cooperation even as warming worsens
    • weakening global institutions alongside democratic erosion
    • and continued dollar dominance, though with crypto seen as the biggest challenger rather than another national currency.

    3. What evidence and patterns in the report best reveal how experts think power is shifting?

    One of the clearest patterns is that respondents do not think the future belongs to a single dominant actor in the way the post-Cold War era was often understood. The report repeatedly points to diffusion, contestation, and erosion of established forms of leadership. China is seen as rising strongly in economic power, nearly matching the US in technology and diplomacy, while the United States is still expected to remain militarily pre-eminent. That split itself is telling: respondents appear to be imagining a world where different forms of power are no longer concentrated in one state.

    Another pattern is institutional weakening.

    Respondents expect the United Nations, UN Security Council, WTO, World Bank, and IMF all to lose influence over the next decade.

    That suggests not merely dissatisfaction with current institutions, but a broader expectation that the post-1945 order is fraying. The report explicitly connects this decay with democratic recession, arguing that respondents who foresee deeper democratic decline are especially likely to expect institutional weakening and a worse overall world.

    A third pattern concerns regional and bloc-level reconfiguration. Europe is not expected to become the world’s leading military, economic, or tech power, yet respondents increasingly think it will achieve greater strategic autonomy. NATO may endure, but in altered form. The Global South section then adds another layer by showing that respondents from those countries often expect even sharper shifts away from US primacy and are more inclined to see China rising, Russia doing better in Ukraine, and even internal US breakdown.

    Together, these patterns show that the report is less about simple replacement of one superpower by another and more about a messy redistribution of influence across states, blocs, technologies, markets, and non-state actors.

    4. What does the report suggest about the role of technology and underappreciated trends in shaping the future?

    The report treats technology as both a direct force of change and a lens that reshapes how other global risks unfold. AI is the most obvious example. Respondents expect major advances, including the possible arrival of AGI within a decade, and the report presents AI as a technology with systemic implications for economics, geopolitics, knowledge production, and everyday life. But the accompanying expert discussion is more cautious than the survey toplines: Atlantic Council specialists stress that today’s AI is not good at truly forecasting the future, that AGI is far from certain, and that trust, energy demands, and market instability could constrain progress.

    The six “snow leopards” deepen this technological and horizon-scanning emphasis. These essays focus on phenomena that may be easy to overlook now but could become highly consequential. They include:

    1. Private tech firms shaping conflict outcomes
    2. Circular rather than one-way migration
    3. Kelp forests as climate and economic assets
    4. The erosion of the human rights order
    5. AI-driven cultural erasure
    6. Neurotechnology capable of decoding thought.

    What unites these cases is the report’s belief that future disruption will not come only from the usual headline issues. Some of the biggest shifts may emerge from domains that sit between established categories: companies behaving like geopolitical actors, migration functioning as an innovation loop, environmental restoration becoming industrial strategy, or data bias turning into cultural loss. This part of the report broadens the frame beyond interstate competition and argues for paying attention to early signals and second-order effects.

    5. What are the report’s biggest implications for policymakers, strategists, and communicators?

    The report’s main implication is that leaders should prepare for a world defined less by stability and rule-bound cooperation than by rivalry, fragmentation, and institutional stress. For policymakers, this means planning for deterrence, alliance adaptation, nuclear risk, democratic erosion, and climate-related conflict at the same time rather than treating them as separate silos. The report’s structure itself makes that point: geopolitics, democracy, climate, finance, and technology are deeply entangled.

    A second implication is that strategic assumptions inherited from the post-Cold War period look increasingly fragile. The report suggests that US leadership can no longer be taken for granted, NATO may need redesign rather than maintenance alone, and multilateral bodies may not be capable of managing future crises in the way they were once expected to. That pushes strategists toward resilience, contingency planning, and coalition-building under less favourable conditions.

    For communicators, the report is especially useful as a map of narratives that may dominate the coming decade:

    • democratic decline
    • technological disruption
    • geopolitical fragmentation
    • and competing visions of order.

    It also shows that audiences are unlikely to share a single worldview.

    The section on Global South respondents is particularly important here, because it demonstrates that expectations about the future vary significantly by geography and political vantage point. In practical terms, this means communication about global risk, strategy, or public policy will increasingly need to account for fragmented perceptions rather than assuming one shared interpretive frame.

    The final implication is methodological: the report argues implicitly for foresight as a discipline of disciplined imagination rather than prediction. Its value lies not in claiming certainty, but in helping readers test assumptions, notice emerging signals, and think more seriously about consequences before they fully arrive.

  • A.I. Radar 2026 by BCG

    A.I. Radar 2026 by BCG

    About the paper

    BCG AI Radar 2026 is a survey-based report on corporate AI investment, CEO ownership of AI transformation, and the rise of agentic AI.

    It is based primarily on BCG’s 2026 AI Radar Survey of 2,360 executives, including 640 CEOs, across multiple industries and markets including the US, Europe, India, Japan, Greater China, the Middle East and Africa.

    The methodology is original survey research, supplemented in places by BCG analysis, BCG client experience, and a separate BCG–MIT Sloan Management Review dataset.

    Length: 29 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.bcg.com/publications/2026/as-ai-investments-surge-ceos-take-the-lead

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that AI has moved from experimental technology investment to a strategic, CEO-level transformation agenda. BCG’s core claim is that corporate AI investment is not only increasing sharply, but is also becoming more durable: organisations are planning to keep investing even if near-term financial returns disappoint.

    The clearest evidence is that projected AI investment has roughly doubled from 2025 to 2026, rising from around 0.8% to 1.7% of organisational revenue. At the same time, 94% of organisations say they will continue investing even if their AI initiatives do not pay off in 2026. Only 6% say they would pull back.

    The deeper message is that BCG sees AI no longer as a CIO-led technology programme, but as a broad business transformation. This is why the report places so much emphasis on CEOs: 72% of CEOs surveyed say they are now the main decision maker on AI, twice the share reported the previous year.

    2. What evidence does BCG provide that AI investment is becoming more serious and sustained?

    BCG provides three main pieces of evidence.

    First, AI investment as a share of revenue is projected to double in 2026. The report shows AI investment rising from about 0.6% of revenue in 2024, to 0.8% in 2025, and then to 1.7% in 2026. That is a significant escalation, especially because BCG notes that the average base revenue of the underlying companies has remained almost the same.

    Second, the increase is broad-based across industries. The chart on page 7 shows all industries planning higher AI investment in 2026. Technology leads at 2.1% of annual revenue, followed by financial institutions at 2.0%, insurance and energy/utilities at 1.9%, consumer at 1.7%, and healthcare at 1.6%. Industrials and real estate are lower at 0.8%, but still show an increase.

    Third, the commitment appears resilient. On page 5, BCG reports that 70% of respondents would “stay the course” or make strategic changes if AI does not deliver the desired financial impact in the next 12 months, while 24% would ramp up resourcing or invest in outside experts. That means disappointment would not necessarily reduce investment; for many organisations, it could trigger more disciplined or more aggressive implementation.

    3. How is leadership of AI changing inside organisations?

    The report’s second major argument is that AI transformation is becoming CEO-led rather than CIO-led. This is one of the most important shifts in the deck.

    BCG reports that 72% of CEOs say they are the main decision maker on AI in their organisation, twice the level from the previous year. It also reports that 82% of CEOs are more optimistic about AI’s ability to deliver ROI than they were 12 months earlier.

    The report goes further by linking AI success to CEO job security. Half of surveyed CEOs believe their job stability depends on getting AI investments and strategy right by 2026. That is a striking framing: AI is not presented merely as a productivity tool, but as a defining test of executive leadership.

    BCG also shows that CEOs express stronger conviction than other executive groups. On page 13, CEOs are slightly ahead of CIOs/CTOs in saying they are ready to lead an AI transformation, confident AI will pay off, and expecting major role disruption by 2030. The implication is that AI is becoming a top-management issue because it affects operating models, workforce design, competitive advantage, and future business models.

    4. What role does agentic AI play in the report’s argument?

    Agentic AI is presented as the next major mechanism through which organisations expect to see measurable value from AI. BCG reports that around 90% of CEOs believe AI agents will enable their organisations to report measurable ROI in 2026, and that CEOs have committed more than 30% of their organisation’s 2026 AI investment to agentic AI.

    The report describes agentic AI as both an opportunity and a risk. On cybersecurity, for example, 59% of leaders see AI agents as both a threat and an opportunity. The same capabilities that make agents useful — automation, scale, system access, continuous learning — can also make them dangerous if misused, hacked, or poorly governed.

    The report also uses BCG–MIT Sloan Management Review data to show that AI applications are expected to take on broader roles in organisations. Currently, 26% of organisations say AI acts as an assistant; in three years, that rises to 61%. The expected role of AI as colleague, coach, mentor, rival, and even boss also increases substantially. This supports BCG’s point that agentic AI is not just a software upgrade; it changes how companies organise work, decision-making, and governance.

    5. What does BCG believe separates leading CEOs from the rest?

    BCG identifies three CEO archetypes: Followers, Pragmatists, and Trailblazers.

    Followers, around 15% of CEOs, recognise AI’s potential but lack full conviction and make cautious early investments. Pragmatists, around 70%, are excited and confident but invest when they see clear value and lower risk. Trailblazers, around 15%, are the most committed group: they invest more heavily, upskill more of their workforce, spend more time deepening their own AI expertise, and are more confident that AI will deliver ROI.

    The report’s most important distinction is that Trailblazers create a “positive flywheel”. They make AI and agentic AI a top priority, deepen their own AI literacy, commit capital at scale, upskill the organisation, and track measurable ROI. For example, Trailblazers spend around 60% of their AI budget on agentic AI, compared with 25% for Pragmatists and Followers. They also allocate around 60% of their AI budget to upskilling and retraining the current workforce, and report that around 70% of their workforce has been upskilled or reskilled on AI.

    BCG’s practical conclusion is therefore quite direct: CEOs must act decisively. The final recommendation is a five-part agenda:

    1. Make AI a key priority
    2. Deepen AI literacy
    3. Commit investments at scale
    4. Upskill the organisation
    5. Track measurable ROI.

    The report’s underlying assumption is that AI advantage will not come mainly from adopting tools, but from executive commitment, organisational redesign, workforce capability, and disciplined measurement.

  • The Global Risks Report 2026 by World Economic Forum

    The Global Risks Report 2026 by World Economic Forum

    About the paper

    The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2026 examines global risks across 2026, 2028 and 2036, framing the period as an “age of competition” shaped by geo-economic confrontation, societal fragmentation, technological acceleration and environmental stress.

    It is a mixed-methods report based on the Global Risks Perception Survey of over 1,300 experts worldwide, the Executive Opinion Survey of over 11,000 business leaders in 116 economies, and foresight input from 161 experts through interviews and workshops conducted between May and November 2025.

    Length: 102 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2026/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the global risk landscape in 2026–2036?

    The report’s central argument is that the world is entering an “age of competition” in which cooperation is weakening just as global risks are becoming faster, more interconnected and more systemic. The report does not present predictions, but rather a set of plausible risk trajectories intended to support prevention and preparedness.

    Its core diagnosis is that geopolitical and geo-economic rivalry are no longer separate risk categories; they are becoming organising forces that shape the entire risk landscape. Trade, finance, technology, supply chains and infrastructure are increasingly treated as instruments of power. This creates a world in which confrontation replaces collaboration, and where multilateral institutions struggle to manage cross-border problems.

    The report’s tone is notably pessimistic. Half of surveyed experts expect a turbulent or stormy global outlook over the next two years, rising to 57% over the next decade. Only 1% expect a calm outlook across either time horizon. The implication is that instability is not viewed as a temporary disruption, but as a structural condition of the coming decade.

    2. Which risks dominate the short-term outlook, and why?

    In the immediate and two-year outlook, geo-economic confrontation is the dominant concern. It is identified as the top risk most likely to trigger a material global crisis in 2026, selected by 18% of respondents, followed by state-based armed conflict at 14%. Over the two-year horizon, geo-economic confrontation is also ranked as the most severe risk.

