Tag: Public Affairs

  • Leading at the Intersections 2026 by Weber Shandwick

    Leading at the Intersections 2026 by Weber Shandwick

    About the paper

    Weber Shandwick’s Leading at the Intersections 2026 is a short corporate affairs trends report about the strategic shifts reshaping modern corporate affairs, especially in the U.S. and for U.S. multinationals.

    It is primarily an expert commentary / advisory perspective, with one referenced survey of Fortune 1000 communications and corporate affairs executives conducted by Weber Advisory and Gravity Research; the sample size, fieldwork method and timeframe are not clearly specified in the report.

    The geographic focus is mainly the United States, with some attention to global stakeholder expectations around U.S. companies abroad.

    Length: 13 pages

    More information / download:
    https://webershandwick.com/news/the-five-shifts-redefining-the-c-suite-agenda-in-2026

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that corporate affairs leaders are now operating “at the intersections” of several forms of disruption:

    • geoeconomic instability
    • polarised U.S. politics
    • reputational volatility
    • AI-driven transformation
    • workforce anxiety
    • cultural fragmentation
    • and changing expectations around responsible business.

    Its core message is that corporate affairs can no longer be treated as a reactive communications function. The authors frame it as a strategic leadership capability that must help organisations make sense of complexity, protect licence to operate, create stakeholder value and support business resilience.

    The report’s strongest underlying assumption is that the operating environment has become too volatile for narrow, bottom-line-only communication. Companies need to understand how business value, stakeholder expectations, culture, politics, technology and social impact now interact. In that sense, the report positions modern corporate affairs as a form of integrated strategic intelligence.

    2. How does the report suggest companies should think about value in a time of disruption?

    The report warns that in uncertain times, leaders may be tempted to focus narrowly on economic value and the bottom line. Weber Shandwick argues the opposite: disruption is precisely when companies need to broaden their understanding of value.

    It identifies several value dimensions beyond financial performance:

    • functional value
    • emotional value
    • and societal value.

    The point is not that profit becomes irrelevant, but that companies’ licence to operate depends on more than profit. Trust, relevance, purpose, stakeholder relationships and perceived contribution to society all become part of the value equation.

    The report links this especially to the 2026 U.S. midterm environment. Affordability, cost of living, inequality, trade, healthcare, housing, immigration and AI regulation are all described as issues shaping public expectations. In this environment, companies face reputational risk if they are seen as detached from ordinary stakeholder concerns.

    One particularly useful insight is that “corporate speak” is no longer neutral. The report frames over-polished, generic language as a credibility risk. Companies are advised to communicate with more emotion, empathy and candour — not as a stylistic preference, but as a trust-building necessity.

    3. What new expectations does the report identify for corporate diplomacy?

    The report argues that U.S. multinationals will be pushed into more explicit forms of corporate diplomacy in 2026. The key issue is that foreign stakeholders may increasingly expect U.S. companies to show that they are not simply proxies for U.S. foreign policy.

    This is an important distinction. The report suggests that U.S. brands have, so far, retained some independence from declining perceptions of U.S. political leadership. But that separation may become harder to maintain if U.S. government actions become more confrontational or less aligned with international norms.

    Three expectations stand out. First, companies must demonstrate local accountability: where decisions are made, how local interests are protected and which commitments endure despite political shifts in Washington. Second, they need deeper local relationships across government, business and civil society, because these relationships become a form of reputational defence. Third, executives may need to speak more visibly and carefully abroad, because silence can increasingly be interpreted as alignment.

    The report also connects this to B2G strategy in an “America First” context. For tech companies in particular, it recommends local storytelling around outcomes governments already care about: workforce upskilling, manufacturing, energy resilience, defence readiness and public-sector efficiency.

    4. Why does the report treat cultural intelligence as a leadership capability?

    The report presents cultural intelligence as a core leadership currency because companies are increasingly pressured to respond to cultural flashpoints in real time. Digital discourse, ideological polarisation, influencer dynamics, bots and platform algorithms all make it harder for organisations to remain silent or generic without others filling in the blanks.

    The report’s argument is not that companies should comment on everything. Rather, leaders need to know their organisation’s “true north” and make sharper decisions about when to engage, how to engage and when not to engage. Cultural intelligence is therefore both an external sensing capability and an internal decision-making discipline.

    The report highlights three ways to build cultural adaptation fluency. Companies should internalise organisational values so they function as an operating system rather than decorative statements. They should dig deeper into the “why” behind cultural signals, not just track what is trending. And they should make scenario planning a routine practice, using AI and other tools to anticipate how cultural communities and influencers may react.

    A useful nuance here is the distinction between audiences and algorithms. The report notes that meaning still comes from human belief, but reach is shaped by platforms. Leaders therefore need to design communication for both human interpretation and algorithmic circulation.

    5. What implications does the report draw for responsible business and AI transformation?

    The report argues that responsible business is not disappearing, even if the language around ESG, sustainability or social impact changes for political and practical reasons. The fundamentals remain important because companies still need to balance material business pressures, stakeholder tensions and reputational risk.

    Three responsible business challenges are highlighted.

    1. First, companies must define the future of human work as AI integration accelerates. Stakeholders will expect human-first integration plans, workforce readiness and credible opportunities for future talent.
    2. Second, the report argues that climate action is becoming more fragmented because coordinated multilateral action is weakening, while “China First” green tech and “America First” energy politics reshape the context.
    3. Third, companies must separate values from “vibes”: in a fragmented information environment, responsibility strategies must be anchored in the business model rather than broad, consensus-seeking purpose claims.

    On AI, the report’s position is pragmatic rather than utopian. AI transformation is treated as unavoidable, but the authors warn against simplistic winner/loser narratives. Companies need a transformation narrative that proves the business case while addressing the human side of change.

    The report identifies three AI-related communication challenges:

    • real-time stakeholder insight
    • machine readability intelligence
    • and human-centred generative creativity.

    The most distinctive point is “machine readability”: companies now need to understand how they appear in AI search and AI-generated summaries, which sources shape those outputs, and how to correct misinformation or poor representations.

    The final message is: be AI-enabled, not AI-enthralled. For B2B marketing in particular, AI should not replace the entire martech stack or become a reason to defund other vital technologies. The stronger argument is for deliberate integration: clear use cases, regulatory awareness, privacy safeguards and attention to workforce impact.

  • Global Foresight 2036 by the Atlantic Council

    Global Foresight 2036 by the Atlantic Council

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods strategic foresight publication from the Atlantic Council that combines original survey research, expert commentary, six “snow leopard” horizon-scanning essays, and a shorter AI discussion section.

    Its core empirical base is the organisation’s fourth annual survey of 447 geostrategists and foresight practitioners from 72 countries, fielded in November and December 2025; the respondent pool is global, though roughly half are US citizens and the sample is drawn from the Atlantic Council’s network rather than a general population sample.

    Length: 76 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/global-foresight-2036/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the world of 2036?

    The report’s central argument is that the decade ahead is likely to be more unstable, more fragmented, and more dangerous than the present, even though the exact future cannot be predicted with certainty. Rather than offering a single forecast, the report uses foresight to map the pressures, risks, and directional shifts that experts think are most likely to shape 2036.

    Its overall tone is notably pessimistic. The opening findings state that 63 percent of respondents expect the world in 2036 to be worse off than it is now, while only 37 percent think it will be better. The report frames this darker mood through a cluster of reinforcing trends:

    • intensifying US-China rivalry
    • a possible hot conflict over Taiwan
    • weakening multilateral institutions
    • democratic decline
    • nuclear proliferation
    • climate stress
    • and rapid AI advances whose benefits are matched by growing concern.

    At the same time, the report is not purely apocalyptic. It argues that foresight is valuable precisely because it helps policymakers and readers prepare for multiple possible futures, including surprising ones. That is why the publication pairs survey findings with under-the-radar “snow leopards” and a separate AI section: the aim is not just to describe probable big trends, but to widen the reader’s field of vision.

    2. What are the report’s main findings from the expert survey?

    The report organises its main survey results into ten headline findings. The most prominent is that respondents broadly expect China to surpass the United States economically by 2036, even if they do not think China will simply replace the US as an uncontested global hegemon. Instead, most foresee either bipolar competition or a more diffuse multipolar system. They also increasingly expect China to attempt to take Taiwan by force, and more than 40 percent foresee another world war, most likely sparked in Taiwan or surrounding waters.