    This reflects the report’s view that economic instruments are increasingly being used for strategic advantage. Sanctions, tariffs, investment controls, technology restrictions, supply-chain weaponisation and resource competition are no longer peripheral policy tools; they are becoming central features of international rivalry. The report argues that this threatens the core of the interconnected global economy.

    Other short-term risks cluster around the same underlying instability. Misinformation and disinformation ranks second over the two-year horizon, societal polarisation third, extreme weather fourth, and state-based armed conflict fifth. Cyber insecurity, inequality and erosion of civic freedoms also feature in the top 10. This shows that the report sees short-term risk as a combination of geopolitical confrontation, social fragmentation and information disorder.

    Economic risks also rise sharply in the two-year outlook. Economic downturn and inflation each rise eight places compared with the previous year, while asset bubble burst rises seven places. The report links these concerns to debt pressures, volatile markets, potential AI-related investment bubbles and the broader uncertainty created by protectionism and geo-economic rivalry.

    3. How does the long-term risk outlook differ from the two-year outlook?

    The long-term outlook shifts from geopolitical and economic confrontation towards environmental and technological risks. Over the 10-year horizon, extreme weather events rank first, followed by biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, critical change to Earth systems, misinformation and disinformation, and adverse outcomes of AI technologies. Half of the top 10 long-term risks are environmental.

    This creates one of the report’s central tensions: environmental risks are being deprioritised in the short term even though they remain dominant in the long term. The report notes that most environmental risks decline in the two-year ranking and also show reduced short-term severity scores compared with the previous year. Yet over 10 years, environmental risks remain the most severe category.

    The report’s interpretation is that immediate geopolitical, economic and societal pressures are crowding out longer-term collective priorities. In practical terms, climate and biodiversity risks remain existential, but political attention is being pulled towards wars, protectionism, inflation, debt, social unrest and technological disruption.

    This is one of the report’s most important implications: the world may be paying less attention to the risks that experts still see as most severe over the coming decade.

    4. What role do technology, AI and quantum developments play in the report’s risk assessment?

    Technology is presented as a source of enormous opportunity and systemic risk. In the short term, the report is most concerned with misinformation and disinformation, cyber insecurity and the way digital technologies amplify social polarisation. Misinformation and disinformation ranks second in the two-year outlook, while cyber insecurity ranks sixth.

    AI becomes much more important over the long term. “Adverse outcomes of AI technologies” rises from #30 in the two-year outlook to #5 in the 10-year outlook — the largest upward shift across all 33 risks surveyed. The report highlights several possible consequences: labour-market disruption, higher inequality, loss of purpose and social belonging, information chaos, concentration of economic power, and risks from military uses of AI.

    The report’s AI chapter is especially concerned with a scenario it describes as “jobless productivity”: productivity rises because of AI, but employment opportunities shrink or become more unevenly distributed. This could deepen inequality and social polarisation, particularly if middle-class and white-collar work is disrupted faster than societies can adapt.

    Quantum technologies are treated as a more distant but potentially severe frontier risk. The report highlights the possibility that quantum computing could undermine current cryptographic systems, threatening digital authentication, data privacy and trust infrastructure. It also warns that quantum leadership could become another domain of strategic rivalry, widening economic and geopolitical divides.

    5. What does the report imply about cooperation, governance and resilience?

    The report’s underlying message is that cooperation is becoming harder at precisely the moment when it is most needed. Multilateralism is described as under pressure from declining trust, protectionism, weakening rule of law and the rise of more adversarial national strategies.

    The report does not argue that cooperation has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that cooperation will need to look different. In a more fragmented world, global treaties may be harder to achieve, so the report points to coalitions of the willing, minilateral agreements, public-private partnerships, multi-stakeholder engagement, public awareness, education, R&D and corporate resilience strategies as practical mechanisms for risk reduction.

    The report’s perspective is pragmatic rather than optimistic. It assumes that the current order is weakening, but not that collapse is inevitable. Its conclusion is that resilience will depend on rebuilding trust, protecting institutional capacity, investing in adaptive infrastructure, preparing societies for technological disruption, and finding new forms of cooperation even amid competition.

    The most important strategic implication is that risk management can no longer be treated as domain-specific. Geopolitics affects economics; economics affects social trust; social distrust affects governance; technology affects all of them; and environmental risks continue to intensify in the background. The report’s core warning is that leaders must prepare for compounding risks, not isolated crises.

  • Journalism and Technology Trends and Predictions 2026 by Reuters

    Journalism and Technology Trends and Predictions 2026 by Reuters

    About the paper

    The report examines the strategic pressures, technology shifts, and business-model changes likely to shape journalism in 2026, with a strong focus on generative AI, platform dependency, creators, video, and misinformation.

    It is a mixed-methods industry trends report drawing primarily on a closed survey of 280 senior news leaders from 51 countries and territories, supplemented by background interviews, industry examples, and third-party data such as Chartbeat analytics; the survey is global in scope but not a representative sample of the wider industry.

    Length: 47 pages

    More information / download:
    https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/journalism-media-and-technology-trends-and-predictions-2026

    Core Insights

    1. Why does the report argue that journalism faces a particularly acute strategic squeeze in 2026?

    The report’s central argument is that journalism is being squeezed simultaneously by technological disruption and cultural-platform disruption. On one side, generative AI is changing how people access information, especially through search engines turning into answer engines and AI tools surfacing information directly in chat interfaces rather than sending traffic to publishers. On the other side, creators and influencers are pulling attention towards more personality-led, platform-native content that often feels more direct, relevant, or entertaining than traditional institutional journalism.

    The report frames this as an existential challenge because it affects both economics and legitimacy. Economically, publishers fear a major drop in referral traffic from search and social platforms. Culturally and politically, journalism is also under pressure from declining trust, direct-to-audience communication by politicians and celebrities, and continued attacks on news media as biased or fake. The report suggests that journalism is no longer just competing with rival publishers, but with AI intermediaries, platform algorithms, and creator ecosystems that change how audiences discover and value information.

    This squeeze is reflected in industry sentiment. Only 38% of surveyed leaders say they are confident about journalism’s prospects in the year ahead, which the report says is 22 percentage points lower than in 2022. At the same time, 53% remain confident about their own organisation’s prospects. That contrast matters: the report suggests many executives believe their own brand may survive or adapt, even while the broader health of journalism as a public institution deteriorates.

    2. What evidence does the report provide that AI and platform shifts are already reshaping access to news and publisher traffic?

    One of the report’s most concrete findings is that publishers expect search traffic to decline by 43% on average over the next three years. That expectation is linked to Google AI Overviews, AI mode, and the wider shift from search engines that send users outward to answer engines that satisfy users inside the interface. The report also notes that around a fifth of respondents expect a loss of more than 75% of their company’s search traffic.

    The report backs this up with Chartbeat data. Across a network of more than 2,500 sites, Google Search referrals were down 33% globally year-on-year between November 2024 and November 2025, and down 38% in the United States. Google Discover traffic was also down. By contrast, Facebook and X showed modest year-on-year increases in that specific comparison period, but the longer trend remains negative: over roughly the last two and a half years, Facebook referrals fell by 43% and X referrals by 46%. The point is not that one channel is collapsing overnight, but that publishers are losing stability across several external traffic sources at once.

    The report also shows that AI referral growth is real but still tiny in commercial terms. ChatGPT referrals to publishers are rising quickly, yet they remain a tiny fraction of overall traffic. The report says Google delivers 500 times as many referrals as ChatGPT from search alone, and 1,300 times as many if Google Discover is included. So the immediate issue is not that AI platforms already replace traditional traffic at scale, but that they may erode old discovery systems much faster than they create meaningful new value for publishers.

    This is why the report highlights publisher ambivalence towards AI platforms. Publishers are weighing lawsuits, licensing deals, visibility strategies, and new optimisation practices such as AEO and GEO. The implication is that access to audiences is becoming less about classic SEO and more about negotiating with, supplying, or optimising for AI-mediated distribution systems.

    3. How does the report think publishers will respond editorially and strategically to these pressures?

    The clearest editorial response in the report is a shift towards distinctiveness. Survey respondents say journalism should focus more on original reporting, contextual analysis, community-building, human stories, fact-checking, and opinion or commentary. These are all framed as forms of journalism that are harder for AI systems to commoditise or summarise into generic output. Conversely, publishers expect to pull back from service journalism, evergreen content, and general news, because those formats are more easily absorbed by chatbots and aggregators.

    The report also points to a format shift. Publishers increasingly see video and audio as strategic priorities in response to AI. Seventy-nine per cent say it is important to invest more in video, and 71% say the same for audio. Text is still important, but the report suggests its economic and competitive position is weakening because AI can cheaply generate, remix, and summarise text-based content. Video and audio are seen as more defensible, more engaging, and more suited to platform discovery.

    Distribution strategy is changing too. For 2026, publishers plan to put more effort into YouTube, AI platforms, TikTok, Instagram, and LinkedIn, while reducing effort on X, Facebook, and old-style Google Search optimisation. This reflects a move away from legacy social and search habits towards video-heavy environments and AI interfaces. It also reflects the report’s broader argument that publishers need to meet audiences where attention is moving, even if that means adjusting tone, format, and production logic.

    The report adds an important nuance: not all publishers will pursue the same path. Some will double down on distinctiveness and direct audience relationships, while others will lean further into automation and scale. The report describes a possible “barbell effect”, with highly distinctive human journalism at one end and highly automated low-cost publishing at the other, leaving mid-market undifferentiated outlets especially vulnerable.

    4. What does the report say about the growing influence of creators, video culture, and personality-led journalism?

    The report treats the creator wave as one of the defining shifts in the media environment. It argues that platform changes have turbo-charged creator economics by favouring viral, personality-led, video-first content over traditional link-sharing and institutional distribution. Publishers are worried primarily about creators taking time and attention away from publisher content: 70% are somewhat or very concerned about that. A smaller, but still significant, 39% are concerned about losing talent to the creator ecosystem.

    Importantly, the report does not present creators purely as a threat. It suggests they have become a model for authenticity, voice, and audience connection, even if much creator content is more opinion-led and partisan than traditional journalism. That duality matters: creators are competitors, but also proof that audiences respond to content that feels human, recognisable, and direct. Publishers, the report suggests, are learning from this without fully embracing its norms.

    That is why 76% of surveyed publishers say they will try to get journalists to behave a bit more like creators in 2026. Half plan to partner with creators for distribution, 31% say they may hire creators, and 28% are considering creator studios or joint ventures. Examples in the report include Wired building writers into platform personalities, CNN Creators, SPIL in the Netherlands, and various creator partnerships or branded ventures at the Independent, Vox Media, and the Washington Post.

    But the report also flags risks. Making journalists more personality-led may create conflicts around editorial standards, reputation, and independence. It may also help staff build their own followings and then leave. More fundamentally, moving too far towards creator logic may undermine some of the things audiences still value in institutional journalism, such as fairness, verification, and a consistent editorial voice. So the report sees creator influence as both necessary stimulus and strategic tension.

    5. What broader conclusions does the report draw about the future of journalism, newsroom AI, and sustainable business models?

    The report’s conclusion is neither apocalyptic nor reassuring. It argues that journalism is still in transition: old models are fading, new ones are emerging, and the eventual settlement is unclear. It suggests the industry will probably get smaller overall, with some audience attention permanently shifting elsewhere, but it rejects the idea that journalism becomes irrelevant. Reliable reporting, human stories, analysis, and trust still matter, especially in a media environment polluted by AI slop, misinformation, and manipulative content.

    On newsroom AI, the report is pragmatic rather than evangelical. AI use is spreading across back-end automation, coding, product development, commercial applications, newsgathering, and content creation with human oversight. Yet the impact so far is mostly described as promising or limited rather than transformational. Only 13% describe newsroom AI initiatives as transformational, while 44% say promising and 42% say limited. Likewise, AI has not yet translated into major labour savings for most organisations: 67% report no job cuts, 16% say they cut only a small number, and 9% say they have actually added jobs.

    On business models, subscriptions and membership remain the main priority, followed by display and native advertising, with events also important. The most notable emerging revenue area is platform payment for content, including AI-related licensing or revenue sharing, though the report makes clear that most publishers expect this to be, at best, a minor contribution rather than a transformative income stream. It also identifies structural barriers to innovation, especially lack of resources, skill shortages, siloed organisations, and weak strategic alignment.