    A second major finding is that NATO is expected to survive, but not unchanged. Respondents are divided on whether it will become more or less influential, yet 44 percent think it will no longer exist in its current form by 2036. The survey also suggests growing doubts about whether the United States will still play the same commanding role within the alliance.

    On Russia and Ukraine, the survey points away from a decisive Russian victory and toward a frozen conflict. Respondents also see Russia as a diminished power by 2036, though still potentially dangerous, especially in nuclear terms. On AI, a majority believe artificial general intelligence could emerge within the decade, and more respondents still see AI as a net positive than a net negative, though the gap has narrowed as concern rises.

    Other major findings include:

    • expectations of wider nuclear proliferation, especially involving Iran and possibly Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan, and some NATO countries
    • a more autonomous but still strategically limited Europe
    • declining climate cooperation even as warming worsens
    • weakening global institutions alongside democratic erosion
    • and continued dollar dominance, though with crypto seen as the biggest challenger rather than another national currency.

    3. What evidence and patterns in the report best reveal how experts think power is shifting?

    One of the clearest patterns is that respondents do not think the future belongs to a single dominant actor in the way the post-Cold War era was often understood. The report repeatedly points to diffusion, contestation, and erosion of established forms of leadership. China is seen as rising strongly in economic power, nearly matching the US in technology and diplomacy, while the United States is still expected to remain militarily pre-eminent. That split itself is telling: respondents appear to be imagining a world where different forms of power are no longer concentrated in one state.

    Another pattern is institutional weakening.

    Respondents expect the United Nations, UN Security Council, WTO, World Bank, and IMF all to lose influence over the next decade.

    That suggests not merely dissatisfaction with current institutions, but a broader expectation that the post-1945 order is fraying. The report explicitly connects this decay with democratic recession, arguing that respondents who foresee deeper democratic decline are especially likely to expect institutional weakening and a worse overall world.

    A third pattern concerns regional and bloc-level reconfiguration. Europe is not expected to become the world’s leading military, economic, or tech power, yet respondents increasingly think it will achieve greater strategic autonomy. NATO may endure, but in altered form. The Global South section then adds another layer by showing that respondents from those countries often expect even sharper shifts away from US primacy and are more inclined to see China rising, Russia doing better in Ukraine, and even internal US breakdown.

    Together, these patterns show that the report is less about simple replacement of one superpower by another and more about a messy redistribution of influence across states, blocs, technologies, markets, and non-state actors.

    4. What does the report suggest about the role of technology and underappreciated trends in shaping the future?

    The report treats technology as both a direct force of change and a lens that reshapes how other global risks unfold. AI is the most obvious example. Respondents expect major advances, including the possible arrival of AGI within a decade, and the report presents AI as a technology with systemic implications for economics, geopolitics, knowledge production, and everyday life. But the accompanying expert discussion is more cautious than the survey toplines: Atlantic Council specialists stress that today’s AI is not good at truly forecasting the future, that AGI is far from certain, and that trust, energy demands, and market instability could constrain progress.

    The six “snow leopards” deepen this technological and horizon-scanning emphasis. These essays focus on phenomena that may be easy to overlook now but could become highly consequential. They include:

    1. Private tech firms shaping conflict outcomes
    2. Circular rather than one-way migration
    3. Kelp forests as climate and economic assets
    4. The erosion of the human rights order
    5. AI-driven cultural erasure
    6. Neurotechnology capable of decoding thought.

    What unites these cases is the report’s belief that future disruption will not come only from the usual headline issues. Some of the biggest shifts may emerge from domains that sit between established categories: companies behaving like geopolitical actors, migration functioning as an innovation loop, environmental restoration becoming industrial strategy, or data bias turning into cultural loss. This part of the report broadens the frame beyond interstate competition and argues for paying attention to early signals and second-order effects.

    5. What are the report’s biggest implications for policymakers, strategists, and communicators?

    The report’s main implication is that leaders should prepare for a world defined less by stability and rule-bound cooperation than by rivalry, fragmentation, and institutional stress. For policymakers, this means planning for deterrence, alliance adaptation, nuclear risk, democratic erosion, and climate-related conflict at the same time rather than treating them as separate silos. The report’s structure itself makes that point: geopolitics, democracy, climate, finance, and technology are deeply entangled.

    A second implication is that strategic assumptions inherited from the post-Cold War period look increasingly fragile. The report suggests that US leadership can no longer be taken for granted, NATO may need redesign rather than maintenance alone, and multilateral bodies may not be capable of managing future crises in the way they were once expected to. That pushes strategists toward resilience, contingency planning, and coalition-building under less favourable conditions.

    For communicators, the report is especially useful as a map of narratives that may dominate the coming decade:

    • democratic decline
    • technological disruption
    • geopolitical fragmentation
    • and competing visions of order.

    It also shows that audiences are unlikely to share a single worldview.

    The section on Global South respondents is particularly important here, because it demonstrates that expectations about the future vary significantly by geography and political vantage point. In practical terms, this means communication about global risk, strategy, or public policy will increasingly need to account for fragmented perceptions rather than assuming one shared interpretive frame.

    The final implication is methodological: the report argues implicitly for foresight as a discipline of disciplined imagination rather than prediction. Its value lies not in claiming certainty, but in helping readers test assumptions, notice emerging signals, and think more seriously about consequences before they fully arrive.

  • The Global Reputation Economy by Burson

    The Global Reputation Economy by Burson

    About the paper

    This Burson report argues that reputation should be treated as a measurable corporate asset class, which it calls “Reputation Capital”.

    It is a mixed-methods, proprietary modelling report combining stakeholder input, brand tracking, media analysis and stock-market modelling; the methodology is more fully described than many agency papers, though some elements remain proprietary.

    The analysis covers 66 publicly traded companies, drawing on tens of thousands of stakeholders, and spans October 2024 to October 2025 across companies headquartered in the United States and other countries.

    Length: 30 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.bursonglobal.com/p/reputation-economy

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about reputation, and why does Burson believe it matters now?

    The core argument is that reputation is no longer a soft, retrospective PR concept but a quantifiable form of capital that can be measured, managed and used as a strategic business asset. Burson argues that in a hyper-connected environment, where companies are exposed to constant scrutiny from legacy media, social platforms, activists and independent publishers, traditional reputation tools are too slow and too shallow. In that context, companies need something closer to near real-time intelligence rather than annual surveys or periodic brand tracking.

    The report therefore reframes reputation as “Reputation Capital”: an asset that can create competitive advantage, build resilience, support bolder decision-making and fuel sustainable growth. It also claims this asset matters not just to communications teams, but to investors, boards and corporate leaders because it can be linked directly to upside and downside in business performance.

    The deeper point is that reputation affects strategic freedom. Companies with strong reputations can absorb setbacks more easily, take bigger risks and retain stakeholder trust. Companies with weak reputations are more exposed: a single misstep is interpreted not as an exception, but as proof of a broader pattern. In that sense, the report presents reputation as a buffer, an enabler and a financial driver all at once.

    2. How does the report measure reputation, and what kind of evidence does it use?

    Burson presents this as a mixed model connecting three domains: stakeholder belief, media signals and financial outcomes. It says the model draws on tens of thousands of stakeholders, including consumers, business decision-makers and opinion leaders, using a comprehensive question set alongside daily brand tracking. It then combines that with large-scale monitoring of traditional and social media, described as terabytes of daily mentions, to build a media profile for each company. Finally, it links those inputs to stock performance by isolating the “unexpected return” in share price movement that cannot be explained by normal market trends or financial fundamentals alone.

    That is important because the report is not presenting original survey data alone, nor a pure media audit, nor a simple financial analysis. It is explicitly a mixed-methods modelling exercise designed to connect perception to business value. Burson says this is what allows reputation to move from an attitudinal concept to a leading indicator of performance. The model was also externally validated, according to the report, by Dr Felipe Thomaz of Oxford/Saïd Business School.

    At the heart of the model is an eight-lever framework: Products, Innovation, Financial Performance and Creativity on one side, and Leadership, Governance, Workplace and Citizenship on the other. Burson treats these as the building blocks of reputation and claims the framework can show not just how a company is perceived overall, but which levers are driving strength, weakness and business impact.

    3. What does the report claim about the financial value of reputation?

    The headline claim is that reputation produced an average of 4.78% in added, unexpected annual shareholder returns across the companies studied. Burson defines these returns as “unexpected” because they sit beyond what standard financial indicators such as revenue or margins would predict, and “additional” because the model attributes them directly to reputation.

    From that base, the report extrapolates to the wider market and estimates the global “Reputation Economy” at just over $7 trillion. It also says that, within its sample, the value of reputation varied widely by company, ranging from $2 million to as much as $202 billion. These numbers are used to support the broader thesis that reputation is not merely symbolic or narrative-based, but economically consequential.

    The report also argues that the biggest opportunity is not simply to maintain a good reputation, but to move from “Reputation Stagnation” into “Reputation Cultivation”. It groups companies into three categories: cultivation, stagnation and erosion. Roughly 60% of firms fall into stagnation, according to the report, suggesting that many companies are leaving value on the table because they lack a deliberate, data-driven reputation strategy.

    That framing reveals Burson’s perspective clearly: reputation management should be treated as value creation, not just risk mitigation. The report is effectively making the case for boards and leaders to think about reputation in capital-allocation terms.

    4. According to the report, what separates reputation leaders from laggards?

    Burson’s argument is that there is no single silver bullet. The biggest difference between leaders and laggards is not one lever but broad, disciplined strength across all eight. The report says the top quartile scores 11 to 15 points higher on every lever and that the gap between top and bottom performers is 13.8 points on a 100-point scale.

    Even so, three gaps stand out most strongly in the report’s description of a modern reputation leader: visionary innovation, excellence in product delivery and unimpeachable governance. Those are presented as the clearest markers of the firms that convert reputation into strategic advantage.

    What matters here is the report’s underlying assumption that reputation is systemic. Leaders do not just communicate better; they manage the organisation more coherently. Workplace culture supports innovation, governance underpins product quality, and credibility across the system gives leaders resilience. That resilience then changes the CEO’s risk calculus: strong-reputation firms can launch ambitious products, enter complex markets and recover from setbacks more easily because stakeholders grant them the benefit of the doubt. Laggards, by contrast, become defensive, incremental and strategically paralysed.

    So the report’s model of leadership is not glamour-driven. It is operational. It suggests that reputation leadership comes from sustained excellence, cross-functional consistency and the ability to avoid weak links.

    5. What are the report’s most important conclusions for sector strategy, workplace investment and AI?

    One of the most interesting parts of the report is its claim that industries have different “reputational centres of gravity”. Tech, for example, remains highly valuable in Reputation Capital terms and scores strongly on Products and Innovation, but its growth is now almost flat. Burson argues that tech’s future reputation gains will depend less on disruptive launches and more on Governance, Leadership and Citizenship, especially as AI raises broader social concerns.

    Other sectors reveal different lessons. Aerospace is presented as a comeback story built not just on better products, but on fixing foundational levers such as Governance and Workplace. Automotive is described as facing a “Citizenship Challenge”, where EV narratives are not enough if stakeholders see gaps in labour practices, safety, supply-chain ethics or broader societal impact. Finance is shown as especially vulnerable because it is declining across three protective levers at once: Leadership, Governance and Citizenship.

    The report’s strongest practical recommendation, however, is about the Workplace lever. Burson calls this the highest-ROI reputation investment because it is under-valued and under-invested, despite showing a large performance gap between best and worst performers. The argument is that employees are now the most credible carriers of company culture, so internal culture becomes a driver of external trust. In other words, the hidden engine of reputation is not the flashiest campaign, but the quality of the employee experience.

    That leads directly to the AI section. Burson says most companies discuss AI in terms of innovation and efficiency, but the more important reputational question is people. The report argues that a company’s AI strategy is effectively a statement about how it values employees. Firms that use AI for augmentation, reskilling and transparent co-creation with staff may gain a “reputation dividend”. Firms that use it mainly for opaque top-down cost cutting may pay a “reputation tax” through backlash, talent loss and weaker Workplace scores. The key question, in Burson’s words, is no longer whether a company has an AI strategy, but whether it has an “AI people strategy”.

  • License to Lead by FleishmanHillard

    License to Lead by FleishmanHillard

    About the paper

    The report examines what FleishmanHillard calls a company’s “License to Lead” — the stakeholder permission leaders need to change course, move quickly and manage disruption without losing legitimacy.

    It is based on original quantitative research: an online survey conducted by TRUE Global Intelligence from 15 December 2025 to 4 January 2026 among 5,550 respondents, comprising 4,000 engaged consumers, 1,400 executives and 150 policy stakeholders.

    The data is global in scope, covering 15 markets across four regions: North America (US, Canada), Latin America (Brazil, Mexico), Europe & Middle East (UK, France, Germany, Brussels, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, UAE, South Africa) and Asia Pacific (China, Japan, South Korea).

    Length: 42 pages

    More information / download:
    https://fleishmanhillard.com/2026/01/license-to-lead-playbook/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about leadership in an age of permanent uncertainty?

    The core argument is that uncertainty is no longer a temporary disruption but the standing condition of leadership. On pages 2–3, the report says leaders now have to make high-stakes decisions faster, with less certainty, under greater scrutiny, and in environments shaped by political volatility, geopolitical change, technological acceleration, media fragmentation and rising stakeholder expectations.

    Its main claim is that the real constraint on execution is no longer strategy quality alone. It is whether stakeholders are willing to let leaders act, especially when strategic shifts involve disruption, short-term pain or visible course correction. FleishmanHillard calls this permission structure “License to Lead”. On page 3, the report explicitly argues that organisations stall not because they lack strategic brilliance, but because stakeholders do not have enough confidence that the new direction is justified and worth following.

    That framing is important because it shifts the leadership discussion from planning to permission. In this report’s logic, reputation is not a nice-to-have or a downstream outcome of success. It is a precondition for making strategy executable when conditions change.

    2. What does the global survey reveal about stakeholder expectations of business leaders today?

    The report shows that stakeholders increasingly expect leaders to be adaptable, clear, accountable and visibly fair. On page 5, 84% of engaged consumers and 82% of policy stakeholders say the current business environment is more unpredictable and disruptive than it was three years ago. Among engaged consumers, the top leadership quality for the next decade is the ability to adapt quickly to change, cited by 51%. Clear and simple communication comes next at 40%, followed by the ability to communicate effectively about changes and pivots at 37%.

    Page 6 deepens this picture. Around half of engaged consumers say their expectations of companies have risen when it comes to acting with customers in mind (52%), doing the right thing (50%) and taking a balanced stakeholder approach (47%). More than 90% say several actions are key to confidence in leadership: clear communication of strategy, message consistency, transparency about difficult decisions, genuine listening, and accountability when things go wrong. The highest figure is 95% for taking accountability when things go wrong.

    The report also shows that long-term loyalty is not driven by lofty rhetoric alone. On page 6, the top three loyalty drivers are the product itself (42%), the company’s mission and purpose (38%), and how the company treats employees and stakeholders (38%). That suggests stakeholders still value purpose, but they place it alongside product performance and treatment of people, not above them.

    3. Where is the biggest trust gap between leaders and stakeholders?

    The sharpest gap is between how executives assess corporate leadership and how engaged consumers assess it. Page 7 is the clearest evidence. While 49% of executives are very optimistic that large companies will address major challenges over the next 10 years, only 20% of engaged consumers say the same. Likewise, 51% of executives say they have “a lot” of confidence that leaders of large companies will act in the best interests of society, compared with just 19% of engaged consumers. On preparedness, 44% of executives believe large companies are very prepared to lead effectively during future disruption, versus only 15% of engaged consumers.

    The report reinforces this perception gap on page 9 and in the appendix tables on pages 37–38. Engaged consumers place extremely high importance on integrity and honesty, accountability, transparency and consistency, but far fewer believe company leaders demonstrate those qualities often. For example, 76% of engaged consumers say integrity and honesty are very important, yet only 23% say leaders often demonstrate them. Accountability shows a similar gap: 74% say it is very important, but only 22% say leaders often demonstrate it.