    The final implication is that survival will depend less on chasing every trend and more on strategic clarity. The publishers most likely to thrive, according to the report, are those with a clear sense of their audience, their role, and the value they can create. That means being human where it matters, adaptable where necessary, and organised enough internally to experiment with new formats, products, and business models without losing editorial purpose.

  • FGS Global Radar 2026 – A Rewired World by FGS

    FGS Global Radar 2026 – A Rewired World by FGS

    About the paper

    The report argues that 2026 will be shaped by a “rewired” world marked by geopolitical fragmentation, deep public pessimism, widening gaps between elites and citizens, accelerating AI adoption, and increasingly atomised influence systems.

    It is a mixed-methods report based on 175 in-depth interviews with senior leaders and policy experts across business, politics, academia and media, combined with nationally representative polling of roughly 20,000 people across the US, Canada, the EU member states, the UK and Japan; public results are averaged across markets with equal weighting by country or bloc.

    The report is explicit about scale and broad geography, but does not clearly specify fieldwork dates or detailed polling procedures beyond that summary.

    Length: 56 pages

    More information / download:
    https://fgsglobal.com/radar

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the state of the world in 2026?

    The core argument is that the world is no longer merely volatile or uncertain; it has been fundamentally “rewired”. The report says the post-war rules-based order is fragmenting, international institutions are weakening, and politics is increasingly driven by strong leaders, national interest and spheres of influence rather than shared values or multilateral norms. It presents this as the defining context for 2026, with the US and China setting the pace and the rest of the world being forced to adapt.

    The report also argues that this rewiring is not only geopolitical. It is economic, technological and communicative. Economically, it sees a K-shaped pattern in which gains accrue unevenly, especially to high-income groups and tech-related sectors. Technologically, AI is portrayed as a major driver of practical business change, labour-market disruption and geopolitical competition. Communicatively, influence is becoming atomised, with mainstream media and traditional institutions losing authority while fragmented digital networks and AI-mediated information systems gain power.

    For leaders, the implication is that older assumptions about stability, consensus and institutional mediation are no longer dependable. The report’s message is that success in 2026 will depend on combining long-term strategic clarity with the agility to respond to constant disruption.

    2. What evidence does the report provide that public pessimism and distrust have reached a critical level?

    One of the report’s strongest findings is the depth and breadth of public pessimism across the 27 countries it polled. It says that in all 27 countries, substantial majorities believe the political system is failing ordinary people and needs fundamental reform, that public institutions are wasteful and badly run, that national identity is disappearing, that democracy is weakening, and that life will be harder for the next generation. It adds that 73% say their country feels divided. Denmark is singled out as the only country where one of these pessimistic propositions is not supported by a majority, which underscores how widespread the mood is elsewhere.

    The report interprets this as more than routine dissatisfaction. It explicitly says this level of pessimism is not normal and may not be sustainable. It describes a widening gap between elites and the broader public, especially in Europe, Japan and Canada, where confidence in governments and institutions is said to be collapsing. It also notes that even people who dislike Donald Trump may still admire his disruptive capacity to act, because many citizens feel conventional institutions no longer deliver results.

    Distrust also extends to information systems. In the stakeholder section, the report says only Denmark and Finland have more people trusting than mistrusting mainstream news media, while 61% overall believe mainstream media have their own agenda and cannot be trusted to report fairly. Politicians are described as the least trusted information source in every country surveyed. That finding strengthens the report’s wider claim that legitimacy is eroding across both politics and media.

    3. Which major divides does the report identify, and why do they matter?

    The report argues that 2026 will be defined by multiple reinforcing divides rather than one single cleavage. The first is the divide between elite and public opinion. Experts tend to see trade-offs as unavoidable on issues such as taxation, AI governance and business incentives, while the public often believes there are simple solutions if only better leaders were in charge. That gap matters because it creates fertile ground for populism and makes it harder for governments to build support for difficult but realistic policies.

    A second divide is between old and young. The report says both generations feel resources are skewed unfairly towards the other, while many experts fear that wealth transfer through inheritance will make success depend more on family assets than enterprise. At the same time, polling suggests younger generations are somewhat more optimistic than older ones in the short term, even though the public overall thinks life will be harder for the next generation. This divide matters because it combines economic frustration with perceptions of intergenerational unfairness.

    A third divide is between the engaged and the disengaged. Younger adults are less likely to follow politics and more likely to think voting makes no difference. The report says disengaged people are more likely to distrust others, believe globalisation has gone too far, downplay climate change and believe conspiracy theories. This matters because democratic systems depend on participation and basic confidence in shared reality.

    A fourth divide is between the global north and south, especially on climate and development. Experts argue that climate impacts are increasingly tangible in the global south, while economic pressure and populism in the north are pushing climate lower down the agenda. Yet publics in the surveyed democracies broadly oppose sending money overseas for climate or development support. This matters because climate disruption and migration pressures are likely to intensify just as willingness for cross-border solidarity weakens.

    4. How does the report portray the outlook for geopolitics, the economy, AI and climate in 2026?

    On geopolitics, the report expects 2026 to be shaped by strong leaders and weaker institutions. It presents the US and China as the two dominant powers, with more grey-zone conflict, strategic rivalry in trade and technology, and the rest of the world struggling to align. It says public pessimism is high about both US-China relations and the chances of peace in the Middle East and Ukraine. Europe is portrayed as pivotal but vulnerable: admired for stability, yet anxious about its competitiveness, growth and geopolitical relevance.

    On the economy, the report describes “a tale of two economies”. Experts are split between cautious optimists, who think the global economy will muddle through, and pessimists, who believe it is structurally fragile and overdue for correction. The report highlights over-leverage in the West, inflationary pressure, and heavy concentration of value in the “Magnificent 7” tech stocks. At the public level, affordability dominates: inflation and cost of living appear as the most important issue in several major markets, and many people believe growth mainly benefits those already well off.

    On AI, the report says the debate has shifted from whether AI will matter to how it will be implemented and with what consequences. Experts expect significant business evolution rather than total revolution, including agentic AI, more conversational models, greater robotisation and practical implementation across functions such as customer service, HR, finance and software development. But both experts and publics are concerned about employment effects: 70% of the public believe AI will destroy more jobs than it creates, and large majorities support stronger regulation and higher taxation of AI companies.

    On energy and sustainability, the report argues that current systems are not fit for purpose. Experts think infrastructure, regulation and planning are too slow to support either economic competitiveness or climate goals. Public concern about climate change remains high, but so do concerns about affordability. The report finds that most people support progress towards carbon neutrality at a slower pace to limit financial pain, rather than pushing ahead as fast as possible regardless of price increases.

    5. What perspective does the report take on leadership, and what are its main practical implications?

    The report clearly adopts a leadership-oriented perspective. It is written for decision-makers in business and politics, and its practical conclusion is that leadership in 2026 requires more than technical competence. Leaders need to understand fragmented realities, operate amid contested legitimacy, and make strategy resilient to volatility rather than built for stability. The report explicitly recommends building a “reality function” to interpret fractured environments, rebuilding strategy around volatility, treating affordability and fairness as non-negotiable constraints, and handling AI as both a capability issue and a social contract issue.

    Its assumptions are also visible. The report assumes that institutional weakening, pessimism and fragmentation are durable enough to shape business strategy directly. It assumes that political backlash, distrust and perceived unfairness will increasingly constrain what organisations can do. It also assumes that influence is no longer governed by a stable hierarchy of media, parties and institutions, but by a messy system of competing networks, platforms and AI-shaped information flows.

    The final practical message is that leaders must combine strategy, agility, authenticity and storytelling. Strategy matters because organisations need a stable destination. Agility matters because the route will keep changing. Authenticity matters because legitimacy is constantly contested. Storytelling matters because fragmented audiences do not absorb complexity easily, and leaders have to repeat and clarify their message in a crowded, distrustful environment. In that sense, the report is not just a diagnosis of 2026; it is also a guide to the leadership style it believes that environment now demands.

  • Corporate Affairs Trends for 2026 by FleishmanHillard

    Corporate Affairs Trends for 2026 by FleishmanHillard

    About the paper

    This is a forecast-style corporate affairs report for 2026 from FleishmanHillard, centred on three linked forces shaping the field: fragmentation, declining trust, and a more confrontational geopolitical environment.

    Methodologically, it is best described as a mixed-methods thought-leadership report grounded in the author’s original analysis, observation, discussions with colleagues, contacts and clients, and selective use of external datasets; there is no single disclosed sample, respondent count, or fieldwork design, and the geographic scope is broad but not clearly delimited, drawing on examples from markets including the UK, US, Germany and Japan.

    Length: 32 pages

    More information / download:
    https://fleishmanhillard.co.uk/2025/12/corporate-affairs-trends-for-2026/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the corporate affairs landscape in 2026?

    The core argument is that corporate affairs is becoming harder because the environment is simultaneously more fragmented, less trusting, and more geopolitically adversarial. The report says three forces stand out for 2026: fragmentation, decline of trust, and an increasingly confrontational geopolitical landscape. Rather than treating these as separate developments, it presents them as mutually reinforcing pressures that reshape how communicators reach audiences, build credibility and advise leadership.

    The report also makes clear that AI is not a standalone trend in this edition because its effects are now embedded across all the others. In other words, AI is treated as a horizontal force altering research, measurement, publishing, direct engagement and execution, but not replacing the need for human judgement in areas such as geopolitical assessment.

    Taken together, the report argues that the traditional model of corporate affairs, built around broad-reach media, relatively stable trust assumptions and a more predictable global environment, is no longer sufficient. The emerging model requires more precision, more segmentation, more direct publishing capability and greater sophistication in dealing with political risk and stakeholder complexity.

    2. Why does the report say that “everything gets smaller,” and what does that mean in practice?

    “Everything gets smaller” is the report’s shorthand for accelerating fragmentation. Drawing on Nicco Mele’s The End of Big, it argues that media, audiences, brands and institutions are all under pressure from digital atomisation, polarisation and weakening institutional authority. In practical terms, this means audiences are harder to reach at scale, general-interest channels are less dominant, and niche publishers, creators and platforms matter more than before.

    The report says audiences are moving towards specialist, high-value and trusted outlets, including titles such as the FT, Economist and Wall Street Journal, alongside podcasts and subscription platforms such as Substack. On page 13, it also points to the visual evidence that major news sites are seeing steep traffic declines while Substack shows growth, reinforcing the idea that the mass-media centre is weakening.

    A second part of this trend is economic: digital publishing is under pressure. The report argues that advertisers are likely to favour retail media networks and more directly attributable formats over traditional display advertising, while referral traffic from Google is declining as more users get information through AI-driven systems. That combination threatens publishers’ business models and may shrink the overall supply of quality journalism and analysis.

    For corporate affairs leaders, the implication is strategic rather than merely descriptive. The report says they will need to widen relationship-building beyond the “usual suspects”, understand audience channel preferences in greater depth, include niche publishers and influential Substack writers in plans, and adjust measurement frameworks to prioritise relevant reach and business-linked outcomes over broad reputational proxies.

    3. How does the report redefine trust, and why does it argue that “absolute trust” is ending?

    The report argues that trust can no longer be treated as a stable, universal measure of reputation. For years, communicators often used trust as a broad proxy for reputational strength, but the report says that assumption is breaking down because trust is now polarised and audience-relative rather than generalised.

    Its key evidence is that broad trust in institutions and news sources is weakening, while audiences increasingly trust the sources that align with their existing worldview. The report cites the Reuters Institute’s 2025 Digital News Report and notes that in 53 of the 54 countries surveyed there is a gap between trust in news generally and trust in “the news I use”. It also cites falling generalised trust levels in the UK, Germany and Japan, with US trust remaining low and flat.

    This leads to a fundamental strategic shift. A channel cannot simply be labelled “trusted” in the abstract. It may be trusted by one stakeholder segment and distrusted by another. On page 19, the report uses the US example to show how left-leaning and right-leaning audiences consume and trust different sources. That means communicators must think in terms of relative trust within specific audience groups rather than aggregate trust across society.

    The report pushes the logic further with the claim that “sounds true” increasingly beats “is true”. That is one of its strongest interpretive claims: in public debate, authority, emotional resonance and perceived credibility may matter more than factual correctness alone. The implication is not that facts no longer matter, but that institutions can no longer assume facts will persuade by themselves. They must communicate in ways that connect with audiences that do not automatically grant them trust.

    4. What role does AI play in the report’s view of communications strategy and direct audience engagement?

    AI runs through the report as an enabling and disruptive force. Early on, the author says AI is woven through the trends rather than isolated as its own section. The report’s view is that AI can materially improve efficiency, research, measurement and tactical delivery, but that its organisational adoption remains uneven and its limitations still constrain full replacement of human work.

    In the context of fragmentation and trust, AI also changes how audiences discover information. The report argues that communicators now need to think not only about reaching humans through media and owned channels, but also about influencing the GPT-based systems those audiences may consult. On page 23, it says earned media accounts for about half of the sources cited by common GPTs in responses about companies or brands, while owned content contributes roughly another fifth. That makes credible earned and owned content strategic assets in both human and machine-mediated discovery.

    This is one of the report’s more forward-looking ideas: businesses increasingly need to act as publishers, not only to reach stakeholders directly but also to shape the information environment from which AI systems draw. That makes publishing strategy more central to corporate affairs than in older media models. It also ties back to trust, because the report frames credible earned and owned content as “vital levers of influence”.

    At the same time, the report draws a limit around AI. In the geopolitical section, it says AI can help manage the growing complexity of communications execution, but management’s demand for geopolitical intelligence, assessment and advice remains a uniquely human capability. So the report is neither techno-utopian nor dismissive: it sees AI as highly useful, but not as a substitute for senior judgement.

    5. What are the report’s main conclusions for corporate affairs leaders, especially in a more zero-sum geopolitical world?

    The report’s third major conclusion is that geopolitical uncertainty is no longer a background condition; it is becoming a central operating reality for corporate affairs. It describes a world in which governments are more nationalistic, businesses are increasingly treated as instruments of power projection, and economic security is becoming intertwined with national security.

    This produces a “zero-sum” environment in which political actors increasingly think in terms of winners and losers, while global companies are trying to create value across multiple markets and stakeholder groups. The report says this tension makes life harder for multinational firms because supporting one government position can complicate operations elsewhere, and localisation strategies, though increasingly attractive, also multiply stakeholder complexity.

    Its practical conclusion is that corporate affairs teams must become more sophisticated systems operators. They need better geopolitical sensing, more formal scenario planning, stronger risk tracking and more structured use of AI for targeted execution. But they also need deeper human expertise, because navigating cross-currents between governments, markets and audiences is presented as a high-judgement advisory function, not just a communications task.

    So the report’s broader meaning is this: corporate affairs is moving away from broad-message distribution and towards high-complexity influence management. Success in 2026 will depend on understanding fragmented audiences, working with relative rather than universal trust, building stronger direct and AI-visible publishing capabilities, and helping leadership navigate a world where politics, economics and communications are tightly fused.

  • Communicating with Robots, Connecting to People by the Scriptorium Initiative

    Communicating with Robots, Connecting to People by the Scriptorium Initiative

    About the paper

    The whitepaper argues that AI will fundamentally reshape corporate communications over the next decade, especially through synthetic stakeholders, predictive systems, mass personalisation, and a renewed premium on human authenticity.

    Methodologically, it appears to be an expert whitepaper built on secondary analysis and illustrative examples rather than original empirical research; no fieldwork method, sample size, timeframe for data collection, or respondent base is clearly specified.

    The geographic focus is framed as global, but the evidence cited draws from a mix of U.S.-centric examples and selected international references, so the precise geographic boundaries of the underlying data are not clearly specified in the report.

    Length: 14 pages

    More information / download:
    https://page.org/knowledge-base/communicating-with-robots-connecting-to-people-nanne-bos-aegon/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the whitepaper’s central argument about how AI will change corporate communications?

    The central argument is that AI will not merely improve existing communication workflows but will transform the entire logic of corporate communications. The paper says the profession has already moved beyond asking whether AI will change communications and must instead focus on how that change will unfold. It frames AI as both a technological and geopolitical force, and suggests that the speed, scale, and sophistication of communication will be radically altered by systems such as GPT-4, Claude, and Grok.

    At the same time, the paper insists that the core purpose of corporate communications will remain stable. It explicitly says that communicators will still need to build trust, deepen understanding with stakeholders, maintain licence to operate, and influence behaviour. In other words, the mission stays the same, but the mechanisms and operating environment change dramatically.

    The whitepaper therefore presents AI not as a side issue or a tool trend, but as a structural shift that changes who receives messages, how they are interpreted, how fast they circulate, and what communicators are actually responsible for. Its five predictions are meant as a framework for navigating that transition while staying anchored in enduring communication goals.

    2. What does the paper mean by “synthetic stakeholders”, and why does it see them as so significant?

    The idea of “synthetic stakeholders” is one of the paper’s most important claims. It argues that, by the mid-2030s, people will increasingly rely on personal AI agents as their main interface with organisations. These agents will not simply summarise information; they will filter, verify, interpret, negotiate, and sometimes even decide on behalf of the human stakeholder. That means journalists, investors, employees, regulators, and customers may no longer engage with corporate communication directly, but through AI intermediaries.

    The report sees this as significant because it changes the locus of trust. Instead of stakeholders primarily trusting brands, institutions, or traditional media, they may trust their own AI agents more. That has major implications for reputation and influence. If AI agents become the gatekeepers of credibility, then communicators must create messages that are readable, interpretable, and verifiable by machines as well as by humans.

    The paper also links synthetic stakeholders to the “death of the single narrative”. It argues that AI agents will personalise information so extensively that there will no longer be one broadly shared version of a corporate story. Different stakeholders may receive materially different framings based on personal history, biases, preferences, and risk profiles. The implication is that communication becomes less about controlling one public narrative and more about maintaining coherence and credibility across many parallel, AI-mediated realities.

    3. How does the whitepaper describe the shift from mass communication to mass conversations and from reactive to predictive communications?

    The paper’s second and third predictions work together. First, it says the old broadcast model of one-to-many messaging is ending. In its place, organisations will engage in “mass conversations”: millions of simultaneous, AI-mediated, highly personalised interactions with stakeholders. These conversations will supposedly be context-aware, emotionally intelligent, and adapted to each person’s needs, role, behaviour, and preferences. Investors, employees, and customers would all receive tailored communication rather than standardised messages.

    This matters because the communicator’s role changes from crafting a single message to designing adaptive systems. The report suggests future communicators will define narrative models, supervise tone calibration, and audit huge numbers of micro-interactions. So communication becomes less a matter of publishing and more a matter of orchestrating intelligent, ongoing relationship management at scale.

    The move from reactive to predictive communications goes even further. The paper argues that AI will enable organisations to anticipate reputational risks, stakeholder disengagement, morale problems, or regulatory friction before they are visible through conventional means. It imagines AI systems that simulate possible stakeholder reactions, run communication scenarios in parallel, forecast trust impact, and identify likely virality or misinformation risks. In this model, communications becomes a foresight function rather than just a response function.

    Taken together, these two predictions describe a future in which corporate communication is continuous, personalised, and anticipatory. The communicator is recast as a strategist and overseer of adaptive systems, rather than primarily as a writer, spokesperson, or campaign manager.

    4. Why does the paper argue that human authenticity will become more valuable as AI becomes more powerful?

    The paper’s fourth prediction is that AI abundance will increase, not reduce, the value of human authenticity. Its reasoning is straightforward: as generative AI floods the information environment with cheap, abundant, low-value content, audiences will become more resistant to anything that feels synthetic or manipulative. The report refers to this as a coming “synthetic content crisis” and says AI filters will increasingly screen out content that lacks originality, emotional value, or resonance.

    In response, the communication that cuts through will be the communication that feels genuinely human. The paper highlights three qualities that will matter most: emotional depth, ethical clarity, and human voice. It argues that trust will increasingly attach to visible human sincerity rather than to polished, scaled, anonymous messaging. This is why it says communicators will become “custodians of authenticity” in a synthetic age.

    Importantly, the whitepaper does not frame this as an anti-AI argument. Instead, it advances the idea of “co-intelligence”: AI handles scale, complexity, translation, and real-time personalisation, while humans contribute judgment, moral reasoning, emotional nuance, vulnerability, and authenticity. So the paper’s conclusion is not that AI replaces human communication, but that the distinctively human elements become more strategically valuable as machine-generated communication proliferates.

    5. What are the report’s main implications for the future role, structure, and ethics of the communications function?

    The paper argues that the communications function will become AI-native. That means the department of the future will look very different from the traditional press-office or corporate affairs structure. Routine content production will increasingly be automated, while human professionals move into roles focused on oversight, orchestration, ethics, and strategic narrative design.

    It predicts new specialist roles such as:

    • AI Narrative Designers
    • Predictive Strategists
    • Communication Ethicists
    • and even Chief Narrative Intelligence Officers.

    It also says existing silos between internal communication, PR, investor relations, and brand strategy will weaken, giving way to a more unified narrative function powered by integrated AI systems. Teams may become smaller in headcount but more specialised in capabilities, drawing on disciplines such as linguistics, data science, behavioural psychology, and ethics.

    Ethics is a major theme here. The report repeatedly warns that predictive communications and AI-generated influence raise serious questions about manipulation, informed consent, transparency, and accountability. It therefore argues that strong governance frameworks will be essential, including explainable AI, clarity about data sources and model logic, and disclosure around synthetic humans or AI-generated messages. High-stakes moments such as layoffs, mergers, or crises are still presented as fundamentally human occasions in which AI should assist rather than replace human communicators.

    The deeper implication is that the future communicator is not just a better prompt writer or AI user. The role becomes more strategic, more cross-functional, and more ethically exposed. The paper’s perspective is that AI raises the bar for human communicators: they will need more judgment, more empathy, and more moral authority, not less.

  • Navigating the future of communication by Burson

    Navigating the future of communication by Burson

    About the paper

    The paper is a forward-looking trends report on how AI, media change, misinformation, data consolidation, Web3, and reputation risk are expected to reshape communications in 2025 and beyond.

    It appears to be a mixed secondary-analysis and thought-leadership report rather than original research: it synthesises external forecasts, surveys, risk reports, media articles, and Burson’s own strategic framing, but does not clearly specify a formal methodology, sample, fieldwork period, or a defined respondent base.

    The geographic scope is partly global and partly U.S.-centred: many headline claims are framed globally, but several examples and the closing policy section focus specifically on the United States.

    Length: 9 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.bursonglobal.com/insights/global/navigating-the-future-of-communications-10-innovation-trends-for-2025-and-beyond

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the future of communications?

    The core argument is that communications is entering a period of accelerated, technology-driven transformation in which AI is not just another tool but the main force reshaping how organisations understand audiences, manage risk, create content, monitor issues, and protect reputation. The report presents this as both a strategic opportunity and a survival challenge: communicators who adapt quickly will become more predictive, data-driven, and resilient, while those who do not risk falling behind in an increasingly volatile environment.

    Burson’s framing is not that one single trend dominates everything, but that several trends are converging at once. AI model improvement, agentic systems, fragmented media, misinformation, explainability, and proactive reputation management all reinforce one another. That means communications is becoming more complex, more technical, and more tightly connected to business strategy. The report repeatedly returns to the idea that communicators must move from reactive messaging to continuous monitoring, predictive analysis, and earlier intervention.

    The conclusion makes this explicit: future success depends on combining data-driven strategy with ethics, adaptability, and human judgement. In other words, the report argues that communications is becoming a more intelligence-led, risk-aware, and technologically mediated function, but one that still depends on trust, authenticity, and human connection.

    2. Which trends does the report identify as most important, and what practical shifts do they imply for communicators?

    The report’s ten trends are: rapid improvement in AI models and computing capacity; the rise of agentic frameworks; a shifting media landscape; data consolidation and intelligence; misinformation as a growing threat; the continuing importance of human expertise; explainable AI; cognitive AI for proactive reputation risk mitigation; convergence between Web3 and generative AI; and the growing importance of proactive reputation management.