    This matters because the report is not merely saying trust is low. It is saying business leaders systematically overestimate how much trust and legitimacy they currently enjoy. That misreading, in the report’s view, is itself a strategic risk.

    4. What are the practical consequences when companies lose this “License to Lead”?

    The report argues that the consequences are commercial and operational, not just reputational. Page 8 is especially direct: 98% of engaged consumers say they are paying attention to corporate follow-through, and 48% say inconsistent or conflicting messages from leadership greatly decrease their confidence in the company. A further 44% say such inconsistency somewhat decreases confidence, meaning only a tiny minority are unaffected.

    The behavioural consequences are significant. In the past 12 months, after losing confidence in a company, 58% of engaged consumers say they stopped buying from it or significantly reduced spending, 50% switched to a competitor, and 40% privately advised friends or family against the company. Those figures appear both in the key findings and in the appendix table on page 35.

    The report’s broader argument is that poor alignment and weak explanation create friction that slows execution. Pages 10–11, in the “License to Lead Maturity Curve”, describe how low-maturity organisations become reactive, then merely stabilising, because stakeholders interpret abrupt pivots as instability rather than disciplined adaptation. The report’s implication is that execution failures are often self-inflicted: leaders do not sufficiently prepare stakeholders before and during change, so even necessary moves become harder to carry through.

    5. What leadership model does the report propose as the answer, and what are its wider implications?

    The proposed answer is a leadership and corporate affairs model built around five conditions and an integrated operating system. On pages 12–17, the “new leadership playbook” identifies five practices: simplification as an antidote to complexity, ruthless leadership alignment, campaigning the strategy, owning the “why”, and stakeholder relevance without shortcuts. These are presented not as communications tactics in isolation, but as interdependent conditions for sustaining permission to act.

    The logic is consistent across these sections. Simplification means reducing complexity into a repeatable direction that stakeholders can understand. Alignment means leaders must resolve disagreements privately and present a unified public narrative. Campaigning the strategy means treating strategy as an ongoing effort rather than a one-off announcement. Owning the “why” means showing the logic, trade-offs and changed assumptions behind a pivot rather than presenting it as an unexplained verdict. Stakeholder relevance means proving fairness through operational decisions, not just values statements.

    Pages 18–24 then elevate corporate affairs into an “operating system” built on three capabilities: insight, influence and adaptability. The report argues that insight helps leaders distinguish real external signals from noise; influence turns reputation into an active enabler of execution; and adaptability helps organisations maintain legitimacy across repeated cycles of change.

    The wider implication, especially on pages 23–25, is that corporate affairs should no longer be treated as peripheral or reactive. The report claims that execution velocity is now partly a reputational capability. Strategy will keep changing; reputation must be built before it is needed; and corporate affairs now determines whether leaders can move quickly without losing stakeholder backing. In that sense, the report is not just about communications. It is an argument for repositioning corporate affairs as core leadership infrastructure in conditions of permanent volatility.

  • Corporate Affairs Trends for 2026 by FleishmanHillard

    Corporate Affairs Trends for 2026 by FleishmanHillard

    About the paper

    This is a forecast-style corporate affairs report for 2026 from FleishmanHillard, centred on three linked forces shaping the field: fragmentation, declining trust, and a more confrontational geopolitical environment.

    Methodologically, it is best described as a mixed-methods thought-leadership report grounded in the author’s original analysis, observation, discussions with colleagues, contacts and clients, and selective use of external datasets; there is no single disclosed sample, respondent count, or fieldwork design, and the geographic scope is broad but not clearly delimited, drawing on examples from markets including the UK, US, Germany and Japan.

    Length: 32 pages

    More information / download:
    https://fleishmanhillard.co.uk/2025/12/corporate-affairs-trends-for-2026/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about the corporate affairs landscape in 2026?

    The core argument is that corporate affairs is becoming harder because the environment is simultaneously more fragmented, less trusting, and more geopolitically adversarial. The report says three forces stand out for 2026: fragmentation, decline of trust, and an increasingly confrontational geopolitical landscape. Rather than treating these as separate developments, it presents them as mutually reinforcing pressures that reshape how communicators reach audiences, build credibility and advise leadership.

    The report also makes clear that AI is not a standalone trend in this edition because its effects are now embedded across all the others. In other words, AI is treated as a horizontal force altering research, measurement, publishing, direct engagement and execution, but not replacing the need for human judgement in areas such as geopolitical assessment.

    Taken together, the report argues that the traditional model of corporate affairs, built around broad-reach media, relatively stable trust assumptions and a more predictable global environment, is no longer sufficient. The emerging model requires more precision, more segmentation, more direct publishing capability and greater sophistication in dealing with political risk and stakeholder complexity.

    2. Why does the report say that “everything gets smaller,” and what does that mean in practice?

    “Everything gets smaller” is the report’s shorthand for accelerating fragmentation. Drawing on Nicco Mele’s The End of Big, it argues that media, audiences, brands and institutions are all under pressure from digital atomisation, polarisation and weakening institutional authority. In practical terms, this means audiences are harder to reach at scale, general-interest channels are less dominant, and niche publishers, creators and platforms matter more than before.

    The report says audiences are moving towards specialist, high-value and trusted outlets, including titles such as the FT, Economist and Wall Street Journal, alongside podcasts and subscription platforms such as Substack. On page 13, it also points to the visual evidence that major news sites are seeing steep traffic declines while Substack shows growth, reinforcing the idea that the mass-media centre is weakening.

    A second part of this trend is economic: digital publishing is under pressure. The report argues that advertisers are likely to favour retail media networks and more directly attributable formats over traditional display advertising, while referral traffic from Google is declining as more users get information through AI-driven systems. That combination threatens publishers’ business models and may shrink the overall supply of quality journalism and analysis.

    For corporate affairs leaders, the implication is strategic rather than merely descriptive. The report says they will need to widen relationship-building beyond the “usual suspects”, understand audience channel preferences in greater depth, include niche publishers and influential Substack writers in plans, and adjust measurement frameworks to prioritise relevant reach and business-linked outcomes over broad reputational proxies.

    3. How does the report redefine trust, and why does it argue that “absolute trust” is ending?

    The report argues that trust can no longer be treated as a stable, universal measure of reputation. For years, communicators often used trust as a broad proxy for reputational strength, but the report says that assumption is breaking down because trust is now polarised and audience-relative rather than generalised.

    Its key evidence is that broad trust in institutions and news sources is weakening, while audiences increasingly trust the sources that align with their existing worldview. The report cites the Reuters Institute’s 2025 Digital News Report and notes that in 53 of the 54 countries surveyed there is a gap between trust in news generally and trust in “the news I use”. It also cites falling generalised trust levels in the UK, Germany and Japan, with US trust remaining low and flat.

    This leads to a fundamental strategic shift. A channel cannot simply be labelled “trusted” in the abstract. It may be trusted by one stakeholder segment and distrusted by another. On page 19, the report uses the US example to show how left-leaning and right-leaning audiences consume and trust different sources. That means communicators must think in terms of relative trust within specific audience groups rather than aggregate trust across society.

    The report pushes the logic further with the claim that “sounds true” increasingly beats “is true”. That is one of its strongest interpretive claims: in public debate, authority, emotional resonance and perceived credibility may matter more than factual correctness alone. The implication is not that facts no longer matter, but that institutions can no longer assume facts will persuade by themselves. They must communicate in ways that connect with audiences that do not automatically grant them trust.

    4. What role does AI play in the report’s view of communications strategy and direct audience engagement?

    AI runs through the report as an enabling and disruptive force. Early on, the author says AI is woven through the trends rather than isolated as its own section. The report’s view is that AI can materially improve efficiency, research, measurement and tactical delivery, but that its organisational adoption remains uneven and its limitations still constrain full replacement of human work.

    In the context of fragmentation and trust, AI also changes how audiences discover information. The report argues that communicators now need to think not only about reaching humans through media and owned channels, but also about influencing the GPT-based systems those audiences may consult. On page 23, it says earned media accounts for about half of the sources cited by common GPTs in responses about companies or brands, while owned content contributes roughly another fifth. That makes credible earned and owned content strategic assets in both human and machine-mediated discovery.