    Taken together, these trends imply several practical shifts. First, communicators are expected to become more technologically fluent. The report says they must understand which AI models and tools to use for predictive messaging, crisis management, engagement, and analytics. Second, workflows are likely to become more automated through AI agents, but with a continued need for human oversight and authenticity. Third, media relations and social strategy can no longer focus only on established platforms; communicators need stronger social listening and broader platform awareness as the media environment fragments and becomes more politically charged.

    Fourth, the function becomes more data-intensive. Burson argues that communicators need stronger analytics capabilities and better integration of multiple data sources in order to spot patterns, measure performance, and anticipate issues. Fifth, reputation work becomes more preventive than reactive: predictive analytics, scenario planning, and faster response systems are presented as essential. Finally, the report suggests that communication leaders must build teams that blend AI literacy with strategic thinking, emotional intelligence, and crisis judgement. That is a notable shift away from seeing communications mainly as content production or media handling.

    3. What evidence and patterns does the report use to support its view of change?

    The report relies heavily on externally sourced statistics, market forecasts, and selected examples to create a picture of rapid acceleration. For AI, it cites projected global market growth to $2.58 trillion by 2032 and says training compute for leading models has doubled every six months. It also references recent model launches such as GPT-4.5, Gemini 2.5, and Gemini Robotics as evidence that capability is improving fast and expanding into more multimodal and physical-world applications.

    For media and misinformation, it points to Bluesky’s user growth, public concern about AI-driven misinformation, the spread of political deepfakes, and the World Economic Forum’s ranking of misinformation as the top short-term risk. These examples support a broader pattern: the information environment is becoming harder to control, less stable, and more vulnerable to manipulation.

    For data, trust, and reputation, the report cites enterprise adoption of real-time analytics, claims about efficiency gains from AI-driven data consolidation, projected growth in AI-powered risk-mitigation tools, and statistics linking strong reputation to faster crisis recovery and stronger purchase intent. The sector heatmap on page 7 adds another pattern: Burson argues that healthcare, technology, and financial services are likely to feel the strongest immediate impact from these trends, while trust-related issues such as explainability, misinformation, and reputation management matter broadly across sectors. Visually, the report uses charts and a heatmap to reinforce the idea that these changes are measurable, cross-sectoral, and already under way rather than speculative.

    4. What assumptions, perspective, and purpose shape the report?

    The report is clearly written from an industry advisory perspective. Its purpose is not only to describe future developments but to persuade communication leaders that they need to modernise their capabilities and invest in more advanced intelligence, monitoring, and risk-management approaches. The repeated “So what” sections show that the paper is designed as an actionable executive briefing rather than a neutral academic study.

    Its perspective is also shaped by Burson’s commercial position. The paper repeatedly frames the trends in ways that align with Burson’s services and proprietary tools, and later names products such as Sonar, Decipher, Flight School, and The Fount as solutions for the challenges described. That does not automatically invalidate the analysis, but it does mean the report should be read as strategic thought leadership with a business-development dimension, not as detached independent research.

    A further assumption running through the report is that more intelligence, more data integration, and more AI-supported foresight will generally improve communications outcomes. Another is that trust, transparency, and human judgement will remain crucial even as automation grows. The report therefore holds two ideas together: communications will become more machine-assisted, but legitimacy will still depend on explainability, credibility, and human expertise.

    5. What are the report’s main implications and conclusions for organisations and communication leaders?

    The main implication is that communications leaders need to rethink the function as an integrated capability spanning technology, intelligence, risk sensing, governance, and reputation strategy. This is no longer just about crafting messages; it is about building systems that can detect issues early, model likely reactions, respond quickly, and maintain trust across unstable media and political conditions.

    A second implication is organisational: teams will need reskilling. The report suggests that AI literacy, data fluency, and comfort with predictive tools will become baseline expectations, but that these must be combined with distinctly human strengths such as judgement, empathy, and crisis leadership. This implies changes in hiring, training, and operating models.

    A third implication concerns governance and trust. Because the report highlights misinformation, explainability, regulation, and political volatility, it suggests that communicators will increasingly sit closer to questions of ethics, compliance, public affairs, and executive risk management. The section on the 2025 U.S. administration makes that especially clear: communications is portrayed as operating in a more volatile regulatory and platform environment where policy shifts, moderation changes, tariffs, and infrastructure decisions affect both messaging and stakeholder trust.

    The final conclusion is that the winners will be the organisations that become proactive rather than reactive. Burson’s report consistently argues for earlier sensing, faster response, stronger data integration, and more scenario-based planning. Its ultimate message is that the future of communications belongs to organisations that can combine technological capability with transparency, agility, and human-centred judgement.

  • Global Foresight 2025 by the Atlantic Council

    Global Foresight 2025 by the Atlantic Council

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods foresight study on what the world may look like in 2035, combining an expert survey, short horizon-scanning essays on six under-the-radar “snow leopards,” and three written future scenarios.

    The original research element is a survey of 357 geostrategists and foresight practitioners drawn from the Atlantic Council’s networks, fielded in late November and early December 2024, with respondents spread across sixty countries plus the United States and representing every continent except Antarctica; the survey sample, however, skewed US-based, male, and older.

    Length: 84 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/global-foresight-2025/

    Core Insights

    1. What overall picture of the world in 2035 does the report present?

    The report presents a distinctly darker-than-light global outlook. Its central message is that many leading strategists expect the next decade to be shaped less by steady progress than by heightened instability, strategic rivalry, institutional weakness, and accumulating systemic risks. The report explicitly says that 62 percent of respondents think the world in ten years will be worse off than today, while only 38 percent think it will be better off.

    That pessimism is not absolute. The report notes some areas of guarded optimism, especially around artificial intelligence and climate cooperation. A majority of respondents think AI will have a net positive impact on global affairs over the next decade, and about half foresee expanded cooperation on climate change. But those brighter notes are outweighed by broader anxiety about war, nuclear risk, democratic decline, and geopolitical fragmentation.

    Structurally, the report is trying to do more than predict single outcomes. It says foresight cannot provide certainty, but it can help readers understand the forces already driving change and the possible consequences of those forces over the coming decade and beyond. That framing matters: this is not a forecast claiming “this will happen,” but an effort to map where expert opinion sees the heaviest risks and most consequential uncertainties.

    So the overall picture is of a world entering 2035 under pressure from several overlapping dynamics at once:

    • hard-power rivalry
    • erosion of the postwar order
    • weak prospects for conflict resolution
    • technological disruption
    • and climate-linked stress.

    The report’s worldview is therefore not just pessimistic but systemic: it suggests that multiple domains of instability are reinforcing each other.

    2. Which geopolitical and security risks do surveyed experts see as most likely to shape the next decade?

    The headline risk is major war. The report’s most striking finding is that 40 percent of respondents expect another world war by 2035, defined as a multifront conflict among great powers. It adds that this war could go nuclear and could extend into space, with 48 percent expecting nuclear weapons to be used by at least one actor in the coming decade and 45 percent expecting direct military conflict in space.

    The report identifies China and Russia as the main vectors through which a broader conflict could emerge. On China, 65 percent of respondents think Beijing will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, a sharp rise from the previous year’s survey. On Russia, 45 percent think Russia and NATO will engage in direct military conflict, also a significant increase year-on-year. In other words, the report suggests that expert concern is moving away from abstract rivalry and toward concrete expectations of military confrontation.

    Another major concern is bloc formation. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to become formal allies by 2035, and many foresee a world divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs. The report treats this as a potentially war-amplifying trend rather than merely a diplomatic realignment. Respondents who foresaw both bloc division and formal alliance-building were much more likely also to expect world war.

    Nuclear proliferation is another core risk. The report says 88 percent of respondents expect at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the next decade. Iran is by far the most cited likely new nuclear power, but expectations also rose for South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. On use, Russia and North Korea are seen as the most likely current nuclear powers to launch a nuclear strike.

    The report also shows pessimism about existing conflicts. On Ukraine, only 4 percent think the war will end on terms largely favourable to Ukraine; most expect either terms favourable to Russia or a frozen conflict. On the Middle East, respondents are much more optimistic about Israeli-Saudi normalisation than about Israeli-Palestinian peace. More than 60 percent expect the current status quo of occupied Palestinian territories to persist by 2035.

    Taken together, these findings suggest the report sees the coming decade as one in which escalation risks are rising across several theatres at once, while the mechanisms for resolving those conflicts appear weak.

    3. How does the report assess the future of US power, alliances, multilateral institutions, and democracy?

    The report’s view of the United States is nuanced: it still sees the US as the likeliest dominant military power in 2035, but a weaker and more uncertain leader in other domains. Seventy-one percent of respondents expect the US to remain militarily dominant, and 58 percent still see it as the leading technological innovator. But fewer expect it to dominate economically, diplomatically, or in soft power, and confidence has dropped across several of these measures compared with the previous year.

    That matters because the report implies that US power is increasingly relative rather than comprehensive. It is not presenting a picture of outright American collapse, but of a more limited United States operating in a multipolar world. Three-quarters of respondents expect the world in 2035 to be multipolar, with multiple centres of power.

    Alliances remain part of that picture, but with more uncertainty than before. A majority still expect the US to maintain its alliance network in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, yet this figure fell sharply from the previous survey. At the same time, almost half expect Europe to achieve greater “strategic autonomy” by taking more responsibility for its own security. So the report suggests a future in which alliances may persist, but under new terms and with more burden-sharing or hedging.

    On multilateral institutions, the mood is much grimmer. Large majorities expect the United Nations, the UN Security Council, and the World Trade Organization to be less capable of solving problems by 2035 than they are today. The World Bank and IMF fare somewhat better, while respondents are relatively more hopeful about regional groupings such as ASEAN, the EU, and even BRICS. That pattern reveals an important assumption in the report: global governance is likely to weaken, while regional or alternative formations may gain relative importance.

    The report is similarly downbeat on democracy. Nearly half of respondents think today’s democratic recession will worsen into a democratic depression by 2035, while only 17 percent foresee a democratic renaissance. It also says 65 percent expect global press freedom to decrease. So the report does not treat democratic backsliding as a side issue; it sees it as one of the defining trends of the next decade.

    There is also a gender dimension to that pessimism. Women in the survey were more negative than men across several questions, especially about nuclear use, democratic decline, rights curtailment, and future US dominance. The report interprets this as reflecting persistent inequalities and the unequal burden crises place on women.

    4. What overlooked “snow leopards” does the report argue could have outsized future impact?

    One of the report’s most distinctive features is its “snow leopards” section: six under-the-radar developments that may not dominate headlines now but could become highly consequential. This is the horizon-scanning part of the report, and it broadens the analysis beyond headline geopolitics.

    1.The first is the threat that non-state actors could attack undersea cables.

    The report argues that the global digital and financial system depends heavily on these cables and that they are vulnerable not only to states but also to militant groups or terrorists. Its core point is that a relatively low-cost attack on critical subsea infrastructure could produce outsized disruption across communications, finance, and military operations.

    2. The second is enhanced geothermal systems.

    The report presents this as a low-carbon energy source with major underexploited potential, noting that if technological and cost barriers fall, it could become a significant contributor to electricity generation in the United States. This is framed not merely as a climate story but as a strategic energy-development story.

    3. The third is a new carbon-capture material, COF-999, described as a yellow powder that could dramatically reduce the cost and resource intensity of pulling carbon dioxide from the air.

    The report does not claim this solves climate change, but it treats the discovery as an example of the sort of scientific breakthrough that could shift the economics of mitigation.

    4. The fourth is rewilding.

    Here the report argues that land abandonment, urbanisation, changing food systems, and ecological restoration could together make much more land available for rewilding, with implications for biodiversity, carbon capture, tourism, and land use. It also notes trade-offs and possible backlash, so this is presented as a consequential but contested trend.

    5. The fifth is quantum batteries.

    The report uses this as an example of a frontier technology that may transform energy storage, with particular attention to medical devices, emergency systems, and electric mobility. The point is not that the technology is ready now, but that its eventual impact could be large if the science translates into scalable applications.

    6. The sixth is Gen Z’s vulnerability to misinformation.

    This may be the most sociologically revealing of the snow leopards. The report challenges the assumption that digital natives are naturally better at navigating false information, arguing instead that heavy social media exposure, algorithmic feeds, parasocial influence, and weak verification habits may leave this generation especially susceptible. The long-term implication is that future elites may enter positions of power with distorted information habits and weaker trust.