    This is one of the report’s more forward-looking ideas: businesses increasingly need to act as publishers, not only to reach stakeholders directly but also to shape the information environment from which AI systems draw. That makes publishing strategy more central to corporate affairs than in older media models. It also ties back to trust, because the report frames credible earned and owned content as “vital levers of influence”.

    At the same time, the report draws a limit around AI. In the geopolitical section, it says AI can help manage the growing complexity of communications execution, but management’s demand for geopolitical intelligence, assessment and advice remains a uniquely human capability. So the report is neither techno-utopian nor dismissive: it sees AI as highly useful, but not as a substitute for senior judgement.

    5. What are the report’s main conclusions for corporate affairs leaders, especially in a more zero-sum geopolitical world?

    The report’s third major conclusion is that geopolitical uncertainty is no longer a background condition; it is becoming a central operating reality for corporate affairs. It describes a world in which governments are more nationalistic, businesses are increasingly treated as instruments of power projection, and economic security is becoming intertwined with national security.

    This produces a “zero-sum” environment in which political actors increasingly think in terms of winners and losers, while global companies are trying to create value across multiple markets and stakeholder groups. The report says this tension makes life harder for multinational firms because supporting one government position can complicate operations elsewhere, and localisation strategies, though increasingly attractive, also multiply stakeholder complexity.

    Its practical conclusion is that corporate affairs teams must become more sophisticated systems operators. They need better geopolitical sensing, more formal scenario planning, stronger risk tracking and more structured use of AI for targeted execution. But they also need deeper human expertise, because navigating cross-currents between governments, markets and audiences is presented as a high-judgement advisory function, not just a communications task.

    So the report’s broader meaning is this: corporate affairs is moving away from broad-message distribution and towards high-complexity influence management. Success in 2026 will depend on understanding fragmented audiences, working with relative rather than universal trust, building stronger direct and AI-visible publishing capabilities, and helping leadership navigate a world where politics, economics and communications are tightly fused.

  • The New CCAO and CCO Mandate by United Minds

    The New CCAO and CCO Mandate by United Minds

    About the paper

    The paper examines how Chief Corporate Affairs Officers and Chief Communications Officers are adapting to political volatility, cultural complexity, economic uncertainty, and AI-enabled communications work.

    It is an original qualitative research report based on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with CCOs and CCAOs from Fortune 1000 companies, conducted over two months in early 2025; the exact number of participants is not clearly specified in the report.

    The geographic scope includes both U.S.-based and European corporate affairs leaders.

    Length: 8 pages

    More information / download:
    https://webershandwick.com/news/new-ccao-and-cco-mandate-navigating-a-new-era-of-corporate-leadership

    Core Insights

    1. What is the central argument of the report?

    The report argues that the corporate affairs and communications function has not retreated in importance as companies have pulled back from the more visible social-issue positioning of the early 2020s. Instead, CCAOs and CCOs have become less publicly visible but more strategically central inside the enterprise.

    The core claim is that corporate affairs leaders are now expected to help companies navigate a volatile intersection of business, politics, culture, stakeholder expectations, employee sentiment, and reputation risk. Their mandate is no longer simply to explain corporate decisions after the fact. They are increasingly expected to help shape those decisions before they are made.

    The report frames this as a shift from communications as a reactive function to corporate affairs as a source of enterprise foresight. The ideal corporate affairs function, according to the report, helps leaders anticipate risk, understand stakeholder dynamics, interpret political and cultural signals, and protect the company’s licence to operate.

    2. How is the CCAO/CCO role changing in relation to business strategy?

    The report’s first major theme is that corporate affairs leaders are becoming proactive business partners. Their value increasingly lies in their ability to translate political, regulatory, cultural, and stakeholder signals into business implications.

    This means they are not only advising on messages, positioning, or crisis response. They are helping business leaders understand where external pressures may require changes to products, operations, stakeholder engagement, or risk management. One example in the report describes a policy-related issue around a consumer product where corporate affairs brought data to the business, prompting an eight-week sprint that helped resolve product issues and changed the relationship between corporate affairs and the product leader.

    The report presents corporate affairs leaders as “orchestrators” across functions. Because they sit close to the CEO agenda and have an enterprise-wide view, they can connect information from legal, policy, HR, product, finance, operations, communications, and external stakeholders. Their strategic value comes from synthesising those signals into business intelligence.

    The practical recommendation is to build formal cross-functional intelligence networks and develop ways to quantify external risk in financial terms. In other words, corporate affairs must be able to speak the language of business impact, not only the language of reputation.

    3. Why does political complexity matter so much in the report?

    Political volatility is one of the report’s defining conditions. The authors locate the research in the early 2025 U.S. context, following Donald Trump’s second inauguration and first 100 days in office. The report says companies are operating in a climate shaped by executive orders, economic volatility, hyper-partisanship, and sudden political attention.

    The report argues that this has forced corporate affairs leaders to rethink public engagement. Companies are moving away from broad social activism and towards brand protection, business-aligned issue engagement, and risk management. The task is no longer simply “Should we speak out?” but “Where does engagement serve the business, where does silence reduce risk, and where is private dialogue more effective than public positioning?”

    One especially important idea is the “audience of one” problem: the risk that a single powerful political figure can draw attention to a company and create operational, reputational, or regulatory consequences. Corporate affairs leaders are therefore developing scenario plans, rapid-response frameworks, and more cautious approaches to political communication.

    This also changes the advisory role of corporate affairs. The report suggests that CCAOs and CCOs are becoming voices of restraint and judgement within executive teams, helping leaders distinguish between noise, bargaining tactics, genuine risk, and issues that require action.

    4. How does the report redefine crisis and reputation management?

    The report argues that crisis management is no longer an exceptional capability. It has become a baseline expectation. In a “permacrisis” environment, corporate affairs teams must apply crisis tools continuously, not only when a discrete crisis breaks out.

    This changes the role in two ways. First, crisis work now extends beyond media response. Corporate affairs teams are expected to help solve the underlying problem, coordinate across business functions, and prevent issues from escalating. Secondly, the report says corporate affairs leaders must make the financial case for proactive reputation management.

    One quoted example describes a corporate affairs leader asking for $2.5 million for a campaign during a contentious situation and using analysis to show that the potential return was 12 times the investment. The point is that reputation work becomes more credible in the C-suite when it is connected to profit protection, revenue risk, regulatory exposure, or operational continuity.

    The implication is that corporate affairs must move from “the team that handles crises” to “the function that helps prevent avoidable business risk”. The report recommends crisis prevention scoring, financial modelling of reputational risk, and closer collaboration with finance and analytics partners.

    5. What does the report say about employees and AI as part of the new mandate?

    The report treats employee communication as a continuing priority, but one that has become more delicate. Employees are described as one of the most important stakeholder groups, especially during uncertainty. At the same time, internal communication now has to navigate political polarisation, regulatory sensitivity, DEI-related scrutiny, and the risk that different employee groups may interpret corporate messages very differently.

    The report therefore points to a more cautious, “sanitised” form of transparency. Companies may still communicate openly, but in ways designed to avoid partisan signalling or unnecessary exposure. The authors recommend mapping internal stakeholder intersections and using tools such as message testing to understand differences within the employee base.

    AI is presented as a practical accelerator for the corporate affairs function. The report says AI is being used for tasks such as preparing Q&As, analysing large volumes of stakeholder content, vetting influencers, monitoring media and misinformation, supporting strategic planning, and improving data analysis. Rather than presenting AI mainly as a replacement threat, the report frames it as a way to free communications professionals from routine work and move them towards more strategic advisory roles.

    However, the report also makes clear that AI adoption is a change-management issue. Teams need clarity on what should remain human-led, what can be AI-assisted, and what ethical guardrails are needed around bias, accuracy, and appropriate use.

    Overall conclusion

    The report’s main message is that the CCAO/CCO mandate is expanding from communications execution to enterprise-level judgement. Corporate affairs leaders are being asked to help companies interpret volatility, anticipate risk, advise CEOs, manage political exposure, support employees, use AI responsibly, and convert stakeholder intelligence into business decisions.