    Across all six, the deeper message is that the future will not be shaped only by visible great-power rivalry. It may also be shaped by overlooked vulnerabilities, scientific breakthroughs, and social shifts that sit below the surface until they suddenly matter.

    5. What do the report’s three scenarios suggest about the range of possible global futures—and what is the report ultimately trying to make readers understand?

    The report ends with three scenarios for 2035:

    1. “The reluctant international order”
    2. “China ascendant”
    3. and “Climate of fear.”

    These are explicitly presented not as predictions but as plausible futures designed to stimulate thinking. That distinction is crucial. The scenarios are a tool for exploring interaction effects between present-day trends, not for declaring which future is most likely.

    “The reluctant international order” imagines a world in which the rules-based international order has neither collapsed nor been revitalised. Cooperation persists because major powers and non-state actors still need it, even if they engage reluctantly and pragmatically. This scenario suggests that messy, improvised, partial cooperation may be more realistic than either liberal renewal or total breakdown.

    “China ascendant” imagines a world in which Beijing becomes the dominant global power, not through one dramatic rupture but through a slow shift enabled by US inwardness, economic influence, institutional repositioning, and strategic patience. The point here is that geopolitical transformation need not come through open war; it can happen gradually through hedging, institutional drift, and changing perceptions of who is reliable and effective.

    “Climate of fear” imagines a world where worsening climate instability drives migration, political conflict, democratic stress, and escalating interest in radical responses such as geoengineering. This scenario shows the report’s assumption that climate change is not just an environmental issue but a force multiplier affecting politics, conflict, mobility, governance, and public fear.

    Taken together, the three scenarios reveal the report’s deeper purpose. It is not merely asking, “What will happen?” It is asking readers to think about how today’s choices, vulnerabilities, and neglected signals can combine into very different but still plausible futures. That is why the report mixes survey data, horizon scanning, and narrative scenarios. It wants to move the reader from passive consumption of trends to active strategic imagination.

    The underlying perspective is clear: the future is not predetermined, but it is being shaped now by decisions on deterrence, alliance maintenance, institutional reform, climate action, technology governance, and democratic resilience. The report’s central implication is therefore strategic rather than descriptive: if leaders fail to act early on compounding risks, the darker futures it sketches become more plausible.

  • FGS Global Radar 2025: The Year of Consequences by FGS

    FGS Global Radar 2025: The Year of Consequences by FGS

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods outlook on the political, economic, technological, climate and workplace consequences likely to shape 2025, with a strong emphasis on what those shifts mean for business.

    It combines 70 individual depth interviews with senior stakeholders across business, politics, media, finance and academia, conducted in October and November 2024, with a nationally representative UK poll of 2,084 adults fielded from 15–17 November 2024; the primary geographic scope is the UK, although the analysis addresses global developments, especially the US and Europe.

    Length: 25 pages

    More information / download:
    https://a.storyblok.com/f/137553/x/493262557e/fgs-global-radar-2025_the-year-of-consequences.pdf

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about 2025, and why does it call it “the year of consequences”?

    The core claim is that 2025 is not presented as a year of entirely new issues, but as the year in which the consequences of recent political shocks, especially the 2024 election cycle and above all Donald Trump’s return, begin to bite. The report argues that many of the underlying challenges remain the same, but the language, political framing and practical terms of engagement around them are changing. In that sense, 2025 is portrayed as a year of disruption, reframing and forced clarity rather than simple continuity.

    The report roots this in a broader anti-incumbent mood across developed Western economies. It argues that falling living standards, inflation and concern over immigration helped drive voters away from established governments. Trump is treated as the most consequential manifestation of that trend, with likely spillover effects across geopolitics, sustainability, AI, business and culture.

    At the same time, the report is not wholly apocalyptic. It repeatedly stages a tension between pessimists and pragmatists, or between gloom and opportunity. Its final position is that 2025 will be dangerous and unstable, but that it may also create openings for decision-making, innovation and strategic repositioning. That balanced but business-oriented framing is central to the report’s purpose.

    2. How does the report think Trump’s return will reshape the global environment for politics and business?

    Trump is the organising force of the report. The authors state bluntly that “2025 will be the year of Trump”, and the expert consensus presented is that he should be taken more seriously this time because he now has more experience, stronger intent and a limited window in which to act. The report expects an early phase of “shock and awe”, including executive action on tariffs, deregulation, immigration and geopolitical positioning.

    Economically, the report expects Trump to push tax cuts and deregulation, with many experts anticipating a short-term US boom that could also buoy global dealmaking and M&A. But it also records a counter-view: that tariffs, labour restrictions and fiscal loosening may later fuel inflation and possibly trigger conflict with the Federal Reserve. So the outlook is not one of settled optimism, but of a potentially powerful near-term stimulus coupled with medium-term instability.

    Geopolitically, the report suggests Trump’s foreign policy is harder to predict because international order is not seen as his main priority. It outlines fears that support for NATO, Ukraine and multilateral institutions could weaken, while authoritarian states may feel emboldened. It also expects pressure on Ukraine to accept a deal, sympathy towards Netanyahu, and renewed tension around Taiwan. At the same time, some interviewees think Trump’s disruptive style might break deadlock in stalled conflicts. That split between alarm and reluctant pragmatism is one of the report’s recurring patterns.

    3. What does the report say about the state of democracy, public trust and mainstream politics, especially in the UK and Europe?

    A major theme is that democratic systems are under strain because governments are struggling to bridge the gap between what they promise and what they can actually deliver. The report links this to structural pressures such as debt, ageing populations, infrastructure needs, weak growth and immigration tensions, especially in Europe. It argues that this mismatch is eroding faith in liberal democracy and creating fertile ground for populism.

    The UK polling evidence is used to illustrate this erosion. The report says 24% of the UK electorate now believes that voting does not make a difference, while nearly eight in ten voters think they are entitled to expect more from government. Particularly striking is the finding that more than one in five people under 45 agree that the best system for running a country effectively is a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections. The report reads this as a serious warning sign about younger adults’ confidence in democratic delivery.

    On the UK specifically, Labour is portrayed as politically dominant but strategically unclear. The report says business and even Labour supporters see a lack of compelling growth narrative, while public confidence is weak: only 13% think the government has a clear and convincing plan for stronger growth, only 11% think it is doing what they hoped, 64% think the UK is in steep decline, and 68% believe Labour will increase their taxes. So the report’s view is that stability of parliamentary control does not equal public confidence or strategic clarity.

    4. What picture does the report paint of AI, climate and business opportunity in 2025?

    The report treats AI as both transformative and unsettled. It emphasises the extraordinary scale of investment, including a cited $1 trillion being spent on AI data centres, and argues that while many firms are still struggling to turn proof-of-concept work into real competitive advantage, most experts believe the technology will prove genuinely transformative over time. It suggests that the biggest near-term gains may come not from science-fiction breakthroughs, but from practical uses that improve productivity, speed up processes and reduce backlogs in functions such as marketing, communications and public services.

    But the public mood is far more divided. The report says opinion splits almost exactly into thirds: those who fear AI could control humans, those who think it will positively transform lives, and those who think it is overhyped. It also notes public scepticism about concrete benefits: only 39% expect positive effects on healthcare and life expectancy, 38% on productivity, and just 17% on their own standard of living, while 50% fear negative effects on job opportunities. The report therefore positions AI as a field where elite and public sentiment have not yet converged.

    On climate, the report argues that international diplomacy has weakened, especially because of Trump and the disappointing COP29 outcome, yet it also sees real momentum in the economics of transition. Its key argument is that sustainability will progress less through idealistic global cooperation and more through energy security, cost competitiveness and industrial advantage. In other words, the report believes the climate narrative is shifting from moral exhortation to transactional self-interest.

    That argument is reinforced by polling. Majorities believe climate science and think action is necessary, but many also want a slower pace to reduce cost burdens, and 45% say there is little point in costly UK action unless larger countries do more. So the report’s broader conclusion is that both AI and climate will move forward in 2025, but under more pragmatic, contested and economically framed conditions than before.

    5. What does the report conclude about workplace culture, generational divides and the implications for business leaders?

    The workplace section suggests that culture debates will remain intense, but the report’s own evidence points to a fairly practical hierarchy of employee priorities. In its UK poll, the top three features of an ideal workplace culture are flexible working hours, trust in leadership, and support for employee wellbeing and mental health. That is notable because it places everyday working conditions and leadership credibility above more symbolic or ideological culture-war themes.

    The report argues that hybrid work is still durable, but that employers will become more assertive about office attendance, with three-day minimum expectations likely to spread. It also says mental health will become even more strategically important because of its effect on absenteeism, wellbeing and retention. By contrast, DEI remains in place but is expected to be discussed less publicly and in less politicised language, especially in the wake of Trump’s return. The report also finds that DEI-related factors rank relatively low in the public’s list of workplace culture priorities.

    Generational differences are another major finding. The report shows sharp age-based divides on asylum, free speech, gender identity, China, EU relations and views of intergenerational fairness. But it also complicates the cliché of a simple youth-versus-age split by showing that preferences are more situational: for example, flexible working matters most to those in mid-career and to women, while views on resilience, authority and fairness vary in more layered ways.

    For business leaders, the implication is clear: broad-brush assumptions about “what younger people want” are not enough. The report points instead towards a need for clearer leadership, more explicit explanations of workplace expectations, greater care around employee wellbeing, and more disciplined choices about when companies comment publicly on social or geopolitical issues. Overall, it recommends a more grounded, less performative model of corporate culture.

    Overall, the report is best read as a business-facing synthesis of elite interviews and UK public opinion that argues 2025 will be shaped by disruption, reduced ideological certainty and more transactional politics. Its message is that leaders should prepare for volatility, but also for openings created by clearer power structures, technological progress and a more hard-headed operating environment.

  • The Global Risks Report 2025 by World Economic Forum

    The Global Risks Report 2025 by World Economic Forum

    About the paper

    The Global Risks Report 2025 is the World Economic Forum’s 20th annual assessment of major global risks across geopolitical, environmental, societal, economic and technological domains.

    It is a mixed-methods report based primarily on the 2024–2025 Global Risks Perception Survey of over 900 experts worldwide, collected from 2 September to 18 October 2024, supplemented by the Executive Opinion Survey of over 11,000 business leaders in 121 economies and qualitative input from 96 experts.

    The geographic scope is global.

    Length: 104 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2025/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the global risk landscape in 2025?

    The report argues that the world is entering 2025 in a state of deepening fragmentation, with risks increasingly reinforcing one another across domains. Its central diagnosis is that geopolitical conflict, societal polarization, environmental stress and technological disruption are converging in ways that existing governance systems are poorly equipped to manage.

    The immediate risk that dominates the 2025 outlook is state-based armed conflict, selected by 23% of GRPS respondents as the risk most likely to present a material global crisis in 2025. This is a major shift from the previous year, when it ranked eighth. The report connects this rise to the wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and Sudan, and to broader fears that conflicts could escalate or spread.

    But the report does not present conflict as an isolated geopolitical problem. It describes a risk environment where conflict is linked to geo-economic confrontation, cyber warfare, misinformation and disinformation, forced displacement, humanitarian crises and weakening multilateralism. In other words, the world is not only experiencing more crises; it is losing some of the connective tissue needed to manage them collectively.

    The tone is notably pessimistic. Only a small share of respondents see the near-term outlook as stable or calm, while a majority expect an “unsettled” world and sizeable minorities expect turbulence or stormy conditions. The report’s broader message is that short-term crisis management is no longer enough because many immediate risks are symptoms of deeper structural shifts.

    2. Which risks dominate the short-term outlook to 2027, and why?

    The top risk over the two-year horizon is misinformation and disinformation, which ranks first for the second year running. The report sees this as especially dangerous because false or misleading content now interacts with political polarization, conflict, elections, distrust in institutions and advances in generative AI.

    The short-term top risks also include extreme weather events, societal polarization, cyber espionage and warfare, state-based armed conflict, inequality, involuntary migration or displacement, erosion of human rights and civic freedoms, geo-economic confrontation and pollution.

    Several patterns stand out. First, geopolitical risks have moved sharply upward. State-based armed conflict is now third over the two-year horizon, and geo-economic confrontation has risen from fourteenth to ninth. Second, economic risks such as inflation and economic downturn have fallen out of the two-year top 10, even though the report warns against complacency. Third, societal risks remain highly prominent, suggesting that social cohesion is becoming a central risk variable rather than merely a consequence of other crises.

    The report’s short-term outlook is therefore not just a list of threats; it is a picture of a world where trust is weakening. Misinformation undermines shared reality, polarization reduces the capacity for collective action, and geopolitical rivalry makes international cooperation harder just when it is most needed.

    3. How does the report describe the longer-term risk outlook to 2035?

    The 2035 outlook is even darker than the short-term outlook. The report finds that all 33 risks assessed in the GRPS are expected to increase in severity over the 10-year horizon compared with the two-year horizon. Environmental and technological risks become much more prominent over the longer term.

    The highest-ranked long-term risk is extreme weather events, followed by critical change to Earth systems, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, natural resource shortages and misinformation and disinformation. This means that four of the top five long-term risks are environmental.

    The report presents environmental risk as having moved from a distant long-term concern to an urgent, worsening reality. Extreme weather remains the top 10-year risk for the second year in a row, while biodiversity loss and Earth system change are framed as signs that the world may be approaching irreversible thresholds.

    Technological risks also rise sharply over the decade. Adverse outcomes of AI technologies ranks only low in the two-year outlook but climbs to sixth in the 10-year ranking. The report treats this as a warning against complacency: current risk perception may be underestimating how quickly AI, biotechnology and other frontier technologies could reshape social, political and security risks.

    The 2035 message is that the world faces a compounding risk landscape: climate stress, technological acceleration, demographic change and geostrategic fragmentation are not separate trends, but structural forces that interact.

    4. What role do technology, misinformation and polarization play in the report’s risk narrative?

    Technology is treated as both an accelerator and an amplifier of risk. The report does not argue that technology itself is the root cause of fragmentation, but it shows how digital platforms, generative AI, algorithmic systems and expanding surveillance capabilities can intensify existing social and political divisions.

    The most immediate concern is misinformation and disinformation. The report notes that generative AI makes it easier to produce false or misleading text, images, audio and video at scale. This makes it harder for citizens, companies and governments to distinguish reliable information from manipulated content.

    The report links this directly to societal polarization, which ranks fourth over the two-year horizon. Polarized societies are more vulnerable to manipulated narratives, and manipulated narratives can in turn deepen polarization. The risk is a feedback loop in which trust in media, institutions and public information continues to erode.

    The report also highlights algorithmic bias and censorship and surveillance. As public services, media systems and political communication become more data-driven, biased or opaque algorithms can produce unfair outcomes and further reduce trust. Meanwhile, the growing digital footprint of citizens gives governments, companies and threat actors greater capacity to monitor and influence behaviour.

    The report’s underlying assumption is that technological governance is lagging behind technological capability. It calls for stronger accountability, transparency, digital literacy and upskilling for those building and using automated systems.

    5. What does the report imply for global governance and risk preparedness?

    The report’s strongest implication is that fragmented governance is becoming a risk multiplier. Across conflict, trade, technology, pollution, biotech and demographic ageing, the report repeatedly returns to the same problem: many of the most severe risks require collective action, but the international environment is becoming less cooperative.

    For armed conflict, the report argues that weakened faith in multilateral institutions could push governments towards unilateral action and selective alliances. For geo-economic confrontation, it warns that escalating tariffs, sanctions and investment restrictions could fragment global trade and weaken cooperation on climate, health, technology and development. For pollution and biotech, it stresses the need for better regulation, monitoring and global norms.

    The report does not suggest that global treaties alone are sufficient. It also emphasizes regional organizations, multi-stakeholder engagement, domestic resilience, public education, corporate strategies, research and development, and better monitoring systems. But its broader conclusion is that durable risk mitigation depends on rebuilding forms of cooperation that can survive geopolitical rivalry.

    The final message is cautiously normative: the world is moving into a more divided and unstable period, but the report insists there is no viable alternative to dialogue, collaboration and multilateral solutions. Its purpose is therefore not simply to forecast risk, but to push leaders to act before today’s warning signals become irreversible crises.

  • Journalism and Technology Trends and Predictions 2025 by Reuters

    Journalism and Technology Trends and Predictions 2025 by Reuters

    About the paper

    The report examines the pressures, priorities, and strategic bets shaping journalism in 2025, with a particular focus on platform disruption, AI, product innovation, and the changing relationship between publishers and audiences.

    It is based primarily on original survey research with 326 senior media leaders from 51 countries and territories, fielded online between 20 November and 20 December 2024, and supplemented by background interviews and industry examples. The geographic scope is global, though the report notes that respondents were concentrated in the UK, US, and Europe.

    Length: 47 pages

    More information / download:
    https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/journalism-media-and-technology-trends-and-predictions-2025

    Core Insights

    1. What does the report identify as the central challenge facing journalism in 2025?

    The report argues that journalism is under pressure from several directions at once: hostile politics, economic strain, weakening platform relationships, and the rise of AI-driven intermediaries that may displace publishers in the discovery chain. Its core claim is not that journalism is disappearing, but that institutional journalism is being forced to redefine its value in a far more contested information environment. Publishers face attacks from populist politicians, a growing creator-led alternative media ecosystem, and a technology landscape in which search, social, and conversational interfaces are all shifting against them.

    A key tension in the report is the contrast between low confidence in journalism as a sector and higher confidence in individual companies’ prospects. Only 41% of surveyed leaders say they are confident about journalism’s prospects in the year ahead, while 56% are confident about their own company’s business prospects. That gap suggests leaders believe the wider institution is weakening even while some organisations think they can adapt and survive.

    The report’s underlying perspective is that journalism’s challenge is no longer just commercial. It is also structural and civic. Publishers are losing control over distribution, are being bypassed by politicians and creators, and may increasingly find their reporting summarised or repackaged by AI systems before audiences ever reach the original source. The report therefore frames 2025 as a year in which journalism must fight for visibility, authority, and economic leverage all at once.

    2. How does the report describe the impact of platform change and search disruption on publishers?

    The report presents search disruption as one of the most serious emerging threats to news publishers. After major declines in referral traffic from Facebook and X, publishers are now worried that search could be next as AI overviews and conversational search products replace traditional link-based discovery. The report cites Chartbeat data showing Facebook referrals to news sites down 67% over two years and X down 50%, while aggregate Google search traffic had not yet fallen overall at the time of writing. Even so, 74% of respondents say they are worried about possible declines in referral traffic from search engines in 2025.

    The concern is not just fewer clicks. It is that AI products increasingly look like replacements for publisher interfaces rather than gateways to them. The report points to ChatGPT Search, Perplexity, Particle, Grok Stories, and other automated news interfaces that summarise multiple sources and foreground the platform’s answer over the publisher’s full article. That changes the economics of discovery. A publisher may still be cited, but citations are not equivalent to traffic, habit, subscriptions, or control of the audience relationship.

    This leads to a second issue: compensation and bargaining power. The report notes that some major publishers have secured licensing deals with AI companies, but these arrangements are uneven and opaque. Nearly three-quarters of respondents, 72%, say the industry should push for collective agreements rather than company-by-company deals. The report therefore treats AI licensing not as a settled revenue opportunity, but as a contested and potentially unequal new layer in the publisher-platform relationship.

    3. What strategic responses are publishers prioritising to adapt their business models?

    The report shows publishers leaning harder into reader revenue, product diversification, and direct relationships. Subscription and membership remain the most important revenue focus, cited by 77% of commercial publishers, ahead of display advertising at 69% and native advertising at 59%. But the report also emphasises that most companies are now combining several revenue streams, including events, platform funding, e-commerce, philanthropy, donations, and related businesses.

    A major theme is that strengthening the core product is no longer seen as sufficient on its own. While 55% still say strengthening the existing product is the main priority, 44% say developing new products and services will be most important for future growth. Publishers are exploring youth products, audio, video, education, games, food, international editions, and bundled offerings. The report presents this as a strategic shift from a narrow news product to a broader portfolio model, influenced especially by the New York Times example.

    The report also suggests that bundling may become more important as a retention strategy. Publishers are looking to combine news with adjacent services and lifestyle products in all-access subscriptions, both to reduce churn and to compete in a crowded subscription market. This reflects a larger assumption in the report: that publishers will need stronger owned-and-operated ecosystems because platform-dependent growth is becoming less reliable.

    4. What role does generative AI play in newsroom transformation, according to the report?

    The report makes clear that generative AI is no longer a speculative issue for news organisations. It says newsrooms are already being transformed, with 87% of respondents saying GenAI is transforming newsrooms fully or somewhat. The strongest emphasis remains on back-end and workflow uses, such as tagging, transcription, copyediting, recommendation systems, coding support, research assistance, and commercial modelling. These are seen as more mature and less risky than fully automated publishing.

    At the same time, the report argues that audience-facing uses of AI are becoming the next frontier. Publishers say they are actively exploring text-to-audio, AI-generated summaries, translation, chatbots, new search interfaces, and text-to-video conversion. The most widely planned initiatives are text into audio at 75%, AI summarisation at 70%, and translation at 65%, with 56% exploring chatbots or new search interfaces. The direction is towards more personalised, reformatted, and conversational news experiences.

    But the report is not triumphalist about AI. It repeatedly notes uncertainty about whether these investments will generate savings or sustainable advantage. It also warns that third-party tools may outpace in-house newsroom tools, and that a flood of synthetic content could increase misinformation risks and further weaken the visibility of original journalism. So AI appears in the report both as an efficiency tool and as a destabilising force that publishers must adapt to quickly without assuming it will solve their core business problems.

    5. What broader shifts in audience behaviour, talent, and media culture does the report see as shaping journalism’s future?

    One of the report’s most important arguments is that journalism is being reshaped by the rise of personalities, creators, and more socially native forms of news consumption. It highlights research showing that many younger audiences increasingly get news from influencers and creators rather than established news brands, and it notes that publishers themselves are split on whether this trend is good or bad for journalism. The report positions this “creator-fication” as both a competitive threat and a creative challenge to legacy media.

    This shift has implications inside news organisations too. The report says talent concerns are especially acute in engineering, data science, product, and design. While most respondents are confident about retaining editorial staff and even editorial stars, they are far less confident about attracting and keeping technical talent. That matters because the same organisations that need to innovate most aggressively around AI, product development, and user experience are struggling to recruit the people required to do it.

    The report also points to audience fatigue as a major issue. It describes efforts to respond through explainers, more human-centred storytelling, constructive or positive products, and “less noise, more signal” formats. This suggests the future challenge is not just reaching audiences but making journalism feel usable, sustainable, and worth returning to in a saturated and exhausting information environment. In that sense, the report’s broader conclusion is that journalism’s future depends not only on defending its principles, but on redesigning its formats, products, and relationships for a very different media culture.

  • Future of Jobs Report 2025 by World Economic Forum

    Future of Jobs Report 2025 by World Economic Forum

    About the paper

    The World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs Report 2025 analyses how technological change, geo-economic fragmentation, economic uncertainty, demographic shifts and the green transition are expected to reshape jobs, skills and workforce strategies by 2030.

    It is primarily an original employer survey, supplemented by data partnerships with ADP, Coursera, Indeed and LinkedIn; the survey covers more than 1,000 employers representing over 14 million workers across 22 industry clusters and 55 economies.

    The methodology is employer-perspective forecasting rather than labour-market measurement alone: the survey was conducted in late 2024 and asks organisations to estimate expected changes over the 2025–2030 period. The report is global in scope, but it explicitly focuses on larger companies and does not fully cover small enterprises or the informal sector.

    Length: 290 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-future-of-jobs-report-2025/

    Core Insights

    1. What are the main forces expected to transform global labour markets by 2030?

    The report identifies five broad forces: technological change, geo-economic fragmentation, economic uncertainty, demographic shifts and the green transition. These are presented not as separate trends, but as overlapping pressures that will reshape business models, employment and skill needs simultaneously.