    Its most important contribution is the framing of corporate affairs as a foresight function. Its main limitation is methodological: while the qualitative design is described in some detail, the report does not clearly specify the number of interviewees, which makes it harder to judge the breadth of the evidence base.

  • Global Foresight 2025 by the Atlantic Council

    Global Foresight 2025 by the Atlantic Council

    About the paper

    The report is a mixed-methods foresight study on what the world may look like in 2035, combining an expert survey, short horizon-scanning essays on six under-the-radar “snow leopards,” and three written future scenarios.

    The original research element is a survey of 357 geostrategists and foresight practitioners drawn from the Atlantic Council’s networks, fielded in late November and early December 2024, with respondents spread across sixty countries plus the United States and representing every continent except Antarctica; the survey sample, however, skewed US-based, male, and older.

    Length: 84 pages

    More information / download:
    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/global-foresight-2025/

    Core Insights

    1. What overall picture of the world in 2035 does the report present?

    The report presents a distinctly darker-than-light global outlook. Its central message is that many leading strategists expect the next decade to be shaped less by steady progress than by heightened instability, strategic rivalry, institutional weakness, and accumulating systemic risks. The report explicitly says that 62 percent of respondents think the world in ten years will be worse off than today, while only 38 percent think it will be better off.

    That pessimism is not absolute. The report notes some areas of guarded optimism, especially around artificial intelligence and climate cooperation. A majority of respondents think AI will have a net positive impact on global affairs over the next decade, and about half foresee expanded cooperation on climate change. But those brighter notes are outweighed by broader anxiety about war, nuclear risk, democratic decline, and geopolitical fragmentation.

    Structurally, the report is trying to do more than predict single outcomes. It says foresight cannot provide certainty, but it can help readers understand the forces already driving change and the possible consequences of those forces over the coming decade and beyond. That framing matters: this is not a forecast claiming “this will happen,” but an effort to map where expert opinion sees the heaviest risks and most consequential uncertainties.

    So the overall picture is of a world entering 2035 under pressure from several overlapping dynamics at once:

    • hard-power rivalry
    • erosion of the postwar order
    • weak prospects for conflict resolution
    • technological disruption
    • and climate-linked stress.

    The report’s worldview is therefore not just pessimistic but systemic: it suggests that multiple domains of instability are reinforcing each other.

    2. Which geopolitical and security risks do surveyed experts see as most likely to shape the next decade?

    The headline risk is major war. The report’s most striking finding is that 40 percent of respondents expect another world war by 2035, defined as a multifront conflict among great powers. It adds that this war could go nuclear and could extend into space, with 48 percent expecting nuclear weapons to be used by at least one actor in the coming decade and 45 percent expecting direct military conflict in space.

    The report identifies China and Russia as the main vectors through which a broader conflict could emerge. On China, 65 percent of respondents think Beijing will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, a sharp rise from the previous year’s survey. On Russia, 45 percent think Russia and NATO will engage in direct military conflict, also a significant increase year-on-year. In other words, the report suggests that expert concern is moving away from abstract rivalry and toward concrete expectations of military confrontation.

    Another major concern is bloc formation. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to become formal allies by 2035, and many foresee a world divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs. The report treats this as a potentially war-amplifying trend rather than merely a diplomatic realignment. Respondents who foresaw both bloc division and formal alliance-building were much more likely also to expect world war.

    Nuclear proliferation is another core risk. The report says 88 percent of respondents expect at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the next decade. Iran is by far the most cited likely new nuclear power, but expectations also rose for South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. On use, Russia and North Korea are seen as the most likely current nuclear powers to launch a nuclear strike.

    The report also shows pessimism about existing conflicts. On Ukraine, only 4 percent think the war will end on terms largely favourable to Ukraine; most expect either terms favourable to Russia or a frozen conflict. On the Middle East, respondents are much more optimistic about Israeli-Saudi normalisation than about Israeli-Palestinian peace. More than 60 percent expect the current status quo of occupied Palestinian territories to persist by 2035.

    Taken together, these findings suggest the report sees the coming decade as one in which escalation risks are rising across several theatres at once, while the mechanisms for resolving those conflicts appear weak.

    3. How does the report assess the future of US power, alliances, multilateral institutions, and democracy?

    The report’s view of the United States is nuanced: it still sees the US as the likeliest dominant military power in 2035, but a weaker and more uncertain leader in other domains. Seventy-one percent of respondents expect the US to remain militarily dominant, and 58 percent still see it as the leading technological innovator. But fewer expect it to dominate economically, diplomatically, or in soft power, and confidence has dropped across several of these measures compared with the previous year.

    That matters because the report implies that US power is increasingly relative rather than comprehensive. It is not presenting a picture of outright American collapse, but of a more limited United States operating in a multipolar world. Three-quarters of respondents expect the world in 2035 to be multipolar, with multiple centres of power.

    Alliances remain part of that picture, but with more uncertainty than before. A majority still expect the US to maintain its alliance network in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, yet this figure fell sharply from the previous survey. At the same time, almost half expect Europe to achieve greater “strategic autonomy” by taking more responsibility for its own security. So the report suggests a future in which alliances may persist, but under new terms and with more burden-sharing or hedging.

    On multilateral institutions, the mood is much grimmer. Large majorities expect the United Nations, the UN Security Council, and the World Trade Organization to be less capable of solving problems by 2035 than they are today. The World Bank and IMF fare somewhat better, while respondents are relatively more hopeful about regional groupings such as ASEAN, the EU, and even BRICS. That pattern reveals an important assumption in the report: global governance is likely to weaken, while regional or alternative formations may gain relative importance.

    The report is similarly downbeat on democracy. Nearly half of respondents think today’s democratic recession will worsen into a democratic depression by 2035, while only 17 percent foresee a democratic renaissance. It also says 65 percent expect global press freedom to decrease. So the report does not treat democratic backsliding as a side issue; it sees it as one of the defining trends of the next decade.

    There is also a gender dimension to that pessimism. Women in the survey were more negative than men across several questions, especially about nuclear use, democratic decline, rights curtailment, and future US dominance. The report interprets this as reflecting persistent inequalities and the unequal burden crises place on women.

    4. What overlooked “snow leopards” does the report argue could have outsized future impact?

    One of the report’s most distinctive features is its “snow leopards” section: six under-the-radar developments that may not dominate headlines now but could become highly consequential. This is the horizon-scanning part of the report, and it broadens the analysis beyond headline geopolitics.

    1.The first is the threat that non-state actors could attack undersea cables.

    The report argues that the global digital and financial system depends heavily on these cables and that they are vulnerable not only to states but also to militant groups or terrorists. Its core point is that a relatively low-cost attack on critical subsea infrastructure could produce outsized disruption across communications, finance, and military operations.

    2. The second is enhanced geothermal systems.

    The report presents this as a low-carbon energy source with major underexploited potential, noting that if technological and cost barriers fall, it could become a significant contributor to electricity generation in the United States. This is framed not merely as a climate story but as a strategic energy-development story.

    3. The third is a new carbon-capture material, COF-999, described as a yellow powder that could dramatically reduce the cost and resource intensity of pulling carbon dioxide from the air.

    The report does not claim this solves climate change, but it treats the discovery as an example of the sort of scientific breakthrough that could shift the economics of mitigation.

    4. The fourth is rewilding.

    Here the report argues that land abandonment, urbanisation, changing food systems, and ecological restoration could together make much more land available for rewilding, with implications for biodiversity, carbon capture, tourism, and land use. It also notes trade-offs and possible backlash, so this is presented as a consequential but contested trend.

    5. The fifth is quantum batteries.

    The report uses this as an example of a frontier technology that may transform energy storage, with particular attention to medical devices, emergency systems, and electric mobility. The point is not that the technology is ready now, but that its eventual impact could be large if the science translates into scalable applications.

    6. The sixth is Gen Z’s vulnerability to misinformation.

    This may be the most sociologically revealing of the snow leopards. The report challenges the assumption that digital natives are naturally better at navigating false information, arguing instead that heavy social media exposure, algorithmic feeds, parasocial influence, and weak verification habits may leave this generation especially susceptible. The long-term implication is that future elites may enter positions of power with distorted information habits and weaker trust.