    The most prominent single trend is broadening digital access, which 60% of employers expect to transform their business by 2030. Within technology, AI and information-processing technologies stand out even more strongly: 86% of employers expect them to transform their business, followed by robotics and automation at 58%, and energy generation, storage and distribution at 41%.

    Economic pressure remains highly important. Rising cost of living is the second-most transformative overall trend, cited by 50% of employers, while slower economic growth is cited by 42%. The green transition is also central: 47% expect climate-change mitigation to transform their business, and 41% expect climate adaptation to do so. Demographic change adds a further layer, with ageing populations affecting mainly higher-income economies and growing working-age populations affecting many lower-income economies.

    The report’s perspective is clearly employer-led: it is concerned with how organisations expect these forces to affect business transformation, jobs, skills and workforce planning. That gives the report practical value, but it also means its findings reflect employers’ expectations rather than a neutral prediction of what will definitely happen.

    2. What does the report predict about job creation, job displacement and the changing composition of work?

    The report predicts substantial labour-market churn. Based on employer expectations, structural labour-market transformation between 2025 and 2030 is expected to affect the equivalent of 22% of today’s jobs. That consists of 170 million jobs created, equal to 14% of current employment, and 92 million jobs displaced, equal to 8%, producing a net increase of 78 million jobs, or 7%.

    This is an important nuance: the report does not present the future of work as simple mass unemployment caused by technology. Its argument is that disruption will be large, uneven and reconfigurational. Some roles will grow quickly, some will decline sharply, and many workers will need to shift skills, roles or sectors.

    Technology is described as especially double-edged. Broadening digital access and AI are expected to create jobs and displace jobs at the same time. Robotics and autonomous systems are more clearly associated with net job displacement. The report’s underlying message is therefore not “technology destroys work” or “technology creates work”, but that technology changes the distribution of work and the skill profile required to remain employable.

    3. Which jobs are expected to grow or decline most, and why?

    The fastest-growing roles in percentage terms are mainly technology-related. These include Big Data Specialists, FinTech Engineers, AI and Machine Learning Specialists, Software and Applications Developers, Data Warehousing Specialists, Information Security Analysts and related roles. Green-transition roles also feature strongly, including Autonomous and Electric Vehicle Specialists, Environmental Engineers and Renewable Energy Engineers.

    However, the largest growth in absolute numbers is expected in frontline and foundational roles, not only in high-tech occupations. The report highlights Farm-workers, Delivery Drivers, Construction Workers, Salespersons and Food Processing Workers, alongside care and education roles such as Nursing Professionals, Social Work and Counselling Professionals, Personal Care Aides, and Tertiary and Secondary Education Teachers.

    The largest declines are expected in clerical and secretarial work. Cashiers and Ticket Clerks, Administrative Assistants and Executive Secretaries, Postal Service Clerks, Bank Tellers and Data Entry Clerks are among the roles expected to decline most. This reflects the combined impact of digitalisation, AI, automation and changing business processes.

    A key implication is that “future jobs” should not be understood only as AI engineers and data scientists. The report points to a more mixed labour-market future: high-growth technology roles, green-transition roles, care and education roles, and continued demand for many frontline jobs.

    4. How are skills expected to change, and what does this imply for workers and employers?

    The report estimates that 39% of workers’ existing skill sets will be transformed or become outdated over the 2025–2030 period. This is lower than the 44% estimate in the 2023 report and much lower than the 57% estimate in 2020, but it still represents a major level of disruption.

    Analytical thinking remains the most sought-after core skill, with seven in 10 companies considering it essential in 2025. It is followed by resilience, flexibility and agility, and leadership and social influence. This matters because the report does not frame the future skills agenda as purely technical. Human, cognitive and adaptive capabilities remain central.

    The fastest-growing skills are AI and big data, networks and cybersecurity, and technological literacy. These are followed by creative thinking, resilience, flexibility and agility, curiosity and lifelong learning, leadership and social influence, talent management, analytical thinking and environmental stewardship. Manual dexterity, endurance and precision are expected to see a notable net decline in demand.

    The report’s underlying assumption is that employability will increasingly depend on combining technical fluency with adaptability and judgement. This is especially important because the skills that differentiate growing from declining roles include resilience, flexibility and agility; resource management and operations; quality control; programming; and technological literacy.

    5. What workforce strategies do employers expect to use in response to these shifts?

    Upskilling is the dominant response. The report says 85% of employers plan to prioritise upskilling their workforce. In addition, 70% expect to hire staff with new skills, around half plan to transition staff from declining to growing roles, and 40% expect to reduce staff as some skills become less relevant.

    The scale of the training challenge is large. If the global workforce were 100 people, the report estimates that 59 would need training by 2030. Of these, 29 could be upskilled in their current roles, 19 could be upskilled and redeployed elsewhere in the organisation, and 11 would be unlikely to receive the reskilling or upskilling they need.

    Employers also identify skill gaps as the biggest barrier to business transformation, cited by 63% of respondents. This makes skills not just an HR issue, but a strategic bottleneck. The report also highlights employee health and well-being as a top strategy for improving talent availability, cited by 64% of employers, while reskilling, upskilling and better progression are also seen as important.

    Finally, AI-specific workforce strategies are central. Half of employers plan to reorient their business in response to AI, two-thirds plan to hire talent with AI-specific skills, and 40% anticipate reducing their workforce where AI can automate tasks. The report’s practical conclusion is that organisations face a dual challenge: they must adopt technology fast enough to remain competitive, while also redesigning jobs, training systems and talent pipelines fast enough to avoid widening skill gaps.

  • UK Corporate Affairs Trends for 2025 by FleishmanHillard

    UK Corporate Affairs Trends for 2025 by FleishmanHillard

    About the paper

    The paper is a forecast-style corporate affairs report on the challenges and priorities likely to shape 2025 for organisations operating in the UK.

    It is a mixed-input outlook rather than original survey research, grounded in firm data, observation, client discussions, and input from FleishmanHillard’s UK corporate affairs experts; the report does not clearly specify a respondent count, case count, interview number, or formal fieldwork process.

    Its geographic focus is primarily the UK corporate affairs landscape, though several trends are framed as global pressures affecting UK-based decision-making.

    Length: 32 pages

    More information / download:
    https://fleishmanhillard.co.uk/2024/12/corporate-affairs-trends-for-2025/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about corporate affairs in 2025?

    The report’s main argument is that corporate affairs leaders are entering a more volatile, fragmented and demanding environment in which complexity itself becomes the defining condition. FleishmanHillard argues that leaders are being asked to do more by boards, executives and stakeholders at the very moment the information environment is becoming harder to read and harder to influence. Traditional media still matters, but it is no longer sufficient as the primary route to key audiences, whose media habits are spreading across more platforms and formats.

    The report says this new reality will be shaped by five interlocking trends: the politicisation of business values, the rise of geopolitics as a day-to-day business issue, the spread of misinformation and inauthentic content, the erosion of reliable data sources alongside the emergence of new ones, and the accelerating operational importance of AI. In other words, the report does not present 2025 as a year of one dominant disruption, but as a year in which multiple pressures converge and force corporate affairs teams to become more adaptive, audience-led and strategically embedded.

    2. What are the five key trends the report identifies, and why do they matter?

    The first trend, The Values Imperative, argues that politics is increasingly entering business life through employees, public debate and direct political targeting. Companies are under greater pressure to take positions, but the report warns that expression is only rewarded when audiences agree with the stance taken. That makes corporate values more than branding language; they become a decision framework for whether and how to engage on contentious issues.

    The second trend, The Corporate Diplomat, says geopolitical issues are no longer distant matters for government relations teams alone. Populism, nationalism, regulatory divergence, supply-chain disruption and state-linked cyber risks mean senior executives and corporate affairs leaders must increasingly act as diplomats themselves. The report suggests that success in one market may now depend on managing tensions involving another market, including a company’s home market.

    The third trend, Ubiquitous Malignancy, describes misinformation as a persistent feature of nearly every communications situation, not a rare exception. The report argues that communicators must judge how much of a situation is being shaped by inauthentic or misleading content and develop specific capabilities for intervention, especially as AI-driven deepfakes raise the stakes.

    The fourth trend, Data Erosion & Accretion, focuses on the weakening usefulness of old monitoring approaches, especially those heavily dependent on X/Twitter and text-based media. At the same time, audience attention is moving toward harder-to-monitor environments such as podcasts, video, WhatsApp and other closed or semi-closed platforms. New tools may help, but the report says the overall picture will become more cluttered and demand more sophisticated interpretation.

    The fifth trend, AI Moves Ahead, argues that generative AI is already improving speed and efficiency in communications work, but that bigger structural change is still ahead. The report sees current tools as operationally useful but limited, while newer models may reshape analysis, memory and self-learning capabilities more profoundly. That makes today’s experimentation a preparation phase for deeper transformation.

    3. What assumptions or perspective shape the report’s interpretation of these trends?

    The report is written from the perspective of a strategic communications adviser addressing corporate affairs leaders who must help organisations navigate uncertainty rather than merely manage publicity. Its underlying assumption is that communications is no longer a support function operating at the edge of decision-making; it is increasingly central to risk management, stakeholder navigation and executive judgement.

    A second assumption is that the environment is not becoming simpler or more controllable. Instead, the report assumes fragmentation, unpredictability and cross-border complexity will intensify. This is visible in how it treats politics, geopolitics, misinformation, data fragmentation and AI not as isolated topics, but as overlapping forces that reshape the communicator’s role.

    A third assumption is that organisations need clearer frameworks rather than louder messaging. The report repeatedly emphasises preparation: values frameworks, issue-assessment models, broader intelligence gathering, better geopolitical literacy, more nuanced data interpretation and structured AI adoption. That reveals a distinctly managerial and advisory lens. The purpose is less to predict headlines than to encourage more disciplined organisational readiness.

    4. What practical capabilities does the report say organisations need to build now?

    On values and politics, the report recommends reviewing the organisation’s values statement so it genuinely reflects shared principles, then using those values as a test for whether a political issue warrants engagement. It explicitly advises leaning strongly against engagement where an issue does not connect directly to a core business value or commercial need. That suggests restraint, not performative commentary, as the preferred operating model.

    On geopolitics, it argues for broader information gathering, deeper historical understanding, better assessment of tensions across key markets and supply chains, and more diplomatic skill sets such as negotiation and war-gaming. This implies that corporate affairs teams need to widen both their input sources and their strategic repertoire.

    On misinformation, the report says teams need methods for distinguishing authentic from inauthentic content, frameworks for deciding when to intervene, and readiness to communicate directly with audiences rather than relying solely on media or fact-checkers. It also stresses that countering misinformation may require behavioural science techniques and emotional engagement, not just rational rebuttal.

    On data, the recommendation is to push partners to improve coverage across podcasts and video, interpret reactions across multiple platforms rather than assuming one channel represents the whole picture, and strengthen human intelligence networks to compensate for what tools cannot see inside walled gardens such as WhatsApp.

    On AI, the report urges organisations to expand trials, identify tasks where GenAI should make the first attempt, and reposition employees from pure production roles toward advisory roles that guide AI strategically and improve output quality. The practical message is that AI adoption should be systematic and role-shaping, not ad hoc.

    5. What are the main implications of the report for corporate affairs leaders in 2025?

    The clearest implication is that corporate affairs leaders will need broader mandates and stronger judgement. The function is being asked to interpret political risk, geopolitical change, data ambiguity, misinformation threats and AI-enabled disruption all at once. That means success will depend less on excellence in any single channel and more on the ability to synthesise complex inputs into sound advice for senior leadership.

    A second implication is that old playbooks are becoming less reliable. Traditional media relations, basic social listening and fact-based rebuttal are still relevant, but they are no longer enough on their own. The report suggests that influence now depends on audience-led, channel-agnostic and emotionally intelligent engagement, supported by better frameworks and more diverse intelligence.

    A third implication is organisational: communications teams must evolve structurally, not just tactically. Values need to be operationalised, geopolitical awareness mainstreamed, misinformation preparedness embedded, data practices modernised and AI integrated into workflows. In that sense, the report presents 2025 as a capability-building year. The leaders who thrive will be those who treat communications as a strategic discipline for navigating uncertainty, not simply a function for message delivery.