    Across all six, the deeper message is that the future will not be shaped only by visible great-power rivalry. It may also be shaped by overlooked vulnerabilities, scientific breakthroughs, and social shifts that sit below the surface until they suddenly matter.

    5. What do the report’s three scenarios suggest about the range of possible global futures—and what is the report ultimately trying to make readers understand?

    The report ends with three scenarios for 2035:

    1. “The reluctant international order”
    2. “China ascendant”
    3. and “Climate of fear.”

    These are explicitly presented not as predictions but as plausible futures designed to stimulate thinking. That distinction is crucial. The scenarios are a tool for exploring interaction effects between present-day trends, not for declaring which future is most likely.

    “The reluctant international order” imagines a world in which the rules-based international order has neither collapsed nor been revitalised. Cooperation persists because major powers and non-state actors still need it, even if they engage reluctantly and pragmatically. This scenario suggests that messy, improvised, partial cooperation may be more realistic than either liberal renewal or total breakdown.

    “China ascendant” imagines a world in which Beijing becomes the dominant global power, not through one dramatic rupture but through a slow shift enabled by US inwardness, economic influence, institutional repositioning, and strategic patience. The point here is that geopolitical transformation need not come through open war; it can happen gradually through hedging, institutional drift, and changing perceptions of who is reliable and effective.

    “Climate of fear” imagines a world where worsening climate instability drives migration, political conflict, democratic stress, and escalating interest in radical responses such as geoengineering. This scenario shows the report’s assumption that climate change is not just an environmental issue but a force multiplier affecting politics, conflict, mobility, governance, and public fear.

    Taken together, the three scenarios reveal the report’s deeper purpose. It is not merely asking, “What will happen?” It is asking readers to think about how today’s choices, vulnerabilities, and neglected signals can combine into very different but still plausible futures. That is why the report mixes survey data, horizon scanning, and narrative scenarios. It wants to move the reader from passive consumption of trends to active strategic imagination.

    The underlying perspective is clear: the future is not predetermined, but it is being shaped now by decisions on deterrence, alliance maintenance, institutional reform, climate action, technology governance, and democratic resilience. The report’s central implication is therefore strategic rather than descriptive: if leaders fail to act early on compounding risks, the darker futures it sketches become more plausible.

  • C-suite Outlook 2025 – Delivering Value in a Volatile World by the Weber Shandwick Collective

    C-suite Outlook 2025 – Delivering Value in a Volatile World by the Weber Shandwick Collective

    About the paper

    The report examines how global C-suite leaders are thinking about value creation, stakeholder priorities and volatility in 2025.

    It is based on original survey research: a short survey of 200 private-sector global business leaders from multinational companies operating across North America, Latin America, EMEA and APAC, with fieldwork conducted from 14 November to 4 December 2024.

    The sample includes companies headquartered in the United States and 22 other countries across five sectors, so the geographic scope is global, although the report presents only limited methodological detail beyond the sample profile.

    Length: 9 pages

    More information / download:
    https://webershandwick.com/news/delivering-value-in-volatile-world

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about leadership in 2025?

    The core argument is that CEOs and senior executives are entering 2025 with underlying optimism, but that optimism is tempered by a strong sense that the external environment remains unstable and difficult to control. On page 2, the report frames this tension directly: business leaders see relative macroeconomic stability compared with recent years, yet they remain highly alert to geopolitical disruption, market shocks, activism, policy change and other forces that can quickly alter the operating environment.

    From that starting point, the report argues that corporate leadership now has to move beyond older, more polarised debates about shareholder primacy versus stakeholder capitalism. Its preferred framing is practical rather than ideological: the job of leadership is to define and deliver the specific mix of value that matters most to the stakeholders who shape the company’s success. In other words, the corporation’s role is presented not as serving one constituency at the expense of others, but as earning legitimacy and performance by managing a company-specific “value equation” across multiple stakeholder groups. This is the report’s main conceptual move, and it underpins everything that follows.

    2. How do executives define “value”, and which forms of value matter most to them?

    A major contribution of the report is that it treats value as multi-dimensional rather than purely financial. On page 4, executives rank five forms of value: economic value is highest at 98% importance, followed by functional value at 96%, ethical value at 88%, and both emotional and societal value at 78%. When respondents were asked to allocate relative weight across these categories, economic value received the largest share by far at 41%, compared with 24% for functional value, 14% for ethical value, 11% for societal value and 10% for emotional value.

    That ranking shows two things at once. First, the report does not pretend that executives have become post-financial or post-commercial. Economic performance remains dominant. Secondly, it suggests that modern business leadership increasingly sees non-financial forms of value as part of business success rather than as optional extras. Ethical, societal and emotional value are not leading priorities, but they are still recognised by substantial majorities as important. The report therefore presents a broadened model of business value: financial performance sits at the centre, but it is strengthened or undermined by how companies function, behave and relate to stakeholders.

    There is, however, an interesting gap between aspiration and performance. The page 4 chart on how well companies are delivering value across stakeholders shows strong perceived delivery on economic and functional value, but weaker performance on societal and especially emotional value. Fewer than a quarter say they are delivering societal or emotional value “very well”. So the report implies that executives recognise a wider value agenda more readily than they currently execute it.

    3. Which stakeholders matter most in executive decision-making, and what does that reveal about the report’s perspective?

    The report makes clear that stakeholder thinking is now mainstream among the leaders surveyed. On page 3, 99% say that considering the interests of multiple stakeholders is important. But the stakeholder model being described is not flat or equal. On page 5, customers rank first, with 99% saying they are important and 86% calling them very important. Investors and shareholders follow at 96%, and employees at 93%. Policymakers and government officials come next at 81%, with partners and suppliers and local communities both at 79%. Advocacy groups and non-profits rank much lower.

    This hierarchy matters because it reveals the report’s practical worldview. It is not arguing that all stakeholders should be treated identically, nor that external advocacy pressure should dominate corporate decisions. Instead, it suggests a prioritised stakeholder model centred on those groups most directly tied to performance, legitimacy and licence to operate: customers, capital providers, employees, regulators and key operational partners. That is a more managerial and strategic version of stakeholder capitalism than a purely normative one.

    The report also subtly signals that stakeholder management is becoming more political. The relatively high ranking of policymakers and government officials, combined with repeated references later in the report to regulation, geopolitics and public affairs, suggests that public policy is no longer a peripheral concern. It is becoming structurally central to the executive agenda, especially in a world where policy decisions can affect supply chains, investment flows, reputation and growth.

    4. What does the research say about volatility, preparedness and growth prospects for 2025?

    The report’s most important empirical message is that leaders feel materially less prepared for the kinds of disruptions they cannot control directly. On page 5, executives report greater confidence in handling internal or more familiar reputational threats, such as a major data breach, a company security threat, a health epidemic or a product recall. But preparedness drops sharply for external shocks such as global armed conflicts, terrorist attacks, political division after US elections, misinformation campaigns, natural disasters and actions by elected officials. This distinction is central: leaders are more comfortable with operational crises than with systemic volatility.

    That matters because the report links growth prospects to the ability to deliver value under pressure. On page 6, only 17% of companies are described as in “high growth”, while 63% report moderate growth and 21% expect moderate or high contraction. Eight in ten companies therefore expect at least moderate growth, but the standout point is not exuberance. It is restraint. The report presents 2025 as a year of cautious forward movement rather than broad-based acceleration.

    The priority data reinforces that interpretation. Revenue growth and profitability top the list of business priorities, but leaders also rank managing market volatility, investor expectations, business transformation, culture and workforce capability very highly. On page 7, the actions executives say they are taking include growing the business, launching products, adjusting governance structures, navigating AI, diversifying supply chains and responding more actively to policy and regulatory issues. So the report portrays growth not as a return to normal expansion, but as something that must be actively defended and engineered amid instability.

    5. What are the report’s implications for communication and public affairs teams?

    The clearest implication is that corporate communications and public affairs functions are becoming more strategically important, but many organisations are not yet confident that those teams are equipped for the task. On page 7, only 17% of executives say their communications and public affairs functions are “well equipped” to keep pace with rapid change, while 13% say their confidence in those functions has decreased. The report therefore identifies a capability gap at exactly the point where volatility makes communication, public affairs and reputation management more consequential.

    The practical implications are spelled out most fully on page 8 in the “new rules” section. The report argues that value creation must start at the top, that CEOs need to prepare now for future volatility, that organisations must actively manage controllable volatility such as mis- and disinformation, that AI should support decision-making, and that the policy environment will become more demanding in 2025. In effect, communications is being repositioned from a downstream messaging function to an upstream strategic capability that helps leadership sense, interpret and respond to threats and expectations.

    For a communications reader, the most significant underlying message is this: communicators are not merely being asked to explain value after the fact. They are increasingly expected to help organisations define value, map stakeholder expectations, detect volatility early, prepare response systems, and support CEO judgement in real time. At the same time, the report suggests that many firms have not yet invested enough in these capabilities. So its conclusion is both elevating and cautionary: communications teams are needed more than ever, but they must upskill and become more operationally strategic if they are to meet the expectations being placed on them.

    One caution is worth noting. Because the report is based on a relatively short survey of 200 leaders and is presented in a highly synthesised, infographic-style format, it is better read as a directional executive sentiment study than as a deeply elaborated academic analysis. Even so, it offers a clear and useful picture of how senior leaders are framing the challenge of 2025: deliver growth and stakeholder value, but do so in a world where volatility is persistent, political and increasingly external to managerial control.

  • UK Corporate Affairs Trends for 2025 by FleishmanHillard

    UK Corporate Affairs Trends for 2025 by FleishmanHillard

    About the paper

    The paper is a forecast-style corporate affairs report on the challenges and priorities likely to shape 2025 for organisations operating in the UK.

    It is a mixed-input outlook rather than original survey research, grounded in firm data, observation, client discussions, and input from FleishmanHillard’s UK corporate affairs experts; the report does not clearly specify a respondent count, case count, interview number, or formal fieldwork process.

    Its geographic focus is primarily the UK corporate affairs landscape, though several trends are framed as global pressures affecting UK-based decision-making.

    Length: 32 pages

    More information / download:
    https://fleishmanhillard.co.uk/2024/12/corporate-affairs-trends-for-2025/

    Core Insights

    1. What is the report’s central argument about corporate affairs in 2025?

    The report’s main argument is that corporate affairs leaders are entering a more volatile, fragmented and demanding environment in which complexity itself becomes the defining condition. FleishmanHillard argues that leaders are being asked to do more by boards, executives and stakeholders at the very moment the information environment is becoming harder to read and harder to influence. Traditional media still matters, but it is no longer sufficient as the primary route to key audiences, whose media habits are spreading across more platforms and formats.

    The report says this new reality will be shaped by five interlocking trends: the politicisation of business values, the rise of geopolitics as a day-to-day business issue, the spread of misinformation and inauthentic content, the erosion of reliable data sources alongside the emergence of new ones, and the accelerating operational importance of AI. In other words, the report does not present 2025 as a year of one dominant disruption, but as a year in which multiple pressures converge and force corporate affairs teams to become more adaptive, audience-led and strategically embedded.

    2. What are the five key trends the report identifies, and why do they matter?

    The first trend, The Values Imperative, argues that politics is increasingly entering business life through employees, public debate and direct political targeting. Companies are under greater pressure to take positions, but the report warns that expression is only rewarded when audiences agree with the stance taken. That makes corporate values more than branding language; they become a decision framework for whether and how to engage on contentious issues.

    The second trend, The Corporate Diplomat, says geopolitical issues are no longer distant matters for government relations teams alone. Populism, nationalism, regulatory divergence, supply-chain disruption and state-linked cyber risks mean senior executives and corporate affairs leaders must increasingly act as diplomats themselves. The report suggests that success in one market may now depend on managing tensions involving another market, including a company’s home market.

    The third trend, Ubiquitous Malignancy, describes misinformation as a persistent feature of nearly every communications situation, not a rare exception. The report argues that communicators must judge how much of a situation is being shaped by inauthentic or misleading content and develop specific capabilities for intervention, especially as AI-driven deepfakes raise the stakes.

    The fourth trend, Data Erosion & Accretion, focuses on the weakening usefulness of old monitoring approaches, especially those heavily dependent on X/Twitter and text-based media. At the same time, audience attention is moving toward harder-to-monitor environments such as podcasts, video, WhatsApp and other closed or semi-closed platforms. New tools may help, but the report says the overall picture will become more cluttered and demand more sophisticated interpretation.

    The fifth trend, AI Moves Ahead, argues that generative AI is already improving speed and efficiency in communications work, but that bigger structural change is still ahead. The report sees current tools as operationally useful but limited, while newer models may reshape analysis, memory and self-learning capabilities more profoundly. That makes today’s experimentation a preparation phase for deeper transformation.

    3. What assumptions or perspective shape the report’s interpretation of these trends?

    The report is written from the perspective of a strategic communications adviser addressing corporate affairs leaders who must help organisations navigate uncertainty rather than merely manage publicity. Its underlying assumption is that communications is no longer a support function operating at the edge of decision-making; it is increasingly central to risk management, stakeholder navigation and executive judgement.

    A second assumption is that the environment is not becoming simpler or more controllable. Instead, the report assumes fragmentation, unpredictability and cross-border complexity will intensify. This is visible in how it treats politics, geopolitics, misinformation, data fragmentation and AI not as isolated topics, but as overlapping forces that reshape the communicator’s role.

    A third assumption is that organisations need clearer frameworks rather than louder messaging. The report repeatedly emphasises preparation: values frameworks, issue-assessment models, broader intelligence gathering, better geopolitical literacy, more nuanced data interpretation and structured AI adoption. That reveals a distinctly managerial and advisory lens. The purpose is less to predict headlines than to encourage more disciplined organisational readiness.

    4. What practical capabilities does the report say organisations need to build now?

    On values and politics, the report recommends reviewing the organisation’s values statement so it genuinely reflects shared principles, then using those values as a test for whether a political issue warrants engagement. It explicitly advises leaning strongly against engagement where an issue does not connect directly to a core business value or commercial need. That suggests restraint, not performative commentary, as the preferred operating model.

    On geopolitics, it argues for broader information gathering, deeper historical understanding, better assessment of tensions across key markets and supply chains, and more diplomatic skill sets such as negotiation and war-gaming. This implies that corporate affairs teams need to widen both their input sources and their strategic repertoire.

    On misinformation, the report says teams need methods for distinguishing authentic from inauthentic content, frameworks for deciding when to intervene, and readiness to communicate directly with audiences rather than relying solely on media or fact-checkers. It also stresses that countering misinformation may require behavioural science techniques and emotional engagement, not just rational rebuttal.

    On data, the recommendation is to push partners to improve coverage across podcasts and video, interpret reactions across multiple platforms rather than assuming one channel represents the whole picture, and strengthen human intelligence networks to compensate for what tools cannot see inside walled gardens such as WhatsApp.

    On AI, the report urges organisations to expand trials, identify tasks where GenAI should make the first attempt, and reposition employees from pure production roles toward advisory roles that guide AI strategically and improve output quality. The practical message is that AI adoption should be systematic and role-shaping, not ad hoc.

    5. What are the main implications of the report for corporate affairs leaders in 2025?

    The clearest implication is that corporate affairs leaders will need broader mandates and stronger judgement. The function is being asked to interpret political risk, geopolitical change, data ambiguity, misinformation threats and AI-enabled disruption all at once. That means success will depend less on excellence in any single channel and more on the ability to synthesise complex inputs into sound advice for senior leadership.

    A second implication is that old playbooks are becoming less reliable. Traditional media relations, basic social listening and fact-based rebuttal are still relevant, but they are no longer enough on their own. The report suggests that influence now depends on audience-led, channel-agnostic and emotionally intelligent engagement, supported by better frameworks and more diverse intelligence.

    A third implication is organisational: communications teams must evolve structurally, not just tactically. Values need to be operationalised, geopolitical awareness mainstreamed, misinformation preparedness embedded, data practices modernised and AI integrated into workflows. In that sense, the report presents 2025 as a capability-building year. The leaders who thrive will be those who treat communications as a strategic discipline for navigating uncertainty, not simply a function for message delivery